Introduction

Parliamentary oversight constitutes a fundamental function of the legislative branch, serving as a mechanism through which parliaments monitor and scrutinize the executive to ensure its actions align with public interests (Rosenfeld and Sajó, 2012; Vile, 1998). In public administration, this oversight aims to enhance the quality and accessibility of public goods and services (Meyer and de Sales Marques, 2018). The United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) Federal National Council (FNC) operates within a distinctive consultative framework that reflects the nation’s governance traditions (Al Mazroui, 2020), while still performing oversight functions comparable to consultative legislative bodies elsewhere. Public administration scholarship underscores that citizens demand a responsive public sector and accountable officials (Christensen et al., 2020; Yaghi, 2014), and parliamentary oversight serves as a continuous check to reinforce these principles (Peters, 2014).

Theoretically, parliaments function as independent institutions tasked with legislation and representation (Beetham, 2006). Principal-agent theory (PAT) elucidates this dynamic, framing parliament as an agent of the people (the principal) and the government (the agent). The theory posits that parliaments and governments strive to serve public interests because the legitimacy conferred or withdrawn by citizens hinges on their performance (Azfar et al., 2018). Consequently, parliamentary members and officials are incentivized to align with constituent demands, whether for electoral retention or appointment renewal (Aucoin and Jarvis, 2005; Balla and Gormley, 2017).

The FNC’s hybrid composition, incorporating both appointed and elected members, represents an evolving approach to legislative oversight within the nation’s governance framework. Historically, formal public administration structures were limited during the colonial period. In the post-independence era, the government has adopted a phased approach to institutional development, with the FNC serving as an important mechanism for systematic policy review and administrative accountability as part of this ongoing process.

While maintaining its consultative nature, the FNC has progressively developed its functions in policy examination and government oversight. These institutional mechanisms demonstrate the potential for parliamentary development, following trajectories observed in other regional models. The continued enhancement of these functions suggests a pathway for the FNC to further strengthen its legislative role, in line with the evolutionary patterns seen in comparable governmental systems in the region, such as Jordan where the parliament operated as a consultative body for decades before becoming a full-fledged legislature (Momani, Aladwan and Salameh, 2021; Yaghi and Yaghi, 2024).

Theoretical relevance and UAE context

PAT proves uniquely suited to analyze the FNC’s constitutional position. Unlike conventional legislatures with clear oversight powers, the FNC operates within a “consultative paradox” - endowed with representational responsibilities yet constrained by its non-legislative status. PAT’s strength in examining delegated-but-limited authority relationships makes it particularly valuable for this study. This application aligns with the UAE’s official reform narrative (Sarker and Al Athmay, 2018). The 2006 Political Empowerment Strategy explicitly framed FNC strengthening as improving “alignment between leadership and citizen aspirations” - a direct articulation of principal-agent logic. This contrasts with Western theories assuming fully autonomous legislatures, instead providing a tailored lens for the UAE’s developmental model. PAT’s focus on information asymmetries and monitoring costs proves especially insightful when examining the FNC’s strategic inquiry patterns, where members prioritize high-visibility issues like housing and healthcare to maximize public pressure on executives.

Alternative frameworks (e.g., authoritarian institutionalism) struggle to explain the FNC’s evolution from symbolic oversight to technical policy influence. PAT better captures this trajectory through its emphasis on gradual monitoring capacity improvements, evidenced in our analysis of inquiry trends and government responses. The FNC occupies a unique middle ground between full legislatures (like Turkey or France) and purely consultative bodies (like Saudi Arabia’s Shura Council), warranting specialized examination. Its development offers crucial insights into legislative maturation in non-Western, non-representative systems.

However, the FNC’s advisory nature invites critique. Aljobair (2020) notes its powers remain largely supervisory, lacking substantive legislative authority - a constitutional constraint creating tension between its representative aspirations and limited influence. These critiques remind us to contextualize the FNC’s achievements within its institutional boundaries. We apply PAT strictly within the public administration tradition (Gailmard, 2014; Braun and Guston, 2003), where: citizens (principals) delegate authority to government institutions (agents); agents must act on principals’ behalf; and mechanisms exist to align interests and monitor performance. In addition, the study specifically examines the UAE’s constitutional context featuring: (a) a single principal (Emirati citizens as sovereign authority); (b) dual agents (both FNC and executive deriving power from this principal); and (c) oversight tools (primarily parliamentary inquiries). As Brandsma and Adriaensen (2017) clarify, such institutional oversight remains consistent with PAT when understood as delegated authority rather than autonomous action. We deliberately exclude broader sociological or international relations conceptions of “agency” (cf. Risse and Sikkink, 2011) to maintain analytical precision.

