Introduction

‘Two persons, including a woman, were killed and nine others injured when suspected militants launched a gun-and-bomb attack in Manipur’s Imphal West district on Sunday, police said. Militants fired indiscriminately from [the] hilltop position towards the low-lying valley areas of Koutruk and neighbouring Kadangband…’ (PTI, 2024c, p. 1–2). The news report depicts the necropolitics in North East India (henceforth NEI), where the ethnic communities live under the shadow of fratricidal violence as an everyday phenomenon. This ongoing violence is an extension of the inter-ethnic turmoil that has its inception in the faulty policies imposed by the colonial rulers during their occupation of the region. Like many other regions of NEI, Manipur remains a contested space due to overlapping territorial claims and shifting ethnic identities between the Valley and the Hill. The Meitei community represents the largest ethnic group in Manipur, mainly residing in the valley (Haokip, 2015; Singha, 2017). Conversely, the hill areas are inhabited by 34 recognised tribes constitutionally designated as Scheduled Tribe (ST Hills). The distribution of resources has restricted the Meitei population’s access to the hills (Kipgen and Roy Chowdhury, 2016). According to Thongkholal Haokip, the Meitei population has been demanding ST status to bypass the restrictions. Once granted, it would give the Meitei population access to the land and the resources in the hill areas. Haokip argues that ‘ST status to Meiteis will automatically remove this restriction and, therefore, [they will] be able to acquire lands in the hills with their sheer purchasing power’ (Haokip, 2015, p. 87). He further states that since 80 per cent of the Meiteis follow Hinduism, their claim to ST status for following animism is ‘misleading’ (Haokip, 2015, p. 86). Therefore, to oppose the demand of the Meitei community, a Tribal Solidarity March was organised by the All-Tribal Students Union of Manipur on May 3, 2023, after Manipur High Court recommended the proposal of The Scheduled Tribe Demand Committee Manipur to the centre for consideration (PTI, 2024b). The protest soon turned into a violent conflict between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo groups, leaving 219 dead and rendering more than 60,000 people homeless and displaced within a span of a few months (Dhillon, 2023; Scroll Staff, 2024).Footnote 1 The apparent divide between hill and valley was followed by vitriolic rhetoric classifying the citizens into tribal/nontribal and Hindu/Christian binary. What is more disturbing is the killings, loot, arson, vandalism, and rape incidents that have been perpetrated by one community over the other based on ethnic identities. Quite ironically, the ethnic identities amongst the communities are not pre-determined; instead, they are continuously constructed and reconstructed depending on the power dynamics and hegemonic influences of powerful groups based on religion, language, and ethnic affinities (Singha, 2017). The construction of ethnic identity, therefore, has become the mainstay of politics in NEI, which not only sustains militancy but is also sustained by militancy through a symbiosis. This interplay of power and construction of ethnic identities triggers violence through the agency of militancy, as well as state crackdowns. In the present time, violence has become a way of life in NEI as militancy is a lucrative business that facilitates a parallel economy sustained by entitlements, illegal arms trade, drug trade and resource extraction (Bhattacharyya, 2018; Bhattacharyya et al., 2023; Das, 2008; Dhillon, 2023).

This study unpacks how the construction and reconstruction of ethnic identities of Manipur, coupled with economic and geopolitical factors, sustain such violence driven by necropolitics (Mbembe, 2003) embedded in biopower and biopolitics controlling citizens’ lives (Foucault, 1978/1976: 140–141). In so doing, it will help us understand how sovereignty in the region is enacted as a ‘living death.’ Taking these backdrops, the study foregrounds the research questions: How have ethnonational movements, state policies, and illicit economic activities transformed Manipur into a necropolitical space, and what alternative frameworks could mitigate this conflict? To achieve these questions, this study employs a qualitative analysis of historical contestations relating to ethno-territoriality based on Adam Moore’s ideas on ethno-territoriality and secondary data and literature collected from various archives. The framework of ethno-territoriality shall help explain that economic and political marginalisation perpetuates cycles of violence and resistance in a contested borderland. It is reckoned that the policy adopted by the state and recent incidents of violence in Manipur, this approach will help to triangulate historical analysis, policy review and thematic analysis, thereby addressing three corresponding aspects: origins of ethnonational movements in Manipur; impact of state actions and role of non-state actors; and the role of necropolitics and narco-terrorism in exacerbating violence. It is to be noted that this study has deliberately applied qualitative methodology because it helps to dig deeper layers of the research question under study, uncovering new insights and producing in-depth descriptions rather than mere facts emerging from face value (Creswell, 2009; Das et al., 2020). The study is organised as follows: in the first section, we look at the historical and political circumstances that gave rise to secessionist movements triggered by pseudo-ethnonational constructions. We have discussed the process of how different ethnic identities were constructed and reconstructed either voluntarily or involuntarily as a part of the social process. The second section discusses how these macro-ethno-national movements splintered into micro-ethnonational movements, transforming NEI into a necropolitical space. Here, we argue that at a time when modes of production and the economy have transformed due to colonial modernity, militancy has become a lucrative trade where power and economy remain under the control of non-state actors. Concluding from the two sections, we argue that instead of promoting ethno-territoriality, the state should encourage civic territoriality as an alternative framework.

