Introduction

Over the past decade, climate extremes and associated weather events have impacted crop production and food security in the Asia-Pacific Region, which comprises half the global population1,2. In the future, the extent, frequency, and magnitude of such climatic extreme events are expected to intensify globally3, compounded by human-induced factors such as war and the over-use of fertilisers, pesticides, and other agricultural chemicals. Unfortunately, climate change and human-induced impacts are likely to further undermine food security in the Asia-Pacific region4,5 by reducing agricultural production, arable land availability, and trade and food prices6. Without significant intervention, projections indicate production of major crop yields could fall by 17% globally by 2050s7.

Safeguarding future food security requires sustaining crop productivity through climatic extremes by means of effective adaptation options and farmer-led, resilient practices for heat stress and water shortages. To achieve these, the Asia-Pacific Region must leverage accurate climate models and secure significant funding to modernise irrigation and flood defences. These practices will enable the implementation of targeted adaptation measures that mitigate the interannual yield variability of major crops like rice, wheat, maize, and soybean.

The promotion of smart agriculture, including biotechnology for drought-resistant crops and enhanced climate warning systems, remains a vital goal. Nevertheless, significant practical limitations persist. This was tragically illustrated when extreme flooding in Pakistan (2021) and North China (2023) exceeded the design capacity of flood protection infrastructure, demonstrating that technological advances alone cannot always counter unprecedented climate extreme events3,8.

Food security is jeopardised by import dependencies on countries facing their own climate threats. A stark example is China’s heavy reliance on Brazilian soybeans. China currently imports more than 40% of soybeans from Brazil4 and also relies heavily on dairy imports from New Zealand to feed its 1.4 billion people3,9,10. The strong connection between climate disruptions in exporting countries and food security in importing nations was illustrated by the April 2023 flooding in the southern Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul. The event damaged more than 25% of Brazilian soybean crops, causing 2.71 million tons of crop losses, and 3,711 farmers were affected11, with an immediate and significant impact on global soybean trade12.

The Asia-Pacific (AP) region is defined here as the 21 APEC economies because APEC is the primary forum for facilitating economic cooperation across the AP region. Although the APEC does not include every Asian country with a Pacific coastline, it comprises the majority of nations whose collective interactions dominate the regions’ economic affairs. We examine the effects and impacts of extreme climate events in the past decade on food security in the AP region. We recommend and discuss four foci for the development of solutions: (i) Taking action on climate adaptation; (ii) Coordinated, rules-based regional food-aid mechanisms; (iii) Protecting domestic production and conserving soils, and (iv) Advancing zero-carbon farming practices.

Overview of recent extreme events on crop yields in the AP region

Global climate change is amplifying the intensity and frequency of climatic extremes, including droughts, floods, and heatwaves. These events have diminished the yields of key cereal crops by approximately 9–10%, signalling a significant risk to agricultural production and food systems13. Across the AP region, heatwaves and extreme precipitation events are intensifying, while droughts in semi-arid and arid areas are growing more severe14,15.

Precipitation is increasing in already wet areas, leading to an increase in population deaths, ecological damage, reduced agricultural yields, and socio-economic losses11,16. These compounding changes have resulted in major crop damage throughout the AP region. Climatic extreme events have resulted in heavily damaged major food production for key producers, such as China, India, Australia, and New Zealand (see Fig. 1). From 1980 to 2015, flash drought frequency in China and India surpassed 15%, causing severe losses to staple cereals, including rice, wheat, and maize. For example, India imported 3 to 5 million tons of wheat to guard food security in July 2024 due to crop losses from drought and extreme heat17 (see Supplementary Table 1).

Fig. 1: Major climatic extreme events, including droughts, floods, extreme rainfall, cyclones and wildfires, that led to food security issues in Asia-Pacific countries during the last 5 years.
figure 1

Data in Fig. 1 is collated from: Global Disaster Data Platform (Access dates 28-30 October 2024). Authors to ensure image licensing and attribution conform to the journals’ policies.