Research gap and objectives

While PAT has been extensively applied to fully empowered parliamentary systems (Osipov et al., 2017), its relevance for consultative governance models remains underexplored. Existing scholarship on GCC states (Herb, 2014; Power, 2013; El-Wafa, Khalil, and Hashish, 2024) identifies a spectrum of parliamentary influence from purely advisory to fully legislative, with the UAE’s FNC occupying a distinctive position shaped by the nation’s federal structure (Herb, 2014). Academic study of Arab consultative bodies remains limited (Painter-Morland, 2006; Yaghi and Antwi‐Boateng (2016)), due both to their relative rarity and the complex historical dynamics between executive and legislative branches in regional governance.

Comparative analysis reveals divergent trajectories among regional parliamentary systems. Kuwait’s longstanding parliamentary tradition has been characterized by recurring institutional tensions, with oversight mechanisms often viewed through a political lens (Brown, 2012). In contrast, the FNC has charted an alternative evolutionary path, progressively expanding its policy oversight capabilities within its consultative mandate. The Council has developed a distinctive operational approach focusing on visible policy issues (housing, service delivery), administrative efficiency, and technical implementation rather than political confrontation. This strategic orientation has enabled the FNC to build institutional credibility by addressing concrete service delivery concerns while maintaining alignment with government priorities, reflecting both incremental parliamentary development and the UAE’s unique sociopolitical context.

Existing scholarship presents divergent views of the FNC. While some emphasize its policy influence (El-Wafa et al., 2024; Yaghi, 2024), others highlight its limited legislative power and symbolic role (Aljobair, 2020; Herb, 2014). This study bridges these perspectives by examining how the FNC exerts influence despite formal constraints, particularly through strategic inquiry selection and technical scrutiny. While Aljobair (2020) characterizes the FNC as “more supervisory than legislative,” our findings show how such supervision can drive tangible reforms (e.g., Emiratization policy revisions), suggesting advisory bodies can achieve a certain level of accountability without binding authority.

Though focused primarily on the FNC, we situate its development within broader Gulf parliamentary trends - notably Kuwait’s contentious elected legislature (Herb, 2014; Zaccara, 2013) and Oman’s technocratic advisory model (Power, 2013) - to highlight its hybrid nature. Our analysis prioritizes empirical depth over comparative breadth, drawing selectively on regional scholarship to illuminate the FNC’s navigation of its “consultative paradox.”

This study addresses two central questions: (1) How does the FNC exercise oversight and influence policy despite its consultative role? (2) What does this reveal about principal-agent dynamics in hybrid systems? Three objectives guide our investigation: First, we examine the FNC’s institutional behavior to determine whether members act as agents of the populace (addressing citizen concerns) or the executive (aligning with government priorities) (Gailmard, 2014; Braun and Guston, 2003). Second, we analyze mechanisms of influence by tracking the evolution of oversight tools (inquiries, policy reviews) from 2006–2023, assessing both inquiry volume/type and government responsiveness (recommendation adoption, ministerial engagement). Third, we evaluate the FNC’s comparative relevance for understanding advisory bodies in systems with limited legislative authority (Malesky and Schuler, 2020). Through this approach, the study offers empirical insights into the UAE’s model of gradual political empowerment (Al Mazroui, 2020) while advancing theoretical understanding of oversight in hybrid governance systems.

The principal-agent relationship in consultative parliamentary oversight

The UAE’s federal monarchy comprises seven emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, and Fujairah), within which the FNC operates as a constitutionally recognized yet non-binding legislative body. Its 20 elected and 20 appointed membership (Mason, 2023; Ulrichsen, 2016; Yaghi and Antwi‐Boateng (2017)) reflects the nation’s distinctive political evolution since federation in 1971 (Al Mazroui, 2020), embodying an adaptive governance model (Watts, 2001) that blends traditional leadership with modern parliamentary mechanisms.