Genesis of ethnonational consciousness

In 1822, the British established a political presence in NEI by annexing the Garo foothills. Subsequently, in 1826, bypassing the monarchy of the Ahom kingdom, they secured control of Assam through the Treaty of Yandabo following their victory over the Burmese (Bhattacharyya, 2023, 2019; Reghunadhan and K.K., 2023; Hall, 1981). The NEI region witnessed a recurring pattern of similar historical injustices. By the close of the nineteenth century, the British had effectively subjugated every kingdom and independent village within the region. Colonial terms such as ‘Backward Tracts’, ‘Excluded Areas’, and ‘Partially Excluded Areas’ have been used to define the extent of colonial control and subjugation of the geographical space and the people who inhabited those regions (Bhattacharyya, 2019; Singh, 2013; Syiemlieh, 2014). Although a policy of ‘non-regulation’ was adopted in many of the tribal-populated hill areas (Syiemlieh, 2014, p. 3) by redrawing the borders and dividing the region into hill and valley, the administrators undermined the geo-cultural space of the tribes and the people (Kapai, 2020). At first, they divided the hill tracts between British India and British Burma, creating new identities overnight within the clans and tribes. Secondly, when a new area was demarcated for administration, it was named after the predominant tribe, putting the smaller tribes in a disadvantageous position. Colonial ethnography and redrawing of boundaries not only imposed new identities on the people living in coloniser-occupied spaces but also documented those identities into water-tight compartments. The fluid identities and borders suddenly became static, dividing the people from the same clan into different sub-nationalities without their consent. Moreover, as the newly formed territories were brought under colonial administration, the official documents registered the names of the places after the dominant tribe, thereby manufacturing a rigid territory with a rigid ethnic identity. This transformation also changed the relations among the tribes noticeably because the ‘[o]nce ethnicised, colonially constructed categories of people began to claim exclusive ownership of the entire territory and/or some administrative units’ (Piang, 2015, p.160). However, there were no fixed identities before this ethnicisation process, as clan members were free to move from one community to another, depending on their choice. Explicating the various civilising and administrative missions of the British Empire, James C. Scott has explored how the pre-colonial people living in the South Asian highlands evaded state governance and control. While the states were pushing their frontiers, the ‘less governed or virtually autonomous peoples’ (Scott, 2011, p. 4) moved away further into the inaccessible terrains. In due course of time, as the states circumscribed the enclosures in the form of borders, the new socio-economic and administrative realities of the modern nation-states transformed the habitus of the once-mobile tribal communities (Kumar, 2005; Ray, 2019). Scott explains that ‘[s]een from the state centre, this enclosure movement is, in part, an effort to integrate and monetise the people, lands, and resources of the periphery so that they become, to use the French term, rentable—auditable contributors to the gross national product and foreign exchange’ (Scott, 2011, p. 5). Scott’s study of the forms of governance in the highlands underpins the centrality of the economic viability of transforming the frontiers into a taxable and resource-producing hinterland (Bhattacharyya, 2019). Drawing from Scott’s findings, Jangkhomang Guite further shows how the oral histories of the tribal communities foreground their journey of coming from ‘somewhere else’ (Scott, 2011, p. 14) to their present habitat, the Zomia highland (Guite, 2019). Guite’s research opens a new vista of the tribal society by decentring the earlier narratives of the tribal societies as penned down by colonial historians. In sharp contrast to the rigid ethnic identities described in colonial documents, Guite argues that the state-evading people sometimes ‘lived under ‘their’ own ‘kings’, at other times under the ‘kings’ of another ethnicity who decimated their power. It was often under the latter, sometimes also under the former, that they found life miserable and hence their eventual flight to the margins of the state’ (Scott, 2011, p. 14). The society in the highland massif was immensely ‘plural, fluid, and porous’ (Scott, 2011, p. 15) because people of one ethnicity mixed with other ethnicities, taking a new way of life. Therefore, ethnic or racial singularity seems to be a far-fetched idea in a society that has experienced the inter-mixing of people for centuries.

