Table 2 Variable and parameter symbol descriptions.
From: Fiscal centralization versus decentralization of transport infrastructure operation and maintenance
Variables | Descriptions |
|---|---|
\(x\) | The probability that the central government adopts “centralization”, \(0\le x\le 1\) |
\(y\) | The probability that local government A adopts “positive operation”, \(0\le y\le 1\) |
\(z\) | The probability that local government B adopts “positive operation”, \(0\le z\le 1\) |
Parameters | Descriptions |
\({C}_{1}\) | Information costs for the central government, \({C}_{1}\ge 0\) |
\({C}_{3}\) | Opportunity costs of the central government, \({C}_{3}\ge 0\) |
\({T}_{{rA}},\,{T}_{{rB}}\) | Incentives for local governments A (B) choosing “positive operation”, \({T}_{{rA}},\,{T}_{{rB}}\ge 0\) |
\({F}_{A},\,{F}_{B}\) | Penalties for local government A (B) choosing “negative operation”, \({F}_{A},\,{F}_{B}\ge 0\) |
\({C}_{2A},\,{C}_{2B}\) | Direct costs of local government A (B) choosing “positive operation”, \({C}_{2A},\,{C}_{2B}\ge 0\) |
\({E}_{A},\,{E}_{B}\) | Effort level of local government A (B) choosing “positive operation”, \({E}_{2A},\,{E}_{2B}\ge 0\) |
\({C}_{3A},\,{C}_{3B}\) | Opportunity costs of local government A (B) choosing “positive operation”, \({C}_{3A},\,{C}_{3B}\ge 0\) |
\({R}_{A},\,{R}_{B}\) | Global benefits when local government A (B) chooses “positive operation”, \({R}_{A},\,{R}_{B}\ge 0\) |
\({Q}_{A},\,{Q}_{B}\) | Losses when local government A (B) chooses “negative operation”, \({Q}_{A},\,{Q}_{B}\ge 0\) |
\(\theta\) | Regulatory efforts of the central government, \(0\le \theta \le 1\) |
\(\alpha\), \(\beta\) | Incentive coefficient of the central government for local government A (B), \(0\le \alpha ,\beta \le 1\) |
\(\gamma\), \(\delta\) | Penalty coefficient of the central government for local government A (B), \(0\le \gamma ,\delta \le 1\) |
\(\sigma ,\,\tau\) | The ratio of local benefits to global benefits of local government A (B), \(0\le \sigma ,\,\tau \le 1\) |
\(\varphi ,\,\omega\) | Influence coefficient of local government A (B) on the benefits of local government B(A), \(0\le \varphi \left(\omega \right)\le 1\) |
\({\mu }_{A},\,{\mu }_{B}\) | Effort coefficient of local government A (B) for operation and maintenance, \(0\le {\mu }_{2A},\,{\mu }_{2B}\le 1\) |
\(\varepsilon ,\,\nu\) | Benefit coefficient of local government A (B) choosing “negative operation”, \(0\le \varepsilon ,\,\nu \le 1\) |
\(a,{b}\) | The ratio of capital and labor transferred between local governments, \(0\le a,{b}\le 1\) |