Despite its advisory status, the FNC exercises meaningful oversight through ministerial questioning, policy debates, and parliamentary inquiries (Aboelwafa and Yaghi, 2024; Khan, 2015). These tools - whether initiated collectively or individually - enable rigorous scrutiny of public affairs (Yaghi and Antwi‐Boateng (2016)), exemplifying the principal-agent dynamic where citizens (principals) delegate authority to governmental institutions (agents). This relationship inherently involves tension, as agents may pursue objectives diverging from principal interests (Cook and Wood, 1989; Mansbridge, 2011).

The FNC’s position within this framework presents unique complexities. While some scholars view consultative bodies primarily as legitimizing instruments (Herb, 2014), others demonstrate their concrete policy impacts (El-Wafa and El Maslouhi, 2024). This dual accountability to both citizens and federal government creates governance dynamics that defy conventional legislative categorization. The UAE’s political culture, marked by historically rooted ruler-citizen trust, further shapes these relationships, with inquiries proving effective in enhancing administrative accountability (Alzaabi et al., 2020; Yaghi, 2023; Gailmard, 2014).

Though limited by its recommendatory authority (Alzaabi et al., 2020; Mason, 2023), the FNC has influenced significant legislation (e.g., 2015 Medical Liability Law, 2020 labor reforms) and institutional innovations (e.g., Federal Transport Council establishment) (Taryam, 2011; UAE Government, 2024). Based on available records, 72% of citizen-oriented inquiries (n = 93) were associated with service improvements, although direct causality requires further study (Yaghi and Yaghi, 2024; Albayan, 2023).

Critics highlight potential tensions in the FNC’s hybrid composition, noting appointed members may face executive pressure while elected members prioritize constituents (Aljobair, 2020). While these concerns merit examination, their full analysis extends beyond this study’s scope and could inform future research on principal-agent dynamics in hybrid systems.

The FNC’s work through a principal-agent lens

The principal-agent framework proves particularly valuable for analyzing the FNC’s unique position in the UAE’s governance system. While traditional parliamentary models feature clear accountability chains between voters, legislators, and administrators, the FNC’s hybrid nature—both semi-representative and advisory—presents a more complex dynamic that conventional theories struggle to explain (Gailmard, 2014; Al Mazroui, 2020). This institutional complexity makes PAT especially relevant for systems like the UAE’s, where traditional legislative checks are limited (Gailmard, 2014). The UAE’s dual-channel representation system, combining the FNC’s formal oversight with the executive’s traditional stewardship role (Al Mazroui, 2020), provides a compelling case for PAT application.

The framework’s explanatory strength emerges in three key aspects of FNC operations: First, PAT’s focus on information asymmetries helps explain why members strategically concentrate on high-visibility policy areas like healthcare and education. In these sectors, public scrutiny effectively compensates for the council’s lack of formal enforcement powers (Braun and Guston, 2003). Second, the appointed membership structure serves as an innovative intra-agent monitoring mechanism that reduces shirking behavior, challenging conventional assumptions about democratic accountability. Third, the FNC’s increasing policy influence despite unchanged formal authority reflects what Braun and Guston (2003) call “competence-based legitimacy”—gained through sustained technical engagement rather than legislative coercion.

This developmental trajectory shows how consultative bodies can establish alternative accountability channels, connecting Western legislative scholarship with newer research on hybrid regimes. While other theoretical approaches focusing on formal institutional constraints help explain the FNC’s constitutional design, they cannot account for its evolution from advisory body to substantive policy actor. PAT proves more powerful in this regard, providing the conceptual tools to track institutional development through improved monitoring capacity and information exchange—patterns evident in the FNC’s inquiry trends and government response rates (Schuler, 2021).

Institutional distinctiveness and comparative context

The FNC occupies a unique space in the UAE’s political system, blending traditional consultative practices with modern parliamentary functions. Three defining features characterize its institutional development: (1) cultivated policy expertise through sustained engagement (demonstrated by a 68% recommendation adoption rate since 2006 as recorded in FNC annual reports (2006–2023); (2) a mixed membership model balancing grassroots perspectives with institutional knowledge; and (3) a federal structure facilitating multilevel policy coordination unavailable in unitary systems (El Wafa and El Maslouhi, 2024; Malesky and Schuler, 2020). While sharing some similarities with Vietnam’s National Assembly in policy review capabilities (Malesky and Schuler, 2020), the FNC’s distinctiveness emerges from its balanced representation system and federal context. Unlike either fully elected or entirely appointed bodies, the FNC’s hybrid composition creates unique executive-legislative dynamics. Its federal role as mediator between national and emirate-level priorities further distinguishes it from unitary systems.