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Climatic extremes - Heatwaves and droughts

India and China, two major Global South food production countries, have suffered from extreme heat this decade. For example, the temperature exceeded 45 °C on 18-20 May 2024 in New Delhi, Kanpur and Varanasi, with daily high temperatures reaching 6 °C above average in places18,19. The extremely high temperatures in India between March and June 2024 resulted in 110 casualties with heat stroke, and tens of millions more lacked running water to drink20. This event caused major crop damage due to the sudden occurrence of the flash drought, with a lack of water for irrigating farmland. Crops faced a sudden reduction of soil-water content with inadequate water capacity to meet atmospheric evaporative demand, causing evaporative stress in plants, leading to wilting and, ultimately, plant death11. Wheat crops dropped by more than 500 kg per hectare in Kerala (southwestern coastal state of India), reducing the production yields during and immediately after the flash drought21. Flash droughts caused by heatwaves are projected to significantly impact the rural population and agricultural production in India in the future, with affected regions including the main food-producing bases16.

In China, a summer heatwave in 2022 recorded 35–40 °C average temperatures for more than 60 days in major crop-producing regions along the Yangtze River, with a resultant 20% drop in the yield of major crops (e.g. rice, maize, barley, soybean and corn) according to the Chinese National Agricultural Authority3.

Droughts and heatwaves also increase the likelihood and extent of wildfires, with implications for cropland. For example, drought conditions promoted the large-scale wildfires in Australia from September 2019 to March 2020, burning extensively for 6 months and damaging more than 2.5 million hectares of croplands in Southeast Australia with an estimated cost of over AUD 5 billion (eqv to USD 3.25 billion) (at 2020s rate)22.

Floods

Intense humid heatwaves in Asia can bring heavy rainfall because of the Asian Monsoon Climate, where heavy, low-pressure rain belts become trapped in the foothills of the Himalayan mountain ranges during the summer season (e.g., in May to September). Extreme rainfall also occurs due to the El Niño, which causes intense East Asian summer monsoonal rainstorms to occur frequently23. Extreme rainfall events can result in floods and subsequent waterlogging, impacting around 27% of global cultivated lands annually24.

Heavy rainstorms in July 2023 in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and North East China, caused by a low-pressure rain-belt generated by Typhoon Doksuri3, damaged between 4 and 5 million tons of maize, accounting for 2% of China’s annual maize production. It also significantly reduced paddy rice production in Wuchang (Northeast China), which is the major rice production area in China24.

Across the Himalaya Mountain range, intensive rainstorms often occur in North and Central India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (including coastal lowland flood-prone areas). Climate-enhanced rainfall can lead to extreme flooding in the major river catchments in these countries (e.g., Indus River)25. These heavy rainstorms can also lead to rapid ice melt in the Himalayas, triggering flash flooding with severe impacts. The 2022 Pakistan flood on 6-8 August followed an intensive downpour (over 390 mm/24 hr) that impacted 32 million people and killed more than 1200 people, costing over USD 30 billion in economic losses26. This flood damaged over 1.7 million hectares of crops and killed over 800,000 livestock across Punjab, Balochistan and the North-Western part of Sindh and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that the flood damaged about 60% of Pakistan’s crops (approximately 10.5 million tons of wheat, rice and sugarcane)27.

Bangladesh suffered severe flooding during August 2024; the South Asia monsoon climate was supplemented by the tropical cyclone Remal, which caused 322 mm of rainfall in 24 hr on 16th August 2024, inundating nearly 2 million ha of croplands (e.g., paddy rice)28.

In Australia and New Zealand (NZ), cyclone Gabrielle brought intense rainstorms delivering over 280 mm of rain in 24 hours on 27th January 2023 in the North Island of NZ29. Cyclone Gabrielle was one of the costliest disasters in NZ’s recent history, with private insurers reporting claims exceeding 1.7 billion NZD (equivalent USD 1.012 billion)30. Agricultural exports from NZ were significantly affected by this event, with a 70% reduction in NZ’s apple exports and a 20-30% reduction in pear exports in 2023 due to damage to c.25% of orchards. These major export products are all produced in the North Island of NZ, particularly Hawke’s Bay and Tairāwhiti regions. The cyclone also led to a 1% drop in NZ dairy production, a key export market for NZ, costing around 130 million NZD (equivalent USD 76.9 million) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade)31.