While this was the way of life in the highlands of South Asia, the colonial map-making process and the subsequent formation of the modern nation-states brought these state-evading peoples within the ambit of citizenship and clubbed them together under hegemonic and majoritarian powers. Before India’s independence, the British government planned to create a Crown Colony by integrating the hill tracts of Burma and India and putting it under British rule (Syiemlieh, 2014). Syiemlieh writes that the British officers planned to create a crown colony that would include ‘entire hill fringe from the Lakher land in the south of the Lushai hills in a crescent shape to the hills of present-day Arunachal Pradesh. Included in this concept would be the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the areas inhabited by the Nagas, the Chins and the Shans States of Burma, the Khasi states and Manipur. A footnote mentions the possibility of including Sikkim, in the proposed Agency’ (Syiemlieh, 2014, p. 8). Whereas Colonial administrators did not want to see ‘Mongolian areas’ to be included in India (Syiemlieh, 2014, p. 10), several tribal leaders expressed their interest in being included in the province of Assam and staying with India (Syiemlieh, 2014, p. 12). Therefore, the British agenda to create a Crown Colony did not materialise and met with severe opposition from the tribal leaders of NEI (Bhattacharyya, 2019; Bhattacharyya et al., 2023; Bhattacharyya and Pulla, 2020a, b). However, the fissure created by the administrative policies to isolate the hill people from the plain forever changed the inter-ethnic relationship not only in Manipur but also almost among the entire NEI (Bhattacharyya, 2019; Bhattacharyya et al., 2023; Bhattacharyya and Pulla, 2020a, b; Sarin, 1982). As frontiers transformed into fixed borders, the bordering areas became highly disputed at times between two countries and at other times between communities (Ningthouja, 2021) and between states of NEI, thus transforming these border spaces into ‘sensitive spaces’ (Dunn and Cons, 2014; Cons, 2016). Eric Hobsbawm used the term inheritance (Hobsbawm, 1997) to describe postcolonial spaces incorporated during colonial occupation and retained by the newly formed nation-states. According to Ningthouja (2021), ‘[a]lthough the postcolonial states supposedly enjoy the monopoly of such ‘inheritance’ (the boundaries), it remains a contested terrain when peoples who actually inhabit the border areas assert to defend what they considered as theirs’ (Ningthouja, 2021, p. 377).

The formation of present-day Manipur exposes these fault lines of the colonial map-making process and its inheritance. Manipur’s merger into the Indian Union on 21 September 1949, after India gained independence from the British occupation, has been considered a problematic episode primarily because of its inclusion as a Part C state through coercive means, according to some scholars (Hanjabam, 2008). On the other hand, scholars like Rani Pathak Das argue that the delay in granting full statehood to Manipur had been the cause of the conflict between the ethnic community and the Indian state (Das, 2008; Verghese, 1997). Moreover, resource extraction from NEI without undertaking any development work in the region has alienated the communities as they have seen India’s relation with NEI as an internal colonisation (Bhattacharyya, 2018, 2019; Sarmah, 2016). Poor infrastructure, lack of motorable roads, high price of commodities, lack of medical and educational institutions, porous borders, unabated immigration, corrupt bureaucracy and many more such factors have festered the wound further. Kunal Mukherjee (2014) writes, ‘[n]ot only has New Delhi failed to look into regional problems in terms of infrastructure development, but over the years, it has exploited or at least tried to exploit regional resources to suit the needs of people living in the Indian heartland region or India proper’ (p. 151). Apart from the centre’s callous approach towards NEI (Barpujari, 1998; Bhattacharyya, 2018, 2019), internal linguistic hegemony in the region has also created counter-hegemonic forces to resist the hegemonic influence of Bengali and Assamese languages (Misra, 2000; Biswas, 2024; Borah and Bhuyan, 2024). Consequently, the Government of India (henceforth GOI) started setting precedence by granting either autonomous councils or statehood to the communities based on ethnic identities. However, as these identities are more of a political construction (Mohapatra, 2016), sub-nationalism often splinters into micro-ethnic-nationalism. According to Sarmah (2016), the popular strategy used by ethnic leaders is to construct ‘identity based political consciousness by interpreting and reinterpreting [the] history of each ethnic group to provide a distinct identity’ (p. 16). As a result, most ethnic communities have militia groups that are involved in fratricidal killings and anti-state activities, making the NEI a necropolitical zone that mars all possibilities of creating a ‘political space for the plausible democratic movements based on political mobilisation across ethnic boundaries’ (Sarmah, 2016, 16). Whereas political scientists like Subir Bhowmik and Sanjib Baruah define India’s northeast as a troubled periphery (Bhaumik, 2009) or a borderland (Baruah, 2005) infested with violence due to state failure; in reality, transborder terrorism, ethnic mobility, and solidarity among ethnic militia across national borders in the imagined Zomia land can be seen facilitating the creation of new necropolitical space sustaining aleatory sovereignty (Dunn and Cons, 2014) that is more of a centre than a periphery and home to ‘absolute power of the negative’ (Mbembe, 2003: 12). ‘Necro’ is a Greek word meaning ‘corpse’. Thus, while Foucault’s biopolitics regulates and controls populations via the usage of biopower, necropolitics is an ‘add-on’ to the ingredients of biopower, focussing on the power to control over death and dead bodies often through coercive violence, destruction and exclusion. In necropolitics, ‘sovereignty means the capacity to define who matters and who does not, who is disposable and who is not’ (Mbembe, 2003: 27). Indeed, ‘under [the] conditions of necropower, the lines between resistance and suicide, sacrifice and redemption, martyrdom and freedom are blurred (Mbembe, 2003: 40), arguably, making the space, a ‘space of walking dead/living death’, wherein the life of an individual always remain a ‘high-risk sandwich’ between life and death. Such dehumanisation can perhaps be equated with Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) ‘bare life’ (naked life), where an individual stripped of human rights is pushed to the margins of political order and exposed to ‘violence (including sovereign violence)’ (Bhattacharyya, 2024, p.18).