This institutional configuration defies conventional classification. The FNC operates beyond traditional legislative oversight models while transcending purely symbolic advisory roles. Through technical scrutiny and procedural evolution, it has developed measurable policy influence, demonstrating how consultative institutions can assume substantive governance functions within defined parameters. These findings contribute importantly to theoretical debates about accountability in systems blending democratic and traditional elements.

The FNC’s comparative advantages become apparent when examined alongside other consultative institutions, though its strengths do not imply superiority over representative parliaments. Rather, they reveal how accountability mechanisms can function without fully elected legislatures. Its evolution reflects the UAE government’s formal recognition of institutional development, ensuring the FNC moves beyond a symbolic advisory status (The UAE Government, 2023). It can be said that the FNC’s trajectory contrasts sharply with other Gulf models. Kuwait’s elected National Assembly grapples with persistent executive-legislative deadlock (Herb, 2014), while Oman’s fully appointed State Council operates with narrow technical mandates (Power, 2013). The FNC’s blend of limited electoral representation and executive appointments avoids both Kuwait’s polarization and Oman’s accountability gaps, though this balance involves trade-offs in legislative authority versus public engagement (Zaccara, 2013). These observations resist broad generalization due to the UAE’s unique federal structure and political culture. Where Herb (2014) characterizes Gulf parliaments as instruments of “managed reform,” the FNC’s incremental influence derives from technical scrutiny rather than electoral pressures—a crucial distinction highlighting the need for context-specific analysis.

Analytical framework

Our study examines two dimensions of the FNC’s development through an institutional lens: (a) policy influence, which is measured via recommendation adoption rates and inquiry scope expansion, revealing growing technical capacity to shape outcomes; (b) institutional evolution by tracking oversight mechanism maturation since 2006 reforms, showing the transition from symbolic body to governance participant. This approach contributes to parliamentary development discussions while respecting UAE political traditions. By focusing on technical processes and federal context, we provide rigorous, non-judgmental analysis aligned with contemporary scholarship on consultative systems.

Methods

This study employs a mixed-methods approach to analyze the FNC’s oversight functions through the lens of PAT. The research integrates quantitative analysis of parliamentary inquiries with qualitative case studies to assess how the FNC navigates its consultative role while influencing policy outcomes. At the core of this investigation lies a systematic examination of all 1,036 parliamentary inquiries recorded in the FNC between 2006 and 2023. Each inquiry was carefully classified according to two primary dimensions: the nature of the government’s response (distinguishing between written and in-person engagement with high-ranking officials) and the substantive focus of the inquiry itself (differentiating procedural matters from policy-oriented questions).

To ensure methodological rigor, the analysis included every inquiry regardless of response status, with particular attention given to the 202 cases that received no official response. Furthermore, 30 percent of cases were cross-referenced with independent media reports to verify reliability (κ = 0.79), providing a robust safeguard against potential selection bias in official records. The focus on institutional behavior rather than public opinion reflects current data availability constraints, as systematic surveys of Emirati views on the FNC remain limited. While this precludes direct claims about citizen satisfaction, the predominance of citizen-oriented inquiries (93 addressing public issues and 726 comprising direct questions) indirectly aligns with PAT’s expectation that agents signal alignment with principal interests to maintain legitimacy (Gailmard, 2014).

The analytical framework was designed to test two core propositions about the FNC’s institutional behavior. First, to evaluate whether the Council prioritizes public interests over procedural formalities, we conducted a comparative analysis of inquiries addressing tangible citizen concerns (such as service delivery gaps or policy deficiencies) versus those focused on administrative processes. Second, to assess the FNC’s evolving policy influence, we tracked both the thematic expansion of inquiries across governance sectors and the adoption rates of the Council’s recommendations, using the 2006 reforms as a benchmark for measuring institutional maturation.

Contextualizing these findings required careful consideration of the FNC’s unique composition and regional parallels. The Council’s hybrid structure—comprising 20 members elected through an emirate-based electoral college (with representation weighted by population, ranging from Abu Dhabi’s 46,000 electors to Umm Al Quwain’s 4000) and 20 members appointed by federal leadership (including subject-matter experts and demographic representatives, with gender parity in appointments since 2019)—presented a distinctive case for analysis. Comparative insights from Kuwait and Oman’s similar hybrid systems (Herb, 2014) helped situate the UAE’s experience within broader Gulf governance patterns. Notably, statistical analysis revealed no significant difference in inquiry quality between elected and appointed members (χ² = 1.32, p = 0.25), suggesting that institutional norms may transcend formal selection methods—a finding with important implications for understanding consultative governance models.

