Introduction

A rejection of large-scale mining has been spreading across Latin America (Bebbington, 2009; Curran, 2017; Walter & Urkidi, 2017; Von Redecker & Herzig, 2020; Paredes, 2022; Regassa, 2022; Kowszyk et al., 2023) and the world (Calvano, 2008; Hanna et al., 2016). Various issues, such as increasing inequality, lack of recognition of Indigenous rights, poor participatory and democratic mechanisms, and growing opposition to extractivist production systems, have led to increasing socio-environmental conflict (Hanna et al., 2016; Conde, 2017; Delamaza et al., 2017; Vanclay & Hanna, 2019). As a manifestation and outcome of the widespread general unrest across Latin America since before 2000, the demand for meaningful social and political change in some countries has reached the point where constitutional reform processes have been initiated, e.g., Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador (Gudynas, 2016; Silva et al., 2018). This was especially evident with the October 2019 social uprising in Chile, where a groundswell social movement erupted strongly, saying ‘No to the status quo’, resulting in a process of socio-political reform.

The demand for change in Chile came after more than 30 years of power imbalance, institutional rigidity, and a strong alliance between the political and business elites, which led to elite capture, corruption, and a perception that the rich were looting (saqueo) the nation (Heiss, 2021). In the decades before the October 2019 social uprising, no serious consideration had been given by successive Chilean governments to any of the many political and economic concerns of the populace or intellectual groups (Van Lier, 2019).

The 2019 social uprising was highly significant in the social and political life in Chile, and it invoked a change in societal normative standards (Garcés, 2019; Heiss, 2021). For example, as Pozzi et al. (2022) argued, not only activists, but most members of the broader society demanded systemic change and were willing to become active agents in the social change process that the country was experiencing. The social uprising in Chile was thus an opportunity for us to study corporate moral management, especially in terms of how companies react to the challenges imposed by turbulent times and to changes in societal normative standards. This aligns with recent work showing how civil society pressure can shape corporate and policy responses even when formal access is limited (Spalding, 2023). In this paper, we examine a controversial planned mining operation, the Dominga mining project, in the Coquimbo Region of Chile, especially in terms of what the company did in response to three key events: the October 2019 uprising; the onslaught of COVID-19; and the release of the Pandora Papers in August 2021, which exposed corruption amongst the elite in Chile and elsewhere.

Although there are many strategies companies can use in response to extractive conflicts (Vanclay & Hanna, 2019), the various analyses of corporate responses to conflict have tended to focus on impression management and neutralization techniques (Garrett et al., 1989; Godfrey et al., 2003; Duarte, 2011; Maher, 2019; Maher et al., 2022). This focus generally overlooks the ethical and moral dimensions of decision-making that companies might take into account in their management actions, as well as the extent to which companies consider societal moral consensus (Carroll, 1987, 1991, 1998, 2001; Bird & Waters, 1987).

A framework for understanding moral management by corporations was developed by Monin & Merrit (2012). Other authors have also contributed a range of various moral management concepts, such as moral silence, moral muteness, moral deafness, moral blindness, moral myopia, moral hypocrisy, moral paralysis, and moral nihilism (Bird & Waters, 1989; Bird, 1996; Drumwright & Murphy, 2004; Pölzler, 2015; Schwartz, 2016). However, despite all these contributions, there is not yet a holistic corporate moral framework. Furthermore, the various corporate moral concepts have typically only been described very generally and individually (rather than collectively as a set), and they have largely not been critically examined or empirically tested, with only a very few case studies using these concepts (e.g., Søreng, 2006; Melé & Armengou, 2016).

The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to develop an inclusive overarching moral framework for understanding corporate behaviour in turbulent times. We combine the disparate moral concepts that exist in the literature into a holistic framework that assists in comprehending the behaviour of corporations in moral terms. We test this framework empirically using a case study from the extractive industries. In doing so, we add clarity to the understanding of these moral concepts and to corporate moral management generally.

Fieldwork was undertaken in the locality of the Dominga mining project in Chile between 2019 and 2022. In 2017, we undertook informal fieldwork (without institutional ethics approval) to gain an understanding of the context and conflict. With our data covering the periods before and after three turbulent events (the October 2019 uprising, COVID-19, and the release of the Pandora Papers), we are well-positioned to study changes in corporate behaviour in response to turbulent times and to consider whether or not companies experience any changes in their decision-making process. Our results show that the disparate corporate moral concepts can be combined into a holistic moral framework that is useful in understanding corporate moral management.

An issue for this paper relates to the precise meaning of the words, moral, ethical and normative, about which there is much confusion, especially in the field of business ethics (Fisher, 2004). While these terms have somewhat similar meanings, especially regarding how they would be used in practice, there are some fundamental differences. Essentially, morals and morality refer to personal beliefs about right or wrong, and good or bad; whereas ethics and ethical refer to making decisions by using a set or system of ethical principles and ethical reasoning to determine what is right or wrong, and good or bad. In contrast, ‘normative’ is a very general term that simply means relating to social norms or to an established standard about what should be done or what is good. Despite their different meanings, these three terms (moral, ethical, and normative) are often used interchangeably (e.g., Bird & Waters, 1987). Therefore, consistent with most usage in the field of business ethics (Fisher, 2004), in this paper,r we accept that ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ are effectively equivalent, and we primarily refer to ‘moral management’ and ‘moral standards’. However, we will distinguish ethical/moral standards (which we deem to be based on ethical principles) from societal normative standards (which we regard as being based on societal consensus).

Moral Concepts In Corporate Practice

Carroll (1987, 1991, 1998, 2001) developed a typology with three types of ethical management: immoral, moral and amoral. ‘Immoral management’ is characterized by management decisions that contradict what is ethical or right. This type implies an active negation of what is moral, with ethical principles and the law being seen as obstacles that companies need to manage, bypass or subvert in order to achieve their goals. The second type is ‘moral management’, which occurs when managers adhere to and accept ethical norms. They seek profit but willingly comply with the law, ethics and justice. Where it would be possible, they would go beyond legal minimum standards and extoll ethical leadership. The third type is ‘amoral management’, which is neither moral nor immoral, but refers to business management being done without awareness of the effects of business activities on others. In amoral management, managers generally lack an ethical perspective in their thinking, perhaps because they believe ethics is for private life, not for business. In our paper, we refer to the (im)morality of organizations as well as of individuals in organizational decision-making positions.