As discussed above, Naga ethnonationalism is an apt example that explains how different tribes are clubbed together for a common purpose; however, the spurious unity is forced superficially. As internal differences, ideologies, and objectives start shaping hegemonic relationships among the groups, the fallout in the form of counter-hegemonic resistance within the group becomes imminent. For instance, the splintering of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) led by Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah (IM) and the Khaplang faction explains the phenomenon (Bhattacharyya, 2019; Bhattacharyya et al., 2023; Bhattacharyya and Pulla, 2020a, b; Panwar, 2017). While analysing the strategy of NSCN (IM), Namrata Goswami (2008) has underlined the prevalence of sub-groups and their agenda within the outfit while reckoning the consensus in ‘overall activity and purposes’ (416). Therefore, what is viewed as Naga identity politically is a conglomeration of several independent identities. The Nagas are neither a ‘unified race’ nor do they speak mutually intelligible languages (Chhonkar, 2018, p. 39). Entirely a misrepresenting and historically obscure nomenclature, (Elwin, 1961) the ‘Naga’ tribes like ‘Angami, Ao, Konyak, Lotha, Mao, Sema, Chakro, Kheza, Sangtam and Chang’ (Elwin, 1961, p. 39) have come to mutually demand political sovereignty from India through various secessionist movements (Bhattacharyya, 2019; Bhattacharyya et al., 2023; Bhattacharyya and Pulla, 2020a, b). M Amarjeet Singh states:

The 2001 Indian Census listed 17 different tribes in Nagaland including a tribe name ‘Naga’. In addition, the census listed a category named ‘unclassified Naga.’ Several public advocacy groups and community-based organisations list altogether 42 different tribes in Nagaland and beyond, while a Naga scholar lists 17 in Nagaland, 16 in Manipur, 3 in Arunachal Pradesh, and some Zeliangrong Nagas in Assam. The list includes four others, namely Konyak, Somra-Tangkhul, Phom, and Yimchunger in Myanmar. (Singh, 2013, p. 795)

Colonial ethnographers have also asserted the non-homogeneous nature and migratory practices among the tribes living in British-occupied territories and beyond (von Fürer-Haimendorf, 1938). Moreover, the tribes had different governance systems, mortuary rites, and diverse ‘racial makeup; there are elements ranging from Mongoloid to the Caucasoid (of the Aryan types) and Negrito (curly hairs of Angamis)’ (Chhonkar, 2018, p. 39). Although a common purpose inspires the representative tribal groups to undertake subversive measures against the state, any negotiation between the Government of India (GOI) and the representative group might not go well with the agenda of some of the members, resulting in splintering into micro-ethno-national groups (Chhonkar, 2018). Pradeep Singh Chhonkar has highlighted how Naga separatist factions cropped up after statehood was granted to the Nagas on 1 December 1963. On the other hand, a prominent freedom fighter like Rani Gaidinliu ‘opposed the attempts by NNC [Naga National Council] to spread Naga nationalism based on Christianity and Western culture in the Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur in 1947’ while ‘some prominent Naga leaders under the banner of All Tribal Delegation went to Delhi in May 1970 to demand statehood for Manipur and chose to remain with the state of Manipur instead of acceding to Nagaland’ (Chhonkar, 2018, p. 40). The arrangement between Nagaland and the GOI is also a matter of serious concern for Manipur. The demand for a greater Nagalim that claims parts of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, and Manipur comes in direct conflict with Manipur’s demand for territorial integrity as Singh states, ‘[t]he Manipuris’ opposition to Nagalim has to be seen in the context of the pre-1949 political status of Manipur’ (Singh, 2013, p. 808) which has a 2000-year-old history. Lamenting the negligence faced by Manipuris, Singh (2013) writes that not only has Naga expansionism hurt the sentiment of the Manipuris, but also the reluctance of the GOI to recognise the rights of the Manipuris has caused sufficient resentment among the people:

Manipur, an ancient kingdom with a 2000-year-old recorded history and a magnificent culture, was made a Part C state … Then in 1962, as a step to appease the secessionist FGN [Federal Government of Nagaland], the Naga Hills district of Assam was made a state. Manipur continued to be a union territory for another ten years, before being granted statehood. Manipuri, an ancient language spoken and written by all the Meiteis and tribals, was not included in the eighth schedule of the Indian constitution for years. The bureaucrats who came from Delhi and other states in 1949 were by and large not sympathetic to the Meiteis and the tribals (Singh, 2013, p. 808).