The assessment of oversight quality extended beyond inquiry volume to examine three concrete indicators of impact: the implementation rate of 42 specific policy recommendations, media coverage patterns for contentious issues, and the alignment of FNC interventions with the UAE’s Vision 2021/2050 strategic priorities. This multifaceted approach, grounded in PAT’s emphasis on institutional behavior under constraints (Cook and Wood, 1989), provides both theoretical insights into hybrid governance systems and practical lessons about the conditions under which consultative bodies can develop substantive policy influence.

The study’s temporal scope (2006–2023) was carefully selected to align with institutional watersheds, with 2006 marking the FNC’s empowerment reforms and 2012 onward providing reliable data on government responses. This design ensures the analysis spans both formative and mature phases of the FNC’s oversight role, offering a comprehensive view of its institutional development. Future research could build on these findings by incorporating public opinion data to further test the relationship between inquiry patterns and citizen satisfaction.

Justification for the research design

The study’s mixed-methods approach, which integrates quantitative analysis of 1036 inquiries with qualitative case studies, was deliberately selected to address the unique challenges of analyzing the FNC’s consultative role. This dual methodology enables the study to simultaneously test theoretical propositions about the FNC’s prioritization of citizen interests, trace the institution’s evolution beyond its formal powers, and generate actionable insights for policymakers navigating hybrid governance systems. By examining both the volume and substantive content of inquiries—coded by thematic focus (public versus procedural), policy domain, and government response type—the design captures the principal-agent dynamics at play, particularly how the FNC exerts influence despite constitutional constraints.

This analytical framework moves beyond descriptive accounts to probe the mechanisms underlying the FNC’s policy influence, aligning with PAT’s emphasis on institutional behavior under bounded authority (Cook and Wood, 1989). The longitudinal dimension is critical: by tracking inquiry patterns and recommendation uptake over time, the study reveals how technical scrutiny can compensate for limited legislative powers—a finding with implications for similar consultative bodies. The inclusion of qualitative case studies (Table 1) alongside statistical analysis (Tables 2, 3) ensures that the findings are both theoretically grounded and policy-relevant, addressing concerns about conceptual rigor while demonstrating how advisory institutions can develop substantive governance roles.

Table 1 Policy areas covered in parliamentary oversight.
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Table 2 Summary of parliamentary inquiries.
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Table 3 Sample government responses.
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Analysis, findings, and conclusion

Institutional spectrum

We clarify the institutional spectrum by distinguishing consultative parliaments (deliberative bodies with non-binding recommendations) from full-fledged legislatures (with legislative initiation and veto powers). The FNC exemplifies what Gawrich (2015) terms “consultative-plus” status that exceeds advisory roles without full legislative authority. As contemporary political development scholarship recognizes diverse modernization pathways (Meyer and de Sales Marques, 2018), the UAE model combines traditional majlis dialog practices with modern parliamentary functions through: (1) representation balance as the 50% elected/50% appointed membership blends grassroots input with institutional expertise (Al Mazroui, 2020), (2) policy influence pathways by technical reviews (68% adoption rate), ministerial accountability sessions (834 since 2006), and citizen-centered inquiries (93 documented), (3) gradual empowerment as the Electoral College expansion (>300,000 members), increased policy domains under review (6 in 2006 to 28 in 2023), and institutionalized response mechanisms (79% inquiry response rate).

This reflects Nag’s (2018) “contextual governance”—adapting democratic principles to local traditions. The system continues evolving, with recent reforms enhancing technical capacity while maintaining consensus-based decision-making (Ulrichsen, 2016).

The impact of FNC inquiries

Parliamentary scholarship has traditionally focused on fully empowered legislatures where clear principal-agent relationships exist between citizens and their elected representatives (Raafat, 2022; Rosenfeld and Sajó, 2022). While such models assume parliamentarians should advocate for their constituents’ interests, scholars note that agents do not always faithfully serve their principals (Peters, 2019). In conventional systems, the theory’s application remains straightforward - legislators are expected to represent citizens and hold executives accountable (Fadhil et al., 2019; Savoie, 2003).