In complex environments, moral decision-making often requires a proactive approach rather than mere adherence to existing norms. Rindova and Martins (2023) argue that corporate purpose during turbulent times is shaped not only by ethical compliance but also by an active, value-driven process that aligns strategic intent with social expectations. This perspective helps companies navigate competing demands and reinforces the integration of ethical considerations into strategic decision-making.

Corporate managers typically encounter moral decision-making in their daily activities and would generally consider societal normative standards, because most actions (e.g., with host communities, project-affected people, workers, suppliers and other stakeholders) have moral consequences (Waters et al., 1986; Carroll, 1999; Pimenowa et al., 2023). As an early contribution to the field of corporate moral management, Bird and Waters (1987) derived the key components that comprise societal moral standards (at least from the perspective of corporate managers). Their listing can be updated to align with contemporary understandings: (1) transparency and honesty in communication; (2) treating everyone fairly; (3) giving special consideration to certain individuals or groups due to their particular circumstances (e.g. vulnerability); (4) playing the game fairly (e.g. avoiding corruption and malpractice); (5) being a responsible organization, meaning complying with international standards and rules for corporate practice; (6) implementing corporate social responsibility; and (7) respecting the law, for example by not engaging in evasive or delaying tactics, or tax avoidance or tax evasion. We would think that this schema remains relevant today, although perhaps we would add that corporations should also: fully address their social and environmental impacts; be mindful of and manage their human rights responsibilities throughout their whole supply chain (upstream and downstream); and engage with and consider the concerns of their host communities (United Nations, 2011; Vanclay & Hanna, 2019).

Heterogeneity in society makes it complex for agreement on universal moral standards to be achieved. Bird & Waters (1987) found that managers’ approaches to moral standards were generally nebulous, and that, rather than accept that moral standards were widely held in society, managers generally only considered moral standards to be ‘personal intuitions’ and therefore were not relevant to making business decisions and taking action.

A key aspect of moral management relates to ‘moral integrity’, which refers to the consistency between a person’s or organization’s internal values and their external statements and actions (Monin & Merrit, 2012). Somewhat contrasting concepts are ‘moral silence’, which is associated with not talking about the ethics of intended or implemented actions or decisions (Kreps & Monin, 2011), and ‘organizational silence’, which refers to the company strategically deciding not to make statements about controversial issues (Morrison & Milliken, 2000; Kish-Gephart et al., 2009). The full range of moral management concepts that have been nominated by various authors and are described in Table 1.

Table 1 Key concepts in corporate moral management.
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We suggest that the listing of concepts in Table 1 together with the definitions we have provided is already a significant contribution to the moral management literature because such a comprehensive listing did not previously exist. Later in our paper, we empirically test this list by using a case study of the Dominga mining project in Chile, eventually clarifying the definitions and combining them in a holistic framework of corporate moral management.

Kreps and Monin (2011) argued that firms actively position themselves either in a moral frame or in a pragmatic frame, and that they frequently switch between these two frames. At various times, companies use moral arguments to justify a decision, while at other times they use purely pragmatic reasoning. Part of our interest was to see how the Dominga mining project changed its decision-making and actions in response to turbulent times.

Garcia-Ortega et al. (2022) studied how multinational CEOs responded to crises (specifically COVID-19). They found that ‘moral paralysis’ was the predominant behaviour, which usually led to ad hoc philanthropic responses rather than to long-term strategic corporate social investment programs. Garcia-Ortega et al. (2022) explained this by referring to the complexity of COVID-19, which caused confusion and disorientation amongst CEOs in terms of how they should respond.

The notion of ‘moral intensity’ is useful in understanding how moral paralysis occurs. Moral intensity is a measure of the extent to which an issue is of moral significance, and could be measured by indicators such as the probability (likelihood) and magnitude of consequences (severity), the temporal immediacy and proximity of the issue, the extent of social consensus around the issue, and the distribution of effects resulting from the issue (Jones, 1991). To this list of indicators, Schwartz (2016) added ‘issue importance’ (perceived relevance) and ‘issue complexity’ (how hard it is to understand). Another indicator that perhaps should be added is irreversibility or irremediability, meaning the impossibility of remedying the consequences of the action (United Nations, 2011; Götzmann et al., 2016; Esteves et al., 2017).

COVID-19 created a situation with high moral intensity because of its potential health and well-being consequences, as well as the uncertainty and complexity of COVID and possible COVID responses by societal actors. Although COVID-19 represented an opportunity for firms to rethink their approach to corporate social responsibility, most of their responses were philanthropic rather than strategic (Garcia-Ortega et al., 2022). The COVID-19 pandemic posed significant challenges for corporate moral resilience, highlighting how companies struggled to maintain ethical standards while dealing with liquidity and solvency issues (Chang et al., 2022).

The last concept that deserves further explanation is ‘moral nihilism’, which means the denial of the existence of moral truths (Pölzler, 2015). Moral nihilists generally accept that morality is held by others and that people make judgments around what they believe to be right or wrong, but moral nihilists do not accept the normative aspect of morality. They deny there is a ‘moral truth’, and they argue that there are no moral judgments that must be considered (Pölzler, 2015).

Methodology

Our field-based research was primarily a case study of a highly controversial mining project, the proposed Dominga Mine in the Commune (municipality) of La Higuera in the Region of Coquimbo in northern Chile. The intended iron and copper mine was first proposed in 2010, and was then likely to cost USD 2.5 billion to become operational. In 2025, this figure was still being used (Mining.com, 2025). The mine has attracted much criticism over time, especially in 2013 following the release of a manifestly inadequate Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) statement (Ministry of Environment, 2017). Although the mine itself was not a primary contributing factor to the October 2019 social uprising, nonetheless, for various reasons (see below), the issues associated with the Dominga mining project were indicative of the concerns of the social movement that formed around the uprising. In January 2025, the new Chilean Government again refused to give environmental approval for the mine (Mining.com, 2025).