Although Manipur was granted a legislative assembly in 1963 and full statehood in 1972 (Sinha, 1987; Kumar, 1991), internal conflicts continued unabated and gradually became acute because of the nature of the relationship between the individuals and the modes of production in postcolonial modern societies. While the Meitei community has been demanding independence from Indian rule based on primordiality and the pre-Vaishnavite past of Kangleipak (Kom, 2010; Meetei, 2015), the relation of the ethnicised communities in terms of land and resource sharing created inter-ethnic conflicts. Land and resource entitlements, reservations, and tax benefits associated with the six scheduled areas under the Indian constitution created unequal social relations among the communities that have been inhabiting the same space for generations. As a result, several factions based on religion and ethnic identities cropped up in the state of Manipur, each demanding a territory of its own. According to Hanjabam (2008), ‘the state of Manipur comprises of the Manipuri consisting of the Meiteis, Meitei Pangal, 36 STs, and 7 Scheduled Castes’ (Hanjabam, 2008, p. 159). While there has been a demand for a satellite autonomous council from creolised populations like the Bishnupriya Manipuris, the state government is yet to recognise their language, let alone their tribal status (Staff Reporter, 2020). L. Lam Khan Piang argues that in pre-colonial societies, there was no individual ownership of lands, and the resources remained under the control of the villages (Piang, 2015, p. 160). Piang further points out that ‘[c]ompeting claims over the same territory arose only after colonially constructed categories of local people who shared local living [and] spaces began to claim exclusive ownership of the entire territory of certain administrative units’ (Piang, 2015, p. 159). What makes the situation worse is Manipur’s strategic geopolitical significance in South Asia, as it shares 398 kilometres of porous international border with Myanmar’s ‘Sagaing Region in the east and Chin State in the south’ (Saisin et al., 2023). According to the United Nations, officially, 1,086,000 refugees and asylum-seekers from Myanmar have entered neighbouring countries as of 2022, of which around 49,600 have been officially sheltered in the Indian states of Manipur and Mizoram (Document—Myanmar Emergency—UNHCR Regional Update—5 December 2022, nd; Sharma, 2014). According to research findings, Myanmar has poor governance, a high rate of violation of human rights, a high fragile state index and poor economic condition when compared to India (Yamahata, 2021). Therefore, the ethnic affinity between the communities in NEI and Myanmar makes it conducive for communities in Myanmar to migrate to India, not only during times of crisis but also during peacetime. As a result, any disturbance or conflict in Myanmar creates an internal security threat for the bordering nations, including India. NEI, therefore, has turned into a ‘hotspot for large-scale migration across the borders’ (Dutta, 2000), especially from Myanmar and Bangladesh. Unabated immigration into NEI from other regions has endangered the culture, language, political rights, and economic well-being of the Indigenous (Communities living before the arrival of the colonisers) communities living here.

Necropolitical narco-space making: normalising violence into a lucrative trade

The origin of militancy in Manipur can be traced back to the secessionist movement in 1964 (Das, 2008), creating a necropolitical space of ‘death’ and ‘living death’. As per available statistics retrieved from the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) from 1992 up to 10 May 2025, there were 6416 fatalities, which include 2283 civilians, 1054 security forces, 2926 terrorists/insurgents/extremists, and 153 not specified. Figure 1 presents the yearly fatalities in the state. Ironically, from 2000 until 10 May 2025, there were 2286 reported incidents of violence.

Fig. 1: Yearly fatalities in Manipur from 1992 to 10 May 2025.
figure 1

Compiled and created by the authors from Manipur, South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). https://satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/india-insurgencynortheast-manipur/fatalities-between-1992-2000; https://satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/india-insurgencynortheast-manipur.

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However, the origin of militancy in Manipur should not be looked at in isolation. As discussed above, geographically, NEI, being a peripheral and sensitive border space of the country, continues to be a hotbed of insurgent movements of various ethnic groups—the complex play of grievances against the nation-state, illegal migration across the border, the question of identity, including the carrying of nefarious unlawful actives. Therefore, the conflict in Manipur can be understood in contiguity with the demands of Nagalim, which claims parts of present-day Manipur. The Naga conflict, or the Naga National Movement demanding an independent Greater Nagalim, stemmed from the question of Naga Sovereignty, which can be linked to 1918 following the formation of the Naga Club. Although the Naga National Movement witnessed the creation of the state of Nagaland in 1963, carving it out of undivided Assam, the discontented Nagas continued the separatist movement in its varied scales and shapes, leading to the signing of the Naga Peace Accord or Framework Agreement on 3rd August 2015 with the GOI and the NSCN (Isaac-Muivah). However, the negotiation of this Naga Peace Accord has failed to reach a consensus (Bhattacharyya et al., 2023). To tackle the insurgent activities of the Naga movement, which disseminated mainly across the Naga-inhabited neighbouring areas of the hills and plains, including that of the present Assam, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh, the GOI promulgated its draconian Act—the Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in 1958. In 1980, the entire state of Manipur was declared ‘disturbed’, following which AFSPAFootnote 2 was extended to the entire state, which operates in the form of Carl Schmitt’s (1922) ‘state of exception’ whereby the legal and constitutional orders are often suspended because of the extraordinary circumstance of the region (see also, Agamben, 1998). In the wake of the Malom massacre, which took place on 04 November 2000 and killed ten innocent people waiting at a bus stand at Malom, Irom Chanu Sharmila (Mengoubi) started her fast for 16 long years in protest against AFSPA; she was forced fed through the nasogastric intubation until she withdrew her fast in 2016 to offer her candidature for the Assembly Election of Manipur, which however she failed to win (Bhattacharyya, 2018; Devi et al., 2020; Sharma, 2014).

