Table 7 Regional GDP manipulation and livelihood investment —regional favoritism.

From: How does regional GDP manipulation affect livelihood investment?

 

Governor’s inauguration source

Provincial party secretary inauguration source

 

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

GDPDIS

−0.414** (−2.345)

−0.029 (−0.123)

−0.405** (−2.306)

1.177* (−1.741)

LOCAL_sz

−0.122 (−0.434)

−0.12 (−0.430)

  

GDPDIS*LOCAL_sz

 

−0.726** (−2.352)

  

LOCAL_sj

  

−0.756* (−1.885)

−0.502 (−1.218)

GDPDIS*LOCAL_sj

   

−1.676** (−2.423)

Control variables

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Constant

39.641*** (4.633)

35.404*** (4.071)

41.753*** (4.871)

41.073*** (4.819)

Province FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R2-within

0.816

0.818

0.817

0.82

N

450

450

450

450

  1. This table presents the cross-sectional regression results with sub-samples divided by regional favoritism. Columns (1) and (2) focus on whether the governors hold office in their birthplace while columns (3) and (4) focus on whether the secretary holds office in their birthplace. *, ** and *** indicate the level of statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. All variable definitions are detailed in Table 1.
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