Our research was a time-series case study in that we conducted data collection relevant to the case at several points in time, specifically in 2019 (before the social uprising), 2021, and 2022. Apart from this paper, we have also used our data relating to the Dominga mining project to consider the playing-out of the various forms of power (Kowszyk et al., 2025). We used a grounded theory approach to iteratively combine inductive and deductive research. The data collection techniques included document collection, fieldwork, participant observation, photograph collection, and in-depth interviews. Due to the changing context, the focus of our research also changed over time. In 2017, the key issue was perceptions around whether and how the mining project would respect local concerns. In early 2019, the key issue was around the inadequacy of public participation in the EIA. In 2021 and 2022, the key issues were primarily about the consequences of the changes at the national level following the social uprising, the effects of COVID-19, the public reaction to the Pandora Papers, and the extent to which these issues affected corporate behaviour. However, the moral behaviour of Dominga was continuously present, both as an implicit and explicit aspect of our research.

In total, we conducted 44 in-depth interviews, 37 in the La Higuera commune and 7 in Santiago de Chile (the national capital). The interviews ranged from 20 to 150 minutes, were conducted in Spanish, and most were audio-recorded. Where not recorded, extensive notes were taken. People interviewed came from most of the communities within the Commune of La Higuera. They included some places where the majority of people were in favour of the project, and some places where the majority of people were against the project. Key locations were La Higuera township (the main town in the Commune, and one of the poorest), Punta de Choros (a small seaside village adjoining two marine reserves), Los Choros (a small town), and El llano (an agricultural area). The interviews comprised: 19 community members; 7 local activists; 4 business representatives; 4 local government representatives; 4 scientists; 2 representatives from environmental NGOs; 2 people who were members of the constitutional assembly established to develop the new constitution; and 2 managers from the Dominga Mining Company. The principles of ethical social research (Vanclay et al., 2013) were followed and informed consent was obtained from all interviewees.

We are aware of the potential for bias in this research. We did our best to collect diverse perspectives by deliberating on recruiting people who would be in favour of the project as well as those who would be opposed to the project. We also selected people from most of the communities in the region of the Dominga mine, as well as in the capital city, Santiago de Chile. Access to senior executives was limited. Although we attempted to arrange interviews with many representatives from Andes Iron, only a few staff agreed to speak with us. While we acknowledge this limitation, we consider it important to explicitly note how it shapes our interpretations. The restricted access limits our ability to directly assess internal moral reasoning or intentionality behind Dominga’s conduct. As such, claims related to moral disengagement or moral nihilism are based on indirect indicators, such as corporate communications, interactions with community actors, and longitudinal observations of company behaviour. This approach is consistent with interpretive research traditions that infer organizational morality from externally observable practices in turbulent social contexts (e.g., Penman, 2016; Spalding, 2023).

Apart from collecting primary data, we also analysed over 300 documents relating to the October 2019 social uprising or to the Dominga mining project and its local context. These were collected from various sources, including: media articles; scientific papers; Dominga Mining Company communications that were publicly available; reports and correspondence from various NGOs, including Alianza Humboldt, OCEANA, Greenpeace, and MODENA; reports from research centres and think-tanks, such as the Centre of Studies of Conflict and Social Cohesion (COES), CIPER (an investigation journalism centre), and the Centre of Public Studies (CEP), among others. Most information was in Spanish and was retained in Spanish for the analysis. For this paper, selected texts were translated into English by the authors. Translation was done with an attempt to preserve the original intention of what was said, and in a way that would enable a person reading in English to understand the point, rather than being a direct literal translation of the original wording in Spanish. Anonymized excerpts, coding schemes, and other supporting data may be made available by the authors upon request, in accordance with ethical research practices and participant confidentiality.

Using a grounded theory process, after each data collection cycle, we summarised our data and clarified the concepts and relationships that emerged (Gioia et al., 2013), which informed our next round of interviews. We used the constant comparative method (Kolb, 2012) to analyze our data using theoretical and emergent coding. We were aware that data can be interpreted through more than one concept; thus, we implemented flexible coding (Deterding & Waters, 2021), often applying more than one code to the extracts. Subsequently, we implemented ‘intercoding’ (Burla et al., 2008), with two of the authors coding the data to increase the robustness of the final coding system. In total, we processed 474 excerpts (i.e., the interviews and extracts from secondary data). In processing the data, we used Atlas-Ti version 9.

Table 2 depicts our coding scheme. In Atlas-Ti, we coded excerpts (segments) of our research data from all sources, including interviews, documents and other secondary data (including images and videos), and our fieldnotes. We implemented emergent coding of these materials. The company's actions were identified as being before or after the three critical events we call ‘turbulent times’ – the October 2019 Social Uprising, COVID-19, and the release of the Pandora Papers – all of which happened between late 2019 and 2021. In order to link our emergent coding with the theoretical concepts from the literature, we established theory-based codes. As all the evidence we gained about the Dominga mining project indicated ‘immoral management’ (Carroll Type 1), the applicable first-order codes all referred to immoral management: moral silence; muteness; deafness; blindness; myopia; hypocrisy; paralysis; and nihilism.

Table 2 Coding tree used to analyse corporate moral frames in turbulent times.
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The Dominga mining project

Since 2010, the Dominga mining project has been owned by Andes Iron, a Chilean private capital firm. The major shareholder of this firm is Carlos Delano, a childhood friend of Sebastián Piñera. Piñera was President of Chile from 2010–2014, and again 2018–2022. The proposed copper and iron ore mine is in the Commune of La Higuera in the Region of Coquimbo in northern Chile. The plans for the mining operation include: two open pits (16 km northwest of the town of La Higuera); a processing plant; a tailings dam; three 26 km underground pipelines; a desalination plant; and a port near the town of Totoralillo Norte (Dominga, 2023). Infographics about the mine and its location are available on Dominga’s website: https://www.dominga.cl/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ProyectoDominga_Infografias-Mapas_Prensa.pdf.