Notwithstanding, the failure of the nation-state to address the grievances of the people of Manipur (vis-à-vis various insurgent groups of NEI) and the delay in granting statehood has provided the impetus to militancy, at a later stage, external factors like the drug trade, arms smuggling (Upadhyay, 2009), external involvement (Bhaumik, 1996; Singh and Sandhu, 2014), and infiltration from neighbouring countries (Loitongbam, 2016; Saisin et al., 2023; Singh, 2022) exacerbated the socio-political stability by shifting the bipolar conflict (between the centre and the federal state) into a multipolar conflict among the ethnic groups (Das, 2008; Singha, 2017).

As discussed in the previous section, it can be discerned that the ethnic-territories claimed by the agitating communities are contested because of their claim to overlapping territorial spaces. To assert dominance over a specific territory claimed by the respective ethnic groups, very often, the armed militia of those communities indulge in inter-ethnic killing. As these militant groups easily move across the rugged, hilly terrains and jungles straddling South Asia due to the porosity of national borders, it becomes difficult for the State to contain violence in these regions. Even when some of the tribal leaders agree to broker peace agreements through negotiation, they are targeted by opposing factions. This is why peace remains ever-evasive in this region. Although the GOI has been trying for a long time to bring all the factions to the negotiation table by doling out financial and reservation packages, the area continues to remain a cradle of ethnic violence. We argue here that a simplistic interpretation of the ethno-territorial claim is not sufficient in understanding the continuation and sustenance of violence in Manipur. Rather, one must investigate the method and means of transition of the society from a conventional economic set-up to a non-conventional social structure where income is generated through non-conventional methods. Due to Manipur’s geo-strategic location, it has become a centre as well as a corridor for illicit opium cultivation and plant-based narcotics trade (Sen, 1989, p. 208). Therefore, the sustenance of militancy is to be seen within the context of an emerging multi-million-dollar flourishing economy based on narco-trade. Due to wide networking and urbanisation, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has estimated that around 377 million people will be using drugs by the end of 2030 (World Drug Report 2021 Methodological Annex, p. 42), whereas in 2003, the number of illegal drug (Sen, 1989, p. 42) users were 200 million. In a recent study, Sharma and Hanhabam have estimated that drug trafficking in Manipur is a 62-million-dollar economy (Sharma and Hanhabam, 2024), however, other sources claim that drugs worth 8.37 billion dollars are traded annually, of which only 240–300 million are intercepted by the police (Chakrabarti, 2024). It is important to note that Afghanistan and Myanmar alone are responsible for ‘91 per cent global opium production’ till 2019 (World Drug Report 2021 Methodological Annex, p. 45). Therefore, Manipur’s geographical proximity to the Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos) (Fig. 2)—Southeast Asia’s opium-producing regions makes it a conducive region for the cultivation, production, and supply of opium.

Fig. 2: The ill-famed Golden Triangle, Southeast Asia’s opium-producing regions.
figure 2

Created by the authors from Google Earth.

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Since Manipur shares a porous border with Myanmar, it becomes easy to supply drugs through that region, not only to different parts of India but elsewhere across other regions. Arguably, experiences of Manipur’s illicit opium economy bear commonality with the opium production economies, not only of the Golden Crescent (geospatially located at the crossroads of Central, South, and West Asia encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Eastern Iran) but also to Mexico (southern part of North America) and Columbia (northwestern part of South America, bordering the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea).Footnote 3

Yearly fatalities in Manipur from 1992 to 10 May 2025

Year

Total incidents

Civilians

Security forces

Terrorists/Insurgents/Extremists

Not specified

Total

1992

 

84

30

51

 

165

1993

 

266

91

66

 

423

1994

 

189

98

63

 

350

1995

 

183

64

74

 

321

1996

 

117

65

93

 

275

1997

 

233

111

151

 

495

1998

 

87

62

95

 

244

1999

 

89

64

78

 

231

2000

44

46

31

60

 