However, the FNC’s consultative nature complicates this dynamic. With half its members appointed by the government and half elected, questions arise about whether members serve executive or public interests. This hybrid structure creates potential divided loyalties, with appointed members possibly favoring government priorities while elected members respond to constituent demands. Notably, the appointment process has advanced gender representation, with some arguing the UAE government is progressing faster toward political modernity than societal expectations (Al Mazroui, 2020).

Our analysis suggests that despite these structural complexities, both elected and appointed members predominantly serve citizen interests. Proposition 1 posits that regardless of selection method, FNC members ultimately prioritize public concerns, making citizens the true principals for both government and parliament. To test this proposition, we conducted systematic content analysis of all FNC inquiries (2012–2023), categorizing them into three types: public issue inquiries (citizen-facing concerns), direct questions (seeking executive accountability), and policy reviews (technical evaluations of legislation). The results (Tables 2, 3) demonstrate that most inquiries serve public rather than governmental interests, confirming citizens’ status as ultimate principals. This finding suggests both the government and FNC recognize public sovereignty despite institutional constraints. The implications are significant: the FNC’s hybrid model shows capacity to address both citizen and executive priorities, though tensions may arise in practice, as noted in critiques of appointed members’ autonomy (Aljobair, 2020). However, further research should explore how this dynamic persists across different policy areas and political contexts. The gender representation achieved through appointments (with women comprising some appointed members) presents another dimension for future study regarding how descriptive representation influences policy priorities in hybrid systems.

The data presented in Table 2 reveal significant patterns in the FNC’s oversight activities from 2006 to 2023. During this period, the council recorded 1036 parliamentary inquiries, comprising 93 public issue inquiries (addressing specific community concerns like water supply shortages), 726 direct questions to cabinet members and agency heads, and 217 comprehensive policy reviews. This substantial volume of activity demonstrates the FNC’s active role in promoting parliamentary oversight and serving public interests, despite its consultative nature.

The government’s engagement with these inquiries may prove a positive development in the FNC’s status in the legislative process. Based on the attendance records, the government’s attendance at FNC sessions (834 since 2006) suggests formal recognition of the Council’s oversight role, though the qualitative depth of engagement varies by policy area. The 202 sessions without executive branch representation likely involved technical follow-ups requiring no immediate government response. This high participation rate suggests a serious commitment to the FNC’s oversight function, though the quality of engagement warrants closer examination.

Table 3’s analysis of response formats between 2012–2022 reveals important nuances. While 304 inquiries received in-person responses from officials, only 68 were addressed through written replies. This disparity matters because oral responses typically indicate higher levels of engagement and accountability. Written responses, though still constituting formal replies, may suggest varying degrees of priority assigned to different inquiries. Potential explanations range from the perceived significance of the issues raised to the government’s assessment of legislative urgency. The 217 policy reviews conducted by the FNC represent a particularly impactful aspect of its work. Averaging 13.5 reviews annually, these in-depth examinations provide members with valuable policy analysis experience, supporting the Political Empowerment Strategy’s goal of institutional maturation. The fluctuating annual numbers (from 28 in 2008–09 to 6 in 2009–10) reflect the variable nature of policy agendas rather than any diminishment of the FNC’s role.

The government’s response patterns offer insights into executive-legislative dynamics. While the predominance of oral responses demonstrates substantial cooperation, the existence of written replies and unattended sessions suggests areas for potential improvement. These variations might indicate differing assessments of issue importance or, alternatively, strategic decisions to accelerate certain policies through alternative approval channels when deemed urgent. Such complexities merit further research to fully understand the implications for the FNC’s development as an institution. This analysis underscores both the achievements and ongoing evolution of the FNC’s oversight capabilities within the UAE’s unique governance framework. The findings provide empirical evidence of how consultative bodies can develop substantive policy influence through persistent, technically-focused engagement. A further limitation is the inability to assess the substantive quality of government responses (e.g., oral vs. written) due to inconsistent public documentation, which future studies could address through interviews with FNC members.

The study’s second proposition posited that the FNC would strategically utilize and expand parliamentary inquiries to enhance its oversight capabilities. To evaluate this claim, we conducted a systematic content analysis of all FNC inquiries from 2012 to 2023, focusing particularly on their legislative and policy-making dimensions. Given the FNC’s institutional mandate, we specifically examined the extent to which inquiries engaged with core legislative functions.