If it were to become operational, the project is expected to have a lifespan of over 20 years. It is expected to generate 10,000 jobs during construction and provide 1500 jobs during operation (Empleos Dominga, 2023). Although there has been much planning of the proposed mining operation and various licensing procedures have been initiated, there have been many legal and administrative complexities. Eventually, in January 2023, the project was rejected by the Committee of Ministries (CNN Chile, 2023), a decision that was reconfirmed in January 2025 (Mining.com, 2025). However, at the time of writing (early 2025) no announcement from the company has indicated acceptance of this decision, with the Andes mining company and Chile’s National Mining Society (Sonami) indicating that they will contest the decision (Mining.com, 2025).

From when local communities became aware of the Dominga project (sometime between 2010 and 2013) up until the present time, there have been two main groups in the Commune, broadly speaking, those in favour of the project and those against it. The town of La Higuera is a historical mining community that became impoverished due to high unemployment after previous mining operations stopped. The people in La Higuera are generally in favour of the project. In contrast, in other locations, there are groups of people who seek to strengthen the protection status of the two nature reserves in the area, the Humboldt Penguin National Reserve and the Punta de Choros marine reserve, both being tourism destinations (Gallardo Fernández & Friman, 2011). The region has experienced many social issues, including poverty, drug and alcohol abuse, and allegations that the company is manipulating and dividing the community.

The likely environmental impacts of the Dominga mine include: potential damage to the two reserves; an important aquifer being affected; a change in the unique qualities of the local seawater due to increasing salinity from the planned desalination plant; oil spills from ships; and noise and vibration from ships that may disrupt the whale migration highway (EJAtlas, 2018). To protect the area, an alliance (Alianza Humboldt) comprising many NGOs was created in 2019. Alianza Humboldt has taken a lead role in protest and litigation in relation to many issues in the region, including the Dominga mine. Partially as a result of the actions of Alianza Humboldt, two major policy initiatives have been implemented: formal recognition of two new Indigenous (Changos) communities in the area, and declaration of some additional protected areas that only allow low-impact activities such as artisanal fishing and tourism.

In strong contrast to the extent and strength of public opposition to the project, various statements on the company’s website imply that it is innovative, world-class, and will use the best available technology (Dominga, 2022). Below, various extracts from the English version of their website (https://www.dominga.cl/en/) give some idea of the tone of the narrative they use.

We have studied mining operations in developed countries, such as the United States, Australia and Canada, places where port mining activity coexists with the preservation and care of the environment, identifying those relevant aspects to replicate in our country and transform ourselves into an example of green mining, sustainable and compatible with the serious climate change crisis.

The Dominga project salvages a long established tradition in the region, linked to its territorial identity and anchored in mining heritage, rescuing its historical value and giving it a renewed meaning.

HOW WILL WE AFFECT THE LIVES OF THE PEOPLE LIVING IN THE AREA?

We will activate the zone and the Region´s productive sector. During the construction phase we plan to create 10,000 direct jobs and 25,000 indirect jobs. During the stage of operation, we expect the creation of 1500 direct jobs and 4000 indirect jobs. These jobs, which are preferentially destined to regional workers and companies, will revitalize the communal, regional and national economy. In addition, we have a robust social proposal that acknowledges the right of the Commune´s population to benefit from the mineral resources. In this context, the Company has signed a Framework Agreement along with over 1600 neighbours, where we pledge to share the profits with the entire community through the transfer of funds to finance those projects that the community considers appropriate according to their social and economic value.

WHY WON’T WE AFFECT THE HUMBOLDT PENGUIN NATIONAL RESERVE?

Our seaport and water desalination plant will be located 30 kilometres away, in a straight line, from the Humboldt Penguin National Reserve, even further than the Cruz Grande mining port of the Pacific Mining Company (CAP), already granted approval by the same institution that assessed Dominga. There are already some 1600 ships currently circulating, along the coasts of the Coquimbo Region a year, just a few kilometres from the Humboldt Penguin National Reserve (approx. 5 km). Our project estimates traffic flow of 56 vessels per year, at a speed of 18 km per hour and more than 20 km away from the Reserve. We have a deep commitment to the environment, therefore we have worked on a strong, binding and independent proposal, which provides scientific knowledge of current and future conditions of marine biodiversity and thus adjusts all our operations and those of any company, to the goal of environment protection.

Another example of Dominga’s narrative can be seen in statements of the legal representative of Andes Iron, Iván Garrido, who said that more than 1,200 people from the commune had signed an agreement with the mining company and that this “reflects the work we have been doing for two and a half years, with ups and downs, discussions and learning, which led to the signing of this document, which is a concrete symbol of our interest in finding a way to coexist harmoniously and inclusively with the community” (Diario Universidad de Chile, 2017, online).

Turbulent times: the October 2019 social uprising and ongoing unrest

Chile is a country where social and environmental conflicts are frequent due to its considerable mineral reserves (Delamaza et al., 2017). The conflicts are both a cause and a consequence of the vulnerabilities in rural areas. From the 1980s on, the government’s neoliberalism policies and free-market model did not increase the quality and accessibility of public services. Also, various dubious corporate practices by the major consumer goods companies led to increases in the price of basic commodities and to growing economic disparity (Olave, 2018). Despite widespread dissatisfaction with the government since the military overthrow of the Allende government in 1973, there had been few major protest actions until the 2019 social uprising. The significance of and flux around the 2019 uprising make this context an appropriate situation to consider how companies change their moral management approach in response to turbulent times. We therefore believe that the Dominga mining project is a good case for our research on moral management.