137

2001

98

48

16

101

2

167

2002

103

30

44

106

21

201

2003

102

23

23

153

6

205

2004

140

39

51

130

13

233

2005

203

140

51

135

9

335

2006

195

74

38

146

28

286

2007

257

130

58

240

33

461

2008

309

113

10

349

24

496

2009

276

76

19

329

8

432

2010

90

29

6

102

1

138

2011

42

23

9

31

2

65

2012

67

23

12

77

1

113

2013

33

21

6

28

0

55

2014

36

22

10

23

0

55

2015

52

18

24

52

3

97

2016

25

14

13

9

0

36

2017

37

23

9

22

1

55

2018

21

7

7

9

0

23

2019

7

4

0

5

0

9

2020

4

1

3

3

0

7

2021

12

8

5

14

0

27

2022

7

5

1

1

0

7

2023

74

66

17

73

1

157

2024

46

51

6

30

0

87

2025

6

1

0

27

0

28

Total

2286

2283

1054

2926

153

6416

In this context, Jeremy Douglas, UNODC’s Regional Representative for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, in an interview, mentioned that the Golden Triangle region is the ‘biggest drug trafficking corridor in the world. In Shan state, Myanmar, there is [not only] the major production of heroin and opium, but also synthetic drugs like methamphetamine, which are spilling out across the region and feeding the whole of the Asia Pacific [region], basically from Japan all the way down to New Zealand and everywhere in between’ (Douglas, 2023). Since the cultivation of opium fetches more money than the cultivation of vegetables, many farmers have taken to the cultivation of opium in the hilly regions of Manipur (Chakrabarti, 2024). The quantum of trade and its value has, therefore, attracted the militants, ex-militants (Correspondent, 2024, p. 9), politicians, army personnel and ministers from the state. Thounaojam Brinda, an ex-cop in Manipur, has alleged that there is a political connection that helps the drug trade to flourish (Laithangbam, 2020). In the past few years, several army personnel have been apprehended in NEI as they were found in possession of drugs worth millions of dollars (PTI, 2008). Along with political patronage and involvement of security personnel in the drug trade, the involvement of all the communities has been ascertained by the arrests made in the past few years: ‘…of the 2,518 arrests made in drug cases since 2017, 873 were ‘Kuki-Chin’ people, 1,083 were Muslims, 381 were Meiteis, and 181 were ‘others’’ (Chakrabarti, 2024). We reiterate, consequently, narco-trade does not remain confined to Manipur, as it has conveniently spilt over to other parts of NEI over the past few years (Syllad, 2024; Dutta, 2021; PTI, 2024a). In 2010, Ghosh argued that ‘Manipur, Nagaland and Mizoram together smuggle[d] at least 20kg of heroin every day’ (p. 207), which has further escalated in the last 15 years. The growth of the drug trade market also largely depends on the social setups. It implies a loss of social value within the community. Due to the continuous disintegration of a community owing to conflict and the weaning of traditional values and driven by necropolitics, it becomes difficult to contain the proliferation of nefarious activities within that community. Years of armed conflict and the involvement of young and old alike have rationalised and normalised inter-ethnic killing as a necessity for claiming ethno-territoriality. Moreover, to sustain a protracted conflict between the nation and other communities, it becomes necessary to raise funds through unconventional methods, of which the illicit drug trade is one of the easiest and most lucrative means of raising funds. Duncan McDuie-Ra (2014) writes that those working underground have been running a parallel economy by collecting taxes from contractors, politicians, businessmen, and government employees in NEI. However, collecting taxes is insufficient to meet militant organisations’ greed and needs. Since the ethnic communities rely on the ethnic militia for their protection against attacks from other ethnic communities, the militia must be replenished with human power and money from time to time. The non-availability of human power, arms and ammunition, and a fund crunch may weaken any militant organisation. Therefore, a parallel economy sustains the alternate social structure by creating a necropolitical society and a narco-space. Apart from that, easy money also helps to avail modern amenities quickly. Such lucrative avenues easily lure the youth into society. Although the GOI has been pumping huge funds for development projects in the region to end violence and create employment, most of the militant-turned-contractors are siphoning off the money through locally-controlled and politically-backed syndicates. The money siphoned off by the politicians and bureaucrats is pumped back into the illegal drug trade and construction businesses. This new wealth-creation mechanism within an ethno-territorial space has greater ramifications because such regions will forever remain disturbed. This underscores that traditional social values in these ethnic societies have been supplanted by excessive greed, unethical activities and craving for money, no matter what the source of that money might be. Even when the majority of the people would want to have peace, the militants who wield power through the barrel of a gun under political tutelage and community patronage continue the illegal trade. As a result, a politics of violence is unleashed on society to keep the dynamics of violence, the need for militancy and the demand for ethnic-territoriality a recurring need for the ethnic communities. Sankar Sen conducted a survey as early as 1989 to show the debilitating effects of narco-terrorism on state governments. He argues that Narco-terrorism has caused widescale global lawlessness, and due to its huge profit margin, it remains one of the best sources to raise funds for terrorism:

Hence, many modern terrorist groups no longer rely on bank robberies and other forms of crime to collect money to fund their activities. They find that alliance with the drug traffickers provides them access to enormous funds, which can be used with lethal effects against the target governments (Sen, 1989, p. 297).

