Table 6 Heterogeneity analysis of environmental regulation.
From: Earnings pressure and firm value: the shifting moderating effect of corporate social responsibility
2010-2012 | 2010-2013 | 2010-2014 | 2010-2015 | 2010-2016 | 2010-2017 | 2010-2018 | 2010-2019 | 2010-2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | |
Panel A: High environmental regulation | |||||||||
P_Epre×CSR | −0.035 (−1.56) | −0.007 (−0.41) | 0.008 (0.52) | 0.001 (0.03) | 0.002 (0.14) | −0.001 (−0.02) | 0.016* (1.73) | 0.018** (2.09) | 0.013 (1.62) |
P_Epre | 1.214* (1.95) | 0.220 (0.52) | −0.028 (−0.07) | −0.114 (−0.37) | −0.218 (−0.87) | −0.237 (−1.04) | −0.669*** (-3.23) | −0.807*** (-4.36) | −0.742*** (-4.29) |
CSR | 0.009 (0.53) | 0.000 (0.02) | 0.008 (0.87) | 0.009 (1.30) | 0.005 (0.79) | 0.008 (1.58) | 0.011** (2.14) | 0.011** (2.31) | 0.011** (2.50) |
Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Year FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Firm FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Obs. | 2373 | 3198 | 4014 | 5048 | 6308 | 7289 | 8593 | 9707 | 10716 |
Adj_R2 | 0.043 | 0.023 | 0.021 | 0.016 | 0.015 | 0.019 | 0.019 | 0.019 | 0.018 |
Panel B: Low environmental regulation | |||||||||
2010-2012 | 2010-2013 | 2010-2014 | 2010-2015 | 2010-2016 | 2010-2017 | 2010-2018 | 2010-2019 | 2010-2020 | |
CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | CAR[−1,1] | |
P_Epre×CSR | −0.032 (−1.04) | −0.009 (−0.47) | 0.007 (0.50) | 0.005 (0.37) | 0.005 (0.43) | 0.007 (0.62) | 0.022** (2.24) | 0.033*** (3.45) | 0.027*** (2.82) |
P_Epre | −0.032 (−1.04) | −0.009 (−0.47) | 0.007 (0.50) | 0.005 (0.37) | 0.005 (0.43) | 0.007 (0.62) | 0.022** (2.24) | 0.033*** (3.45) | 0.027*** (2.82) |
CSR | −0.032 (−1.04) | −0.009 (−0.47) | 0.007 (0.50) | 0.005 (0.37) | 0.005 (0.43) | 0.007 (0.62) | 0.022** (2.24) | 0.033*** (3.45) | 0.027*** (2.82) |
Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Year FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Firm FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Obs. | 2093 | 2936 | 3743 | 4481 | 5159 | 6170 | 7080 | 8060 | 8925 |
Adj_R2 | 0.038 | 0.022 | 0.020 | 0.013 | 0.011 | 0.024 | 0.020 | 0.019 | 0.017 |