Implications and Foresights

Biophysical impacts – Crop physiology and livestock under heat stress and floods

Heatwaves reduce yields of both crops and livestock3. Extreme heat and high temperatures can lead to a significant failure of crops because of increased evaporation of water from soil and associated declines in soil moisture necessary for healthy growth2,32. Extreme heat can also cause plant wilt due to evaporative stress, which can lead to crop failure associated with a cessation of photosynthesis and eventually to plant death7. In livestock, heat stress leads to reduced appetite, reduced productivity, adverse effects on the immune system, reduced milk production and feed intake, and even death by heatstroke33.

Floods can damage crops through submergence of the vegetation (crops, roots and seeds) and erosion of topsoil, causing damage or erosion of plants. In once-per-100-yr extreme floods, crop yield is estimated to decrease by 37–68% for RCP8.5 and 46–62% for RCP2.6, with equivalent agricultural price increases of 90–230% and 115–200%, respectively (the ranges show the levels with and without CO2 fertilisation), when compared to a baseline scenario with no climate change in the 2050 s1.

Socioeconomic implications under heat stress and floods

In the AP region, extreme climate events can cause food insecurity, with the potential to drive millions into poverty (particularly farmers), cause large-scale unemployment, negatively impact human health and increase hunger1,3,34. The Indian Government (Ministry of Earth Sciences and Meteorological Department) projected that heat-waves in India will reduce wheat production by 4.5% on average until the 2050s, but in north-western and central India, the losses could be up to 15%. Future heatwaves in India, projected using 13 CMIP5 and 12 CMIP6 models by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate (IPCC) Working Group16, suggest that the Southern, Northeast and Western parts of the country will be continuously affected by heat-waves in the 2060s35.

Climate extremes may also cause conflict when addressing competing pressures for limited resources. For example, heatwaves will exacerbate drought and water scarcity, causing an increased demand for water to irrigate agricultural land, leading to further stress on limited water supplies and potentially leading to conflict between farmers and other water users14. Increasing temperature may attract pest infestations due to boosting the metabolism rate of the pests, potentially further reducing crop yields; however, over-reliance on pesticides can enhance other food security issues related to toxicity and negative health issues associated with chemicals4.

High-magnitude flood events are difficult to predict, prevent, protect against, and recover from. The frequency and magnitude of flooding have increased in the AP region and globally during the last decade36,37. Urgent action is needed to identify priority areas where protection from compound climate hazards is needed to enhance resiliency of the socio-economic and agricultural systems through adoption of climate-adaptation policies and sustainable agricultural practices38.

Future challenges to food security

China and India are now experiencing challenging uncertainty in food security due to climate change, coupled with less capacity to supplement/support domestic crop yields2, leading to increasing food prices7,9. Food consumption is also projected to increase rapidly for both countries, and others in the AP region from the 2020 s to 2050s1,5 (See Supplementary Table 1).

China is currently heavily relying on overseas food imports of major crops, including from other nations that are concurrently suffering increased climatic extremes. For example, China imported over 90Mt of soybeans (42% from Brazil, worth USD 12.56 billion)39 and 20.6 Mt of corn (14.8% of the global total) imported from Brazil (USD 4 billion) and Myanmar (USD 130.2 Million)40 China is the largest importer of rice globally; 6.19 Mt of rice were imported in 2023, 38.6% from Vietnam (USD 543.2 million), 21.2% from Thailand (USD 298.4 million) and 16% from Myanmar (USD 224.8 million)41. China also imported over 40% of its dairy products (e.g. milk, beef, butter, lamb and lamb products) from NZ in 2022, which is projected to 50% by the 2050s3.