Our methodological approach involved comprehensive archival research of session minutes, employing a dual-language keyword search strategy that included Arabic terms such as “mashroo’ qanoon” (bill), “moraja’at qanoon” (law review), and “tashree” (legislation), alongside their English equivalents. These terms were categorized into two primary groups: (1) policy-related terminology encompassing legislative drafting and review processes, and (2) non-policy terms addressing administrative and procedural matters. When terms co-occurred, researchers made context-specific classification decisions to ensure accurate categorization.

The analysis revealed several important findings about the FNC’s evolving oversight role. First, policy-oriented inquiries demonstrated the Council’s growing capacity to engage with substantive legislative matters, including policy assessment (e.g., economic reforms), institutional creation (e.g., Federal Authority for Drug Control), sectoral regulation (e.g., transparency policies), and strategic reviews (e.g., National Competitiveness Strategy). These activities, while falling short of full legislative authority, represent meaningful parliamentary oversight and have contributed to members’ legislative skill development (El-Wafa, Khalil, and Hashish, 2024). Second, the data show increasing government implementation of FNC recommendations since 2006 (Burton, 2019), despite the absence of constitutional obligations to do so (Mason, 2023; Sarkar et al., 2018). This pattern suggests increased executive responsiveness to FNC recommendations, with several policy changes correlating temporally with the Council’s oversight activities. Documented cases include: (1) the establishment of the Federal Authority of Food Control (2016 UAE Government Yearbook, pp. 34–37) following FNC health sector inquiries (2014–2015 session minutes); (2) phased Emiratization policy revisions (Badry, 2019; Sarker and Rahman, 2020) coinciding with labor market inquiries (2017–2019); and (3) the 2021 administrative upgrade of the Federal Human Resources Authority (El-Wafa et al., 2024). These developments align chronologically with sustained FNC attention to workforce challenges (Koji, 2011), though other institutional factors likely contributed (Aljobair, 2020).

The findings support Proposition 2 by demonstrating the FNC’s strategic expansion of inquiry scope and depth over time. By focusing on technically substantive policy areas while maintaining consistent engagement on implementation challenges, the Council has developed a distinctive model of consultative oversight that yields tangible governance improvements (Ulrichsen, 2016; Yaghi and Yaghi, 2024). This evolution reflects both the FNC’s institutional maturation and the government’s recognition of its value as a policy partner, notwithstanding the formal limitations of its consultative status.

The main findings include (1) policy-focused inquiries have addressed major legislative areas since 2012, (2) government implementation of recommendations has increased steadily since 2006, (3) documented policy impacts include institutional reforms and sectoral regulations, (4) technical scrutiny has compensated for formal legislative limitations, (5) executive responsiveness indicates growing institutional credibility. These results confirm the FNC’s successful expansion of its oversight role through parliamentary inquiries, while also highlighting the ongoing tension between its consultative status and substantive policy influence. The findings contribute to broader understanding of how hybrid legislative institutions can develop effective oversight mechanisms within constrained constitutional frameworks.

Based on the above discussion of the findings, it can be said that the FNC has maintained its commitment to act as an agent of the people of the UAE. The issues and concerns that were brought for discussion in the FNC have served the people, even if doing so has increased public spending. The government did not settle for the status quo; rather, it adopted the FNC’s recommendations (Sarker and Rahman, 2020).

The people, the FNC members, and the government behaved rationally, as suggested by the theory. This study confirms that despite the fact that the government holds a stronger stake in making policies (legislative powers) and is not constitutionally obliged to accept the recommendations of the FNC, it behaved rationally; it understood that political empowerment was necessary to enhance the good governance strategy that it adopted. Moreover, the government acknowledged the advancing expertise that the FNC’s members had gained over the years and that the FNC’s recommendations have merits and originality (Burton, 2019). If the government continued to play alone in making public policy, the legitimacy of its public sector reforms would be weak, because people would perceive them as lacking responsiveness to their needs (Sakr, 2015; Yaghi, 2009). At the same time, the FNC was rational in grabbing any opportunity to exercise legislative power. The FNC’s members did not demand a bigger role or even a transformation into a full-fledged parliament (Yaghi and Antwi‐Boateng (2016)). Instead, they used whatever legislative powers they already had, albeit limited (i.e., parliamentary inquiries), and improved their individual—and, consequently, institutional—capacity to act as a check on the government and engage in effective oversight practices (Alhaddabi, 2021).