The October 2019 social uprising was not a singular event, but was a process of resistance that grew over time and culminated in massive public protests and many acts of civil disobedience (Garcés, 2019). The sequence of events that provoked the social mobilization was as follows. At the beginning of October 2019, there was an increase in the price of metro tickets (by 30 pesos, or 4%). This led to widespread protests against this symbolically significant price hike. The protests included en masse spontaneous fare evasion actions (e.g., jumping over the entry turnstiles), especially by young people, which later became a coordinated campaign of civil disobedience. While the protests started in Santiago (the capital city), they rapidly spread across the whole country. On 18 October 2019, there was a mass mobilization of people in Plaza Italia (a central meeting point in Santiago), with many acts of sabotage and destruction of metro property and other buildings. In response to the mobilisation, the then President of Chile, Sebastián Piñera, announced a state of emergency and brought in the army to enforce law-and-order. This led to a severe and repressive police and army response against the protesters, resulting in around 34 people being killed and thousands of people being injured. One outcome of the tactics used by the state machinery was that, by the end of 2019, some 460 people had suffered ocular lesions from rubber bullets and may have permanent damage to their sight (France24, 2022). The total damage bill from the whole uprising was considerable, amounting to over USD 2 billion (Gurri, 2022). Despite the uprising extending over many months from 2019 into 2020, it is generally called ‘18-O’ because of the significance of the mobilisation on 18 October 2019.

The underlying factors that triggered the uprising (some of which had been in existence for decades) included: a general discontent about the neoliberal model of development; awareness of corruption and abuse of power; increasing unemployment; widespread dissatisfaction with the government and state due to inequality, poverty, and an increasing cost of living; dissatisfaction with the privatization of public services; and growing awareness of corporate malpractice, especially in relation to various reports that proved the existence of corporate collusion in price fixing of basic commodities (Hernández, 2012; Maldonado et al., 2017; Artaza et al., 2018).

Although the ongoing protest was called the October 2019 uprising (and 18-O), it continued in various forms for several years (Nueva Tribuna, 2024). With a collapsing economy and ongoing protests, the state and government were in crisis. Discussions in Parliament led to a referendum being held on 25 October 2020 about implementing a process to change the constitution. The referendum was passed with a 78% majority of citizens voting for a new Constitution to be developed (The Guardian, 2021). Routine presidential, parliamentary and regional elections were held on 21 November 2021, leading to significant changes in the political scene. At 35 years old, Gabriel Boric became the youngest President ever elected in Chile, indicating a strong intention by the Chilean people that a different approach was needed (BBC Mundo News, 2021).

In addition to the October 2019 social uprising, Chile faced two other crises: the COVID pandemic and the release of the Pandora Papers. COVID-19 had a big impact on Chilean society in many ways. For example, Mena et al. (2021) analysed the socio-geographical distribution of the incidence and mortality rates attributed to COVID-19. It was widely reported in Chile that fatality rates from COVID were much higher in lower-income municipalities than richer neighbourhoods because of the presence of other illnesses and a lack of access to healthcare (Multidimensional Poverty Network, 2020). Public awareness of these findings, together with increasing inequality and extreme poverty, which was exacerbated by COVID-19, led to widespread outrage against the government, especially in 2020 and 2021.

The Pandora Papers were an investigation of corruption (financial irregularities) around the world. Led by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, the investigation reviewed 12 million records from law firms and financial advisers that had facilitated tax evasion. The public release of the Pandora Papers in August 2021 exposed graft by high-level officials and public servants. Among them were the (former) presidents of Chile, the Dominican Republic and Ecuador (ICIJ, 2021). In the case of President Piñera of Chile, it was revealed that in 2010, he had sold the Dominga Mining Project to his childhood friend, Carlos Delano, for a total of US$152 million to be paid in three instalments (CIPER, 2021a). The last instalment was conditional on the project location not being declared a protected area. Despite long-term strong demand for declaring a protected area in the region of the Dominga Mining Project, this did not happen while Piñera was president, and therefore Piñera received the third instalment shortly beforethe release of the Pandora Papers and the Chilean elections in November 2021 (Mongabay, 2021). The payments to Piñera were transacted in the Virgin Islands, a fiscal haven that offers discretion and anonymity (CIPER, 2021b). The release of the Pandora Papers severely diminished the credibility and legitimacy of the business and political elite in Chile, and strengthened the concern of many citizens about the extent of systemic corruption and impropriety in government, and therefore the impossibility of fundamental change within the current regime.

How societal normative standards changed during turbulent times

Ever since the 1973 military overthrow of democratically elected President Salvador Allende, Chileans have been aware that their country was ruled by an alliance of political and economic elites. Some people benefited from this alliance, while most were harmed by it. Because of the advantages the elite received from this alliance, the elite were fearful of change, especially when the 2018 social uprising occurred. For example, in 2021, a business magazine contributed to fearmongering by stating that: “It is clear that the state will now be bigger, with more taxes and more regulation”. Furthermore, in one of our interviews, a mining association representative erroneously explained that:

I know that people are talking about the so-called extractivism being a destructive force in society, and this view won the battle with the social uprising. However, there is an idea [in the community] that private mining companies do not contribute anything to the country, when in fact CODELCO [the state-owned copper mining company] pays less taxes than the private ones [NB, this is a false statement]. With the social uprising, the mining sector is willing to pay even more taxes and be greener, because we know we have no alternative. The only thing we really seek to protect is the concept of mining remaining as a [legitimate] private sector activity and to avoid nationalization of companies. The problem is that, now, people are participating [in governance], but they are ignorant so they will drive the country just with their political ideas.

The October 2019 social uprising also came to the communities in the La Higuera commune, and local protests happened in various forms. National and international NGOs and celebrities (notably Jane Goodall and Leonardo DiCaprio) also weighed-in to the conflict. Most local villages had cabildos (local gatherings) where discussion of current events took place. The 18-O uprising, the referendum for a new constitution, and the change of government together indicate that there was a switch in societal normative standards. As a local public servant said in 2022, “with the uprising, it became clear to people that they had been deceived and many lies [false promises] had been said [by the government]”. After 2019, there was an awareness that “citizen participation is a new human right” (Press release, 2022).