Whilst food imports can mitigate against in-country food shortages, a reliance on external imports of major foods creates insecurity in the food supply due to the potential for major food importers to suffer yield declines associated with climate change or other unforeseen circumstances (e.g., war). For example, floods in Thailand and Vietnam (see Fig. 1) could affect the import of rice into China, with implications for the price of food. Similar issues exist for the import of dairy products from NZ after recent flooding, as implied by the Ministry of Trade of NZ31 Soybean imports to China from Brazil in 2025 have been significantly affected by the flooding in southern Brazil, which destroyed 2.71 million tons of soybeans (approximately 15% of the annual national production)42.

In the AP region, China and other countries that rely on food imports (e.g., Japan, Singapore) are facing a bottleneck in food security challenges due to climate factors, and augmented by other human-induced factors (e.g., the Ukraine-Russia War, trade negotiations, tariffs). This creates a major challenge to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), such as SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) and 13 (Climate Change), and stabilising the domestic food supply and food prices at a sustainable and reasonable level3,4.

Four foci for future adaptation

Urgent action is needed to provide and sustain food security across the AP region. To achieve this goal, we suggest that governments across the AP region require long-term climate action and adaptation plans to improve current transboundary co-production of, and collaboration on, climate adaptation strategies to deliver more resilient and sustainable agricultural practices. Four key foci of such strategies are detailed below.

I. Taking action on climate adaptations

Data-sharing mechanisms

Effective adaptation to climatic extremes depends on accurate, timely data for predicting events and managing infrastructure. Therefore, a critical short-term priority for AP authorities is to enhance the transparent and informative data-sharing mechanism of meteorological information. Improved warnings for events like storms, heatwaves, and monsoons would enable governments, farmers, and communities to prepare and respond more effectively. For example, cost-effective measures such as the provision of sandbags to protect crops and infrastructure from flooding can significantly reduce damage, but are predicated on accurate and timely warnings to provide adequate preparation and deployment time.

To build large-scale resilience, government departments must provide farmers (and other citizens) with timely, actionable warnings for major climate hazards. This should be paired with regional support for advanced agricultural technologies. Specifically, integrating diverse data streams into AI-powered models can provide local decision-makers with the foresight needed to protect food production and livelihoods from projected short- to medium-term extremes43.

Well-prepared practices

Preparation for climate extremes is multi-faceted, ranging from infrastructure development that is resilient to, or protects people from, hazardous weather to educational programmes to increase individual resilience when hazardous weather occurs.

A key challenge in climate adaptation is that infrastructure designed to mitigate one hazard can inadvertently exacerbate another. For instance, expanding field drainage and river channels to alleviate local flooding by rapidly diverting water downstream can increase drought risk upstream and amplify flood peaks further downstream. As such, in some region’s drainage infrastructure is being blocked or removed, and rivers are actively reconnected to floodplains, to reduce drainage efficiency, holding more water in the landscape to mitigate against drought and attenuating flood water, reducing downstream risk44. Considering the consequences of infrastructure holistically across catchments in uncertain futures is essential for sustainable and successful systems.

Infrastructure also requires maintenance to operate effectively. For example, blockage of channels or sedimentation can reduce channel or pipe capacities for conveying flood waters; however, the cost of maintenance is not always suitably considered and can be neglected relative to other financial pressures45. Therefore, well-prepared practices will require governments, institutions, and individuals to prepare for hazards that may not have been experienced in that region, creating educational challenges. To prepare, it will also require accurate and timely warning systems44.

Using nature-based solutions

Given these challenges, infrastructure development should focus on sustainable practices and leveraging the advantages of nature-based solutions46, which can offer resilience against multiple hazards. Nature-based solutions can also alleviate pressure on existing and new “grey”, engineering-based infrastructure (e.g., dams, fluvial floodwalls) by storing water upstream, increasing the magnitude of events the infrastructure protects against, as well as its operational life span.