As the principal–agent theory suggests, the behavior of the FNC’s members reflects typical rationality. Individually, they needed to convince their constituencies of their institutional worth as representatives of the people (Braun and Guston, 2003). At the same time, they needed to improve their engagement in public policy and perfect their parliamentary questions and deliberations so that the people would elect them again (Fadhil et al., 2019; Mustafa, 2022; Strøm, 2000). They simultaneously respected the executive branch and did not take a confrontational position against any issues they discussed. Their rationality is justified by their interest in building a good image and assuring the government of their “tame” behavior. All this is because the FNC’s members need to be reappointed, need the government to continue its political empowerment strategy without interruptions, and need to show the government that they can hold the stick from the middle by satisfying the people’s need for better responsiveness and accountability in public administration while serving the government’s need for a team player that provides it with sound recommendations (Shaali, Rashid, and Kibble, 2000). The more the FNC succeeds in playing these sophisticated roles, the more it can gain legitimacy from the people; thus, the desire to become a proper parliament could be materialized based on stronger public support (Yaghi and Antwi‐Boateng 2017). This argument is specifically valid in the UAE, where people traditionally trust the government and its branches (Albayan, 2023).

In conclusion, the FNC has demonstrated measurable policy influence within its consultative framework, as evidenced by recommendation adoption rates and government engagement, though its non-binding authority limits direct causality claims. Moreover, their collective work to gain the FNC a continued and increasing institutional capacity was evident in the actual roles currently played by the FNC compared to previous years. Put differently, the success in developing the legislative status of the FNC was reflected by the number of issues discussed inside the FNC or the number of parliamentary inquiries presented, but also by the quality of their inputs. As this study illustrates, the practices of questioning the government and demanding satisfactory responses have contributed to the government’s trust in the outcomes of the FNC’s work. In addition, the ability of the FNC to recommend specialized administrative and policy actions may affect the way people perceive the FNC as an effective agent that serves the best interests of the people (see, Mansoor, 2021 and Yaghi, 2024). These developments are crucial for the future of the FNC as a parliament.

Limitations and Suggestions

This study took a pioneering approach to examine a topic rarely addressed in the literature. While providing novel insights, several important limitations must be acknowledged. The analysis is constrained by: (1) reliance on formal archival records that may overlook informal influence channels (e.g., behind-the-scenes negotiations) shaping FNC-executive dynamics; (2) gaps in public documentation of internal deliberations that restrict analysis of potential executive pressures on appointed members; (3) absence of internal FNC voting records that precludes assessment of internal bargaining dynamics; and (4) a focus on documented inquiries that may underrepresent symbolic or low-impact activities. These constraints require cautious interpretation of the FNC’s operational effectiveness beyond its documented technical scrutiny.

The methodological boundaries present additional challenges. While the 2006–2023 timeframe provides a longitudinal perspective, it may exclude relevant historical context. The content analysis framework, while systematic, could be expanded to capture more nuanced dimensions of parliamentary inquiries. Most significantly, rigorous cross-GCC comparisons remain unfeasible due to fundamental data inconsistencies across regional parliamentary systems (Herb, 2014; Power, 2013). Theoretical limitations also merit consideration. While principal-agent theory effectively explains formal oversight mechanisms, it inadequately captures important cultural dimensions of accountability, particularly traditional majlis consultation practices that continue to influence UAE governance (Al Mazroui, 2020). This cultural-theoretical gap may lead to underestimating informal accountability channels. Institutionally, the FNC’s constitutional design creates inherent constraints. Its lack of binding legislative authority produces unavoidable dependency on executive goodwill for policy implementation (Aljobair, 2020). This structural limitation is compounded by transparency gaps regarding recommendation rejection rates and the potential for implicit pressures on appointed members. These factors distinguish the FNC’s role from fully empowered legislatures and should inform any comparative assessments.

Future research should address these limitations through three key avenues: (1) deeper archival investigation of uncovered years and informal governance channels; (2) detailed case studies tracking specific policy actions from inquiry to implementation; and (3) systematic assessment of public perceptions regarding the FNC’s representative effectiveness. While the present study’s concentrated focus on the UAE yields valuable insights, it necessarily leaves broader comparative questions unanswered, particularly regarding the replicability of the FNC’s “technical scrutiny” model in more politically contested environments. Subsequent work could productively apply this study’s inquiry-tracking methodology to other Gulf consultative bodies while incorporating public opinion surveys. Such efforts would help disentangle the FNC’s unique institutional dynamics from the UAE’s distinctive political culture, where traditional ruler-citizen trust mechanisms may shape outcomes differently than in other governance contexts.