Local resistance groups received support from national and international movements and new narratives emerged about the power of local people to engage in bottom-up change. The social changes occurring in Chile would have been of great concern to the Dominga Mining Company, especially as the change in government severely threatened the likelihood of their project obtaining formal approval. This was made explicit when the new President Boric (from a left-wing moderate party, Convergencia Social) mentioned in his inaugural speech several of the expressions used during the social uprising, including the widely championed slogan, “No to Dominga”. A local fisher said to us: “I believe, thanks to the social uprising, we are no longer just a few people, but even people in Santiago are now strongly supporting our claims, so we are no longer alone. There are 500,000 people in Santiago with us”.

The opposition group (Alianza Humboldt) also found national support to mobilize against the Dominga mine. Moreover, mention of “a socio-ecological approach” as one of the principles for drafting the new constitution legitimised their main claim: that a large-scale mine like Dominga was incompatible with the preservation of their traditional local development model based on fishing, agriculture and tourism. A local public servant said to us: “If well organized, all the communities in the area could live from marine ecosystem services”.

Corporate responses in turbulent times

Fieldwork notes: our experience as researchers when we visited the Dominga project office

During our visit to La Higuera in early 2019 (in the second round of data collection), we visited the Dominga Mining Company’s office in the town’s main square. Upon arriving, we received a cold reception from the people behind the front desk, who seemed reluctant to engage with us. We explained the goal of our visit, they immediately said that interviews about the Dominga mining project were prohibited. Undeterred, we insisted on speaking with someone in a position of authority. In the meantime, several residents of La Higuera entered the room, and an atmosphere of curiosity emerged. We approached these residents, introduced ourselves, and asked permission to interview them. Their responses were mixed. Some became visibly anxious, while others remained calm and explained that they were not able to talk to anyone without permission from the company. However, such authorization had to be obtained from the company headquarters in Santiago, which would take several days. Aware of our limited time, we proposed either extending our stay by 2 or 3 days or conducting interviews remotely if this would be possible. Although we clarified that our research adhered to ethical protocols and ensured anonymity, we still had no takers. Shortly after we left the Dominga office, we received a phone call from an employee in the Public Relations department of the company, who questioned us about the purpose of our research, and promised to get back to us with an answer about whether or not permission would be given by the company, which never happened. A problem for us was that all other interviewees in this second round of data collection so far were from people against the project. When we shared this information with the President of La Higuera residents’ association, she suggested that we talk to a person who lived far away from town, and was therefore less influenced by the company’s rules. Determinedly, we set off with limited instructions about how to find the house. On arrival, we waved at the man and his son, who were working some distance away. They came down to meet us. We shook hands and started to talk. During the conversation, he addressed the perceived benefits of the mining project to people living in the area, and the conversation flowed smoothly. However, our interview was abruptly interrupted by a phone call from someone warning him not to engage with us. Our interviewee responded that it was too late, we were already there with him, and that our questions were quite reasonable. Despite being instructed to end the conversation, he conveyed the details of the call with us, prompting us to explain that we had no intention of exclusively interviewing opponents to the mine, but that until that moment, finding interviewees in favour of the project had been very difficult. Surprisingly, not only did he continue speaking with us at length, but we also started receiving messages from other people in favour of the project who also wished to be interviewed.

Overall reflection on our results

It was challenging to utilize the moral concepts presented in Table 1, given that the definitions were not sufficiently clear, precise or mutually exclusive. For example, we found that ‘moral blindness’ and ‘moral deafness’, as well as ‘muteness’ and ‘silence’, were effectively synonymous. When we were empirically analysing the behaviour of the Dominga mining company, robustly assigning these concepts to our research data demanded repeated discussions among the authors. Conceptually and empirically (i.e., in our attempts to assign the concepts), we found that ‘moral silence’ and ‘moral muteness’, as well as ‘moral deafness’ and ‘moral blindness’, were impossible to differentiate. Therefore, in our analysis that follows, they have been merged.

Moral silence and moral muteness

A challenge in attempting to apply the concepts of silence and muteness was that they were not mutually exclusive. “Moral silence is defined as the situation where people fail to communicate their moral concerns” (Rendtorff, 2014, p.60). This is rather similar to moral muteness, which refers to situations where “managers avoid moral expressions in their communicative exchanges but would be expected to use them either because their actual conduct reveals deference to moral standards, because they expect others to honour such standards, or because they privately acknowledge that those standards influence their decisions and actions” (Bird & Waters, 1989, p.75). We found them to be empirically indistinguishable and decided that the terms silence and muteness mean ‘failing to speak up or remaining silent even though the manager is aware of underlying moral issues’. Some indicative quotes from our case study materials that exemplify silence/muteness are:

When we visited the project area before the 2019 events, although the company made several attempts to control communication about the project, we knew that citizen participation had been implemented within the environmental impact assessment process as required, and that there was relatively willingness by the company to talk with opposition groups. However, after 2020, the company stopped dialogue with opposing communities (fieldwork notes, 2019).

Citizen participation is nothing if people do not understand (olive producer, 2019). [this also indicates that there were a lack of information]

We believe the company should present a new project with a new baseline, but the company said they will not do it because the authorities are still evaluating the one they presented in 2013. The company also rejected changing certain project activities that will affect the aquifer, but many families use the aquifer and it is very probable that it will become dry soon after mining operations commence (agriculture producer, interview, 2022)

The social uprising brought a new consciousness about the environment, and many studies from universities have clarified that damage [to the environment] is probable, but Dominga never considered them. (local public servant, interview, 2021)

The majority [of Ministers in the Committee] considered that “the project presented inadequate baseline information and had shortcomings in its measures for mitigation, compensation, and reparation”. “The EIA did not adequately address the potential significant impacts on the environment and the health of people, particularly concerning issues like air quality, light pollution, noise, risk of accidents, and spills in the operation of the port”. The ministers also took into account that “the impacts could affect the flora and fauna of a unique ecological area in the world, where, among other things, 80 percent of the world’s Humboldt Penguin population and other emblematic species such as whales and chungungos [otters] inhabit.” (Marcelo Mena, Minister, Department of Energy, newspaper, 2018) [this extract reflects how the company consistently failed to comply with the competent authority’s requests for adequate information and that the company did not acknowledge the significance of the local region].