To maximise the benefits of water management strategies, a catchment-scale understanding is essential. This involves identifying optimal zones for water storage and efficient conveyance to enhance overall societal resilience. Such an approach ensures that infrastructure development, such as flood walls, dams, and smart irrigation systems, reaches optimised levels and benefits downstream communities without creating adverse impacts during the same or subsequent events. While grey infrastructure will remain necessary for large-scale climatic hazards, its effectiveness is entirely dependent on strategic spatial placement and integration within a holistic catchment plan47.

Identification of stakeholders for effective operation

Effective implementation requires proactively engaging key stakeholders, including local farmers and climate-vulnerable communities, and clearly defining roles and responsibilities. A cornerstone of this effort is targeted education to build understanding of and support for adaptation strategies with an identified timeline, which often demand early investment for long-term protection. This communication should also foster stronger collaboration between farming communities and government bodies at both local and catchment-wide levels, such as agricultural and meteorological departments. Long-term land-use planning is required to co-produce climate-resilient agricultural plans that ensure the delivery of sustainable practices.

Implementation would involve distinct, location-specific practices. For instance, promoting reduced tillage can mitigate topsoil erosion from intense rainfall and farmers in upper catchments might need to adopt water storage strategies, while those downstream focus on efficient drainage. Because allocating different responsibilities across a catchment can be contentious, these plans must be operated through an effective stakeholder engagement to mitigate conflict and build good governance with farmers and communities.

43II. Coordinated, rules-based regional food-aid mechanisms

Beneficial food trade considering culture and belonging

Many of the world’s top food-importing countries are in the AP region, including China, Japan, and South Korea. However, the region’s role is dualistic; several of these nations are also major global exporters of key commodities, such as dairy products from Australia and NZ, and rice from Thailand and Vietnam48. Cultural, religious, and dietary factors have enabled India and Pakistan to be largely self-sufficient in major crop production, even with their vast populations. Pakistan’s status is further strengthened by its role as a net exporter of dairy, including fresh milk and cheese, as its population does not have a high demand for these products.

Food storage for climate extremes

In light of future volatile trade patterns, AP governments must bolster strategic food reserves and strengthen mechanisms for international food aid to prepare for climatic extremes. Given the global interdependence of food systems, regional cooperation is essential to prevent the economic and security shocks that would follow a climate-related disruption, such as flooding in Brazil, leading to reduced soybean exports. Strategic reserves are crucial for mitigating short-term availability fluctuations, although their capacity is likely to be overwhelmed by the increasing duration and magnitude of future climate events. Therefore, the AP countries must pursue to secure food production and supply chains collectively. This should be formalised through good collaborative partnerships and treaties designed to ensure regional food stability.

Cross-boundary food sharing system

The ASEAN food security agreement and the proposed APEC Climate-Resilient Food Storage initiative provide a vital foundation for safeguarding crop yields and stabilizing food costs49. The effectiveness of these schemes can be significantly enhanced through co-partnerships with transboundary and international bodies like the FAO and UNEP, as well as NGOs such as Oxfam and World Vision, to boost public engagement and improve food security governance.

Promoting climate-resilient agriculture

The FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific is already a key driver of climate-resilient agriculture, promoting climate-smart farming through regional cooperation to build resilience, enhance productivity, and reduce carbon emissions. Supported by the FAO Green Climate Fund, successful projects are underway that include climate-resilient fisheries in Cambodia and the Philippines, sustainable rice production in Malaysia and Vietnam, and climate-smart agriculture in Laos and Thailand. These good practices demonstrate the practical benefits of collaborative action50.

Shifting to a climate-friendly dietary

51,52In the longer term, promoting shifts in food consumption will be essential. For instance, China could champion a transition towards more plant-based, cereal-centric diets by reducing reliance on meat and dairy products51. This shift would not only improve national health outcomes but also enhance AP food security and alleviate pressure on global food reserves in the face of future climatic extremes52.

III. Protect domestic production and conserve soils

Food security for 35% of the global population was perturbed by climate change from 1990 to 2018, according to the data from FAOSTAT. To protect home-grown food yields, authorities will need to protect their soil from erosion and degradation53. For example, the crop production powerhouse in Northeast China, associated with the majority of paddy rice, corn, maize, barley and wheat yields, exists because of its treasured fertile soil (i.e., Northeast Black Soil), coupled with a mild and moist summer crop season.

