Table 2 Payoff Matrix for the three parties.

From: Evolutionary game model and simulation analysis of multi-stakeholder behaviour for promoting Braille labelling on pharmaceutical packaging in China’s legal framework

Pharmaceutical companies

Visually impaired individuals

Regulatory authorities

Proactive regulation \((x)\)

Passive regulation \((1-x)\)

Proactive provision \((y)\)

Purchase drugs with Braille-labelled packaging \((z)\)

\({E}_{g}-\gamma {C}_{f}-\varepsilon {C}_{v1}-{C}_{g},\)

\(-\gamma {C}_{f}-\varepsilon {C}_{v1},\)

\({E}_{f}+\Delta {E}_{f}-\left(1-\gamma \right){C}_{f},\)

\({E}_{f}+\Delta {E}_{f}-\left(1-\gamma \right){C}_{f},\)

\({E}_{v1}-\left(1-\varepsilon \right){C}_{v1}.\)

\({E}_{v1}-\left(1-\varepsilon \right){C}_{v1}-D.\)

Purchase drugs without Braille-labelled packaging \((1-z)\)

\(-\gamma {C}_{f}-{C}_{g}-{R}_{v},\)

\(-\gamma {C}_{f},\)

\(-\left(1-\gamma \right){C}_{f},\)

\(-\left(1-\gamma \right){C}_{f},\)

\({E}_{v2}-{C}_{v2}+{R}_{v}.\)

\({E}_{v2}-{C}_{v2}.\)

Passive provision \((1-y)\)

Purchase drugs with Braille-labelled packaging \((z)\)

\({E}_{g}+F-\varepsilon {C}_{v1}-{C}_{g},\)

\(-\varepsilon {C}_{v1},\)

\({E}_{f}-F,\)

\({E}_{f},\)

\({E}_{v1}-\left(1-\varepsilon \right){C}_{v1}-D.\)

\({E}_{v1}-\left(1-\varepsilon \right){C}_{v1}-D.\)

Purchase drugs without Braille-labelled packaging \((1-z)\)

\(F-{C}_{g}-{R}_{v},\)

\(0,\)

\(-F,\)

\(0,\)

\({E}_{v2}-{C}_{v2}+{R}_{v}.\)

\({E}_{v2}-{C}_{v2}.\)