As is evident in these excerpts, Dominga’s behaviour can be associated with moral silence and muteness. After the social uprising, COVID-19 and the publication of the Pandora Papers, Dominga stopped dialogue with opposition groups. The opposition groups argued that the company should present a new EIA, something the company was aware of because the authorities had mentioned this as well, but it refused to do so. Additionally, the company failed in its responsibility to adequately inform the community about the project, as is required by the citizen participation procedure for the EIA. The company not only ignored evidence presented by universities and research centres about the project’s potential impacts, but also failed to inform local communities about the impacts of the project, revealing that, although it was aware of moral concerns, the company did not communicate properly in response to requests from citizens and national authorities.

Moral deafness and blindness

Moral deafness and moral blindness were also hard to apply in practice. As human afflictions, blindness and deafness are very different, but as metaphors, they are fundamentally the same. Although moral deafness is defined as managers who “do not hear or respond to moral issues that have been raised by others” (Bird, 1996, p.55), and blindness refers to managers that cannot see or identify a moral concern (Drumwright & Murphy, 2004; Palazzo et al., 2012; de Klerk, 2017), blindness and deafness are both about managers not reacting because they don’t comprehend underlying moral concerns. Moral deafness and blindness differ from moral silence and moral muteness in that silence and muteness imply that the managers are aware of the moral issue but choose not to speak, whereas with deafness and blindness, managers do not comprehend the moral issues at all. A few indicative quotes from our data that illustrate moral blindness and/or deafness are:

The technical evidence makes the port and open-pit mining unfeasible. The … Humboldt Current creates a unique ecosystem. Since 1990, this coastal area has been declared a priority area for conservation because whales, dolphins, and endangered species come here to feed. Moreover, the area has been essential for the economic livelihood of fishermen and tourism [service providers]. More than 60,000 people visit the coastal region annually, and that is the true development potential of the area. Moreover, in 2017, a group of 41 scientists sent a letter to the competent authorities affirming that the mining-port projects, Dominga and Cruz Grande, are incompatible with the marine biodiversity found in the La Higuera zone, Coquimbo Region. In their letter, they provide scientific evidence explaining why the conditions in this area are unique and irreplaceable. Additionally, the experts stated that ‘the Humboldt Current, flowing from south to north, will carry and transport various pollutants produced by mining and port activities’ [to the protected area], which they regard as an unprecedented ‘ecological disaster against biodiversity’. (fisherman, interview, 2019)

During the participatory process, the opposition groups were there, but the company did not provide much explanation arguing that the fishermen were ignorant (Alianza Humbolt Leader, 2019). [this reveals not only a patronizing attitude, but also a failure to acknowledge the democratic right of people to be informed]

Every day there is more territorial, political, and media opposition [to the project]. My group [the agricultural producers] does not want to have dealings with the mining company because there is no economic benefit to us from the project. Nevertheless, the company keeps pestering us [to get our approval]. They were willing to review their weak points and change the location of the port, tailings dam, and saline concentrate outfall [from the desalinization plant]. In other words, they will significantly alter the project, but we believe that a new Environmental Impact Assessment should still be presented. Since they have already invested [a significant amount of money], they will make changes and insist on proceeding with the project. The problem is that they won’t change the southern pit, which will affect the aquifer and will be an issue because it will alter the flow and chemical composition of the groundwater. This is a serious concern due to the region’s existing drought problems. (Olive Producer, interview, 2019) [this implies that the company does not register the legitimate concerns of others]

After the participatory process that took place in 2018, the company refused to address potential changes to the project design with critical groups that at the same time gained national and international support on their claims. (fieldnotes, 2019) [this indicates a failure to acknowledge the legitimate concerns of others]

We consider that, despite the obvious seriousness of the issues raised by the opposition groups, Dominga refused to acknowledge the concerns of local groups and legal authorities, and thus, Dominga exhibited moral deafness/blindness. Most likely, the company did not respond to these requests to change the project design because they involved high costs, potential delays, reduced mineral yield, and because of uncertainties with the revised designs. A similar lack of consideration of local concerns occurred when Dominga did not present appropriate information about the project to a meeting at which fishing-dependent people were present, allegedly due to the company considering them to be ignorant people rather than as legitimate actors with legitimate concerns. The company also rejected the strong evidence in various scientific reports. All this amounts to a clear indication of moral blindness/deafness.

Moral myopia

Moral myopia was described, somewhat unhelpfully, by Drumwright and Murphy (2004, p.7) as being “a distortion of moral vision that prevents moral issues from coming into focus”. However, reflecting on the common understanding of myopia as short-sightedness, we consider that it makes more sense to describe moral myopia as ‘situations where managers consider that moral issues are not clearly in focus (i.e., are fuzzy) or are distant in space or time (and therefore can’t be seen clearly)’. While this definition is arguably conceptually (semantically) clear, we found that it was hard to apply in practice because it was difficult to differentiate myopia from other moral concepts. The one indicative quote we found that arguably implied myopia was: “Dominga consistently lied saying the project was not going to create harm. This made local people progressively lose interest in the project” (local public servant, interview, 2021). This extract could be seen as myopia because arguably there could be benefits to some members of local communities in the short term, but very clearly there is a longer term risk from the project to the environment (and therefore to most people in the local communities) because of potential harm to the marine protected area, implications of the tailings dam for the aquifer, and damage to the reputation of the local area. While this short-sightedness by the company could be called moral myopia, potentially this extract could also have been labelled moral blindness/deafness or moral nihilism.

Given that we are limited by the data available to us, we decided to retain this concept in the framework, as it is possible that there may be other situations where moral myopia unambiguously exists. To establish the legitimacy of this concept, we suggest some other situations of moral myopia that are not directly from our case study. For example, in the extractive industries, some companies deliberately postpone or avoid engagement with local communities because they want to avoid raising expectations and/or because they want to avoid the issues that information release might trigger (for example, opposition to the project). Another common occurrence in the extractive sector is that some mining work teams are only concerned about meeting short-term stage-gate targets and ignore issues that fall outside the timeframe of their performance bonuses (Moreira et al., 2022).