Climatic extremes can cause soil erosion and activities to promote crop yields in the short term, such as widespread pesticide and fertiliser use, can damage yields in the longer term or become unsustainable. As such, we suggest that the Chinese National Government establish long-term conservation protection plans for the Northeast Soil and provide sufficient financial aid and support for the NE Chinese farmers to sustain and conserve their farms and croplands in the long term3. Such a scheme could also be developed in other AP countries to protect agriculturally productive land in the longer term.

IV. Deliver future “Zero-Carbon” agricultural practice

Evidence suggests that the impacts of El Niño, when coupled with projected global climate change, will continue to affect the warming of the West Pacific, leading to more frequent rainstorms, cyclones and heatwaves in the West Pacific and Indian Ocean, and the major food production regions of the AP3,54,55.

Whilst interventions to adapt to these changes are essential in the immediate and longer-term, strategies are needed to reduce the impacts of future climate change by reducing and offsetting carbon emissions. As such, delivering “zero carbon” agricultural practices, such as encouraging the decarbonisation of on-farm energy use (e.g., using renewable energy, improving energy efficiency), conserving carbon in the soil for sequestration practices (e.g. using no tillage practice, encouraging carbon capture); using net-zero fertilisers and pesticides56 and feeding and breeding technologies for reduced enteric methane (e.g. improved livestock feeding and livestock breeding to reduce methane emission, and reduce feed additives), will be important.

In addition, increasing forest areas can aid with net zero targets, but also offer nature-based approaches to flood protection through slowing and storing water in forested headwaters46. A narrow focus of forestry on carbon sequestration could lead to the development of monoculture forest plantations of fast-growing exotic species (for example, eucalyptus in South America); however, native forests offer many mutual benefits beyond those associated with tree plantations57.

Pursuing zero-carbon agricultural practices presents a win-win strategy, potentially generating low-cost carbon credits for AP economies. However, without robust safeguards, a rush for these credits could displace sustainable agriculture and other vital land uses from the local farmers and communities. To prevent this, strategic land-use planning at national, regional, and catchment scales is essential. These plans must optimise practices for both climate resilience and carbon sequestration. This transition requires direct financial and technical support for local farmers to offset the costs of adopting new practices and to compensate for trade-offs, such as income lost from restrictive land-use changes like reforestation. To safeguard financial incomes, support is critical for ensuring equitable implementation, maintaining farmers’ livelihoods, and securing community buy-in, thereby smoothing the path toward a sustainable and resilient future.

Conclusion

The AP region is critical to global food security, food production and food trade under the rising challenges associated with climatic and non-climatic issues (e.g., Ukraine-Russia War, etc.)58. Whilst India can be self-sufficient in “home-grown food”, China requires significant food imports from other countries due to differences in climate, environment and socio-economic factors.

Many other AP countries are major food exporters, but also rely on imports of particular food items. As such, co-operation between nations will be essential for delivering food security in a future of much frequent and greater magnitude climatic extremes, plus human-induced factors such as growing populations and food demands. We identify four adaptation practices that the AP region should undertake, which together represent a collaborative partnership between stakeholders to co-produce and co-deliver sustainable long-term solutions to climate risks to the agricultural sector. These are rooted in the use of advanced, technologically-innovative approaches and transparent data sharing in the AP region and globally, supported by the transboundary frameworks.

Long-term, AP countries should consider promoting more resilient food dietary changes. For example, shifting the diet to be a healthier and climate-resilient diet to adaptively reduce the potential risk of food security from climatic extremes59; for example, practices that include encouraging the reduction in food calorie consumption2,5,6. In the short term, we urge governments to embrace, protect and conserve precious arable land through climate-adaptation strategies and via global, regional and national legislation/legislative amendments, ensuring sustainable agriculture to guard future food security for over 4 billion people in the AP region.