On a similar note, Ningthoujam Koiremba Singh and Nunes (2013) write that ‘Drug trafficking is also connected to other categories of transnational crime that include money laundering, arms smuggling, corruption, illegal migration and terrorism’ (p. 69). Since narco-terrorism erodes ‘the power and authority of the nation-state’ (Singh and Nunes, 2013, 69; Upadhyay, 2009), India’s neighbouring countries, like Pakistan and China, have constantly promoted drug trafficking and narco-terrorism (Behuria, 2022, p. 38; Prabha, 2001) in NEI to destabilise the region. Consequently, these ethnic societies become easy victims and are on the verge of self-annihilation and ruination. Despite having high literacy rates in Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram, these regions remain disturbed, destabilised, and volatile. Violence has taken a toll on ordinary people’s cultural and social lives. In contrast, those promoting violence seem oblivious to the fact that the foundation of those societies is fast eroding, thereby leaving a legacy of a ruined nation to future generations.

Conclusion: possibility of civic territoriality

Based on the preceding discussion, it is apparent that the state’s use of coercive tactics may exacerbate the alienation of the people of NEI; however, the threats posed by narco-terrorism are more debilitating as they can be seen as coercion by consent. The state has argued that on certain occasions, stringent laws such as the AFSPA may be deemed necessary to quell the violence perpetrated by militant factions. However, regrettably, there have been reported instances where these laws have been abused by officials, leading to a violation of human rights (Bhattacharyya, 2018; Bhattacharyya et al., 2023). Incidents involving rape, severe beatings resulting in fatalities or disabilities have, therefore, fostered resentment within the affected communities, impeding efforts toward integration. We argue that while legislation like AFSPA remains paramount to tackling insurgency in the region and bestowing legal protection to the armed soldiers operating in the region, the draconian constituents of AFSPA must be made ‘humanitarian’ in compliance with the United Nations Human Rights Committee by revoking ‘blanket immunity’ to the armed soldiers’ intentional engagement in human rights violation by misusing AFSPA (Bhattacharyya, 2018; Sharma, 2014). Furthermore, the protracted delay in addressing the legitimate rights of ethnic groups has deteriorated the already challenging circumstances in Manipur. The prevailing corrupt practices among bureaucrats and politicians in the central government have established a pattern in NEI, allowing them to siphon off funds designated for development projects easily. As a result, democratic efforts to address this crisis have only led to more corruption, with tribal leaders collaborating with the central bureaucracy and politicians to embezzle public funds. Further, dissatisfied members of the same group sometimes take advantage of the situation to form new insurgent groups and become involved in corrupt activities and drug trafficking. Moreover, ethno-territoriality and exclusive rights of a particular group on a territory exclude other groups, and the unequal relationship becomes unsustainable because of the hegemonic pressure of one group on the other. Since ethnic-territoriality is based on how identities are constructed, no matter how preposterous they might seem, these newly constructed identities create fertile ground for the contestation of rights and privileges. Ethno‐territoriality, according to Adam Moore, is one of the reasons for ethnic conflict because one group claims exclusive rights over a territory and its resources, thereby marginalising and excluding other groups (Moore, 2016). Since claiming ethno-territoriality (Wouters, 2020) has become a convenient mechanism of negotiation between the GOI and the ethnonational forces, it is setting a precedence for splintered groups and identities to rewrite and reclaim historicity to create new identities that would legitimise their demands for claiming rights over territory. Moreover, as shown in the previous section, the connection between terrorism and drug trafficking creates lucrative opportunities for the misdirected youth. These youths, lured by power and money, are coaxed into the insurgency by the senior members and leaders of the community, who seek to create new ethnic identities. Consequently, the cycle of violence sustained by creating new identities will remain a never-ending process. Under such a political climate and necropolitical space, the common hapless citizens are drawn into the vortex of violence and hatred unwillingly. As these mechanisms are put into practice as the preferred means of resource extraction from NEI, the sustenance of violence is seen as a lucrative opportunity. To end this violence, the state should create better opportunities for these communities in India’s borderland, eliminate corruption at all levels (political and bureaucratic), and strive to create a transparent system of governance. Instead of treating NEI as a hinterland for resource extraction, a meaningful engagement of the people of this region can help transform a necropolitical space into a self-governing federal space. Most often, the tribal groups feel alienated because of cultural and religious differences with mainland India; therefore, instead of alienating the citizens by imposing alien cultural practices, the language, culture, and food habits of the tribal people should be widely promoted. While doing so, the so-called mainland Indian should also be culturally sensitised so that instead of seeing the Hindi-speaking-northern-belt as the centre of the nation, each federal state in NEI should be given equal centre stage in the nation-making process. Since most tribal communities have abandoned their tribal cultures and converted to Christianity, the traditional social foundations, values, and customs have undergone significant transformations. This transition phase presents challenges for tribal communities, often causing them to feel overwhelmed by the imposition of new laws and cultures from the nation-state. Respecting Indigenous cultural practices, food habits, and customs without interference can foster goodwill between the nation-state and tribal communities. Therefore, instead of promoting ethno-territoriality and ethnonationalism, the nation should look forward to promoting civic territoriality through meaningful participation of the communities. Instead of a powerful nation-state making decisions for the periphery, the periphery should be given centre stage in policy-making. The change in power dynamics and social relations will not only help empower peripheral communities but also ameliorate their sense of alienation.