The Global Stocktake and NDC procrastination

As dust settles after the 30th Conference of the Parties (COP30) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Belém, Brazil, experts, policymakers, and observers around the world are trying to make sense of its numerous, but often complex, outcomes. The most important question is whether the Paris Agreement’s target of keeping the global mean temperature rise to below 1.5 degrees Celsius is still within reach. Answering this question requires an analysis of the pledged emissions reductions made by all the Parties to the UNFCCC. There is, however, an important problem with current pledges: we are still missing many, and most of those that we already have arrived late.

The Paris Agreement relies on recurring cycles of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to drive ambition through a cyclical, five-year mechanism involving climate policy pledges and joint reviews. After the first such review, the Global Stocktake in 2023, countries were expected to update their NDCs by February 20251,2. However, initial compliance was minimal: only 16 Parties met this deadline, and even after an extended cutoff in September, just 64 submissions were logged, representing about 30% of global emissions3.

As Fig. 1 shows, the number of submissions increased in the run-up to the COP in Belém, which the Brazilian Presidency framed as the “NDC COP”, potentially adding to the confusion. However, most submissions happened before the conference itself, around the Global Climate Leaders’ summit on 6–7 November, and of the 42 pledges recorded during that time, 28 are in fact the same pledge, made by the European Union and its 27 members (all Parties to the UNFCCC). A further 26 pledges were submitted during and after the COP (not visualized in Fig. 1), with the most recent ones registered in January and February 2026. These include major economies, such as Mexico, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia.

Fig. 1
Fig. 1
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New NDC Submissions in 2025: aggregate number and breakdown per month (Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on UNFCCC National Determined Contribution Registry).

International vs domestic drivers of delay

This widespread delay raises critical questions about the resilience of the Paris Agreement’s governance model. After all, if the Parties are ignoring the most basic level of procedural compliance, will they be willing to ratchet up their ambition to jointly achieve the intensity of climate action needed to keep the global average temperature rise below 1.5 or even 2 °C? What does this degree of procedural non-compliance mean for a regime which rests on ‘obligations of conduct’ as much or even more than on ‘obligations of result’?4,5.

While such questions are warranted, we argue that these delays may reflect efforts to align pledges with domestic policy and improve credibility rather than a simple lack of ambition. In this we are drawing on an analysis of the Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance Committee reports, fieldwork at the SB62 in Bonn, and 23 country case studies. The case studies include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, EU, Gambia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, USA, and Vietnam. The dataset emerged as part of the ‘Pulling Power of Paris’ project, and draws on reports prepared by country experts, covering NDC development as well as domestic climate politics. Cases were selected based on a matrix of high/low climate ambition (as assessed by the Climate Action Tracker) and increased/not-increased ambition of NDCs in the 2020-2022 period (for many parties, that means their second or updated NDCs). Case selection also considered broad geographical coverage and the inclusion of both fossil fuel exporters and importers.

The posture of the United States and the broader geopolitical turbulence in 2024–2025 have amplified uncertainty around the Paris Agreement’s credibility. While the U.S. submitted its post-GST NDC ahead of the February deadline, the inauguration of the Trump II administration marked a dramatic reversal. Its decision to withdraw from the Agreement once again sent shockwaves through global climate diplomacy, undermining trust in multilateral commitments and emboldening actors resistant to climate action.

Combined with the war in Ukraine and rising anti-multilateralist sentiment, these developments have created a climate of instability that, according to some observers, discourages timely NDC submissions. The dominant interpretation of NDC procrastination was that many governments were waiting for clarity on the future of collective action before committing to ambitious pledges.

Four clusters of factors behind postponement

However, the timing of the USA’s withdrawal, shortly before the February 2025 deadline, does not explain broad non-compliance across the UNFCCC. Nationally Determined Contributions are influenced by the international environment, but they are also the outcomes of long domestic procedures and political processes6,7,8.

We can identify four clusters of factors behind delayed submissions. First, financial and institutional constraints persist, as enhanced standards under the Katowice Rulebook require whole-of-government coordination and robust data systems. Second, technical hurdles – such as incomplete inventories and recalibration when baselines shift – delay credible target-setting. Third, domestic political dynamics, including elections, coalition changes, and ‘green backlash,’9 disrupt timelines. Finally, procedural and strategic considerations, from ‘summit theatre,’10 where Parties are likely to look for the biggest possible stage to present their international pledges, encourage postponement for tactical or performative reasons. Additionally, ambiguous signals from the UNFCCC Secretariat, which, faced with apparent delays in NDC submissions in early 2025, did not insist on meeting the formal deadline but instead offered a new one in September (see Fig. 1), contributed to procedural uncertainty.

Implications for the Paris Agreement and the path forward

Although the slow pace of submissions is troubling, it is also clear from both our data and from the already submitted NDCs that governments are investing more effort in aligning pledges with domestic policy frameworks. NDCs are not symbolic – they carry weight in international negotiations and domestic politics8. Their performative dimension underscores their significance: states want the right stage to announce commitments because this matters for their status and their international role, as well as for their domestic legitimacy. Delays nonetheless weaken the Paris Agreement’s core ratcheting mechanism and risk eroding trust among Parties. To prevent this, systemic barriers must be tackled directly. A major question is whether, for the sake of the Paris ambition mechanism, headline target pledges (the ‘whats’) should not be procedurally separated from more complex policy and implementation outlines following the Katowice Rulebook (the ‘hows’). This would be a major and politically controversial change, and knowing that some NDCs do not have headline mitigation targets – problematic – but it also might help to maintain the Paris momentum.

Because many obstacles related to the detailed and complex NDCs are financial, institutional, technical, and procedural in nature, targeted capacity‑building – with support from the UNFCCC Secretariat, international donors, and platforms such as the NDC Partnership – is essential. The Secretariat should provide clearer and more consistent procedural guidance, but it cannot shoulder this task alone. Strong climate leadership from ambitious Parties is equally critical; in this regard, the European Union’s inability to produce a timely joint pledge in 2025 undermined the process. Whether this round of NDCs ultimately delivers higher ambition and improved quality will only become evident after the COP assessments, which will require robust measures of NDC quality that build on, but also go beyond, the Katowice Rulebook.