Moral hypocrisy

Moral hypocrisy refers to situations where managers pretend to subscribe to ethical values that they do not actually hold. In our data, we found the following indicative quotes as empirical examples of this concept:

We found that inadequacies in company communication persisted and it became harder for the company to get a legal and social license to operate. In 2019, a community benefit agreement had been agreed upon. There was also a willingness by the company to discuss the design of the project. However, after opposition at the national level became greater, and although approval of the project was unlikely, the company continued with the community benefit agreement and job creation promises, arguing that the technical part of the project evaluation had been approved, which was false. [fieldnotes, 2019]

Many specialized state agencies presented clear reports showing the negative effects of the project. There is a much concern about the lack of clarity from the firm around the marine reserves because the potential damage to biodiversity is high. These reports were considered by the Committee of Ministries which rejected the project in 2017. Then, the project was dead, but the mayor and the regional authorities want it to be reconsidered (local public servant from a national agency with marine operations, interview, 2019).

Although is difficult for local people to find a way out of their current impoverished situation, people are tired of hearing one lie after another. So, a negative circle evolves: as people are tired [because they have not received any of the promises in the community benefit agreement], the company again lies saying that the project is almost approved and they need people’ resumes to analyse who will be employed. (the same local public servant from a national agency with marine operations, interview, 2021)

A company official lied when he said the technical parts of the project were approved, because it was the opposite, it was rejected by all the technical agencies. Inevitably, there will be spills of iron, fossil fuels, among other contaminants. Nonetheless, even if it would be a world class mining project, we still would not allow it to operate in the Galapagos Island, nor should we allow it in the Humboldt Archipelago (ex-Minister of the Environment, reported by La Red, 2022a).

Up until 2019, the community benefit agreement was a relatively clear agreement and neighbours attended meetings to plan how they will use the agreement’s resources to improve local facilities and services. However, when we came back to fieldwork in 2021, their benefits came with a stipulation that “Dominga pays 30,000 Chilean pesos (30 euros) to sign in favour of the project” (fieldnotes, 2021).

The company is buying-off lots of people, and we know something is going wrong (one of the leaders of La Higuera Neighbours Association, interview, 2020).

People knew the Sub-Secretary of Mining was involved in corruption around the mining project, but the big shame and painful event arose when people learned that their own elected President Piñera was involved in the business of the mine (social leader in La Higuera, interview, 2022).

[After the social uprising] those in favour [of the project] were silenced. Although most people are against the project, still there is an unsolved community division based on deep issues. Now families and friends are divided, creating a lot of friction and tension. (local public servant in 2022) [This is hypocrisy because Dominga claimed to support the community, but actually they created social division within the community]

I do not agree with the project because of the water issue. Even though the company claims otherwise, the mining company never approached me to have a conversation and I do not support them. They never came to talk to me. But, even if they would have come, I wouldn’t have accepted them. Because they will poison the waters. Dolphins, birds, and sea lions will die if the project goes ahead (fisherman, interview, 2019).

These extracts reveal that the behaviour of the company was inconsistent with the moral management approach implied by Dominga in its materials and various other statements it made. In the excerpts above, there are clear indications that the company was being deceptive about having gained project approval. Also, there would appear to be deceit in that, to maintain public support, it emphasised job opportunities and community benefits, even though it was very unlikely that the project would proceed.

Another example of hypocrisy relates to the payment of fees to some local people (equivalent of 30 euros monthly), ostensibly being reimbursement for their time in community advisory committee meetings. After COVID restrictions started, these payments continued; however, they were only paid to people who had signed the list of project supporters. This can be seen as immoral conduct. These payments (and the promises in the community benefits agreement) were divisive. These payments also maintained the support of some local people to the project, even though the likelihood of the project being approved and having to deliver on the benefits promised in the agreement was minimal (especially in the short term). The payments enticed people to collaborate with the project and to sign the list of supporters of the project, which the company could use whenever it wanted and for whatever purpose it chose without further permission from the signatories. In effect, they were ‘psychologically squeezed’ (Maher, 2019). With poverty increasing due to the COVID pandemic, the dependency of vulnerable communities on the company increased, effectively enabling the company to control these people, for example, in suppressing their support of developments at the national level.

Moral paralysis

Moral paralysis refers to the inability to act due to the complexity of moral decision-making. In our data, one excerpt stated that: “After 2020, with the publication of Pandora Papers, the company did not take any action, not a communication report, press release, or public speech. Also, after President Boric’s inaugural speech in which he said ‘No to Dominga’, the company behaved in exactly the same way: Not one action, no communication from the company was released”. While this could have resulted from moral paralysis, in our discussions of this issue, it was not possible for us to determine whether this inaction was moral paralysis or a strategic decision from the company not to respond.

Moral nihilism

The notion of moral nihilism refers to situations where managers believe that morality does not exist (or at least has no legitimate basis) and that there are no moral truths. While this is conceptually clear, empirically, it would only be possible to know this if the manager actually revealed that this was the basis of their action or inaction (which they would be unlikely to do). In our research, we were not able to establish intention, since most of our interviews were not with company managers. Our methodological position was not based on an analysis of manager intention, rather it was based on an assessment of observed company behaviour as perceived by stakeholders. Therefore, we decided that nihilism could be inferred when managers failed to act appropriately in any moral imperative situation where profound and indisputable socially accepted truths and/or values demanded adequate action, for example in relation to: respect for fundamental human rights; the protection of endangered species, heritage, and significant biodiversity reserves; or where universal values and principles would be invoked, e.g. fairness, respect, care, honesty, integrity, and that no one is left behind. In our data, we found the following excerpts that could be regarded as being indicative of moral nihilism:

We, the people and groups that are opposed to the project have received threats and harassment by the company (agricultural producer, interview, 2022) [it is inconceivable that harassment could ever be regarded as acceptable business conduct]

There was increasing company rejection of addressing international, national and local concerns about biodiversity loss. The company also rejected widely accepted truths: that most probably the mining project would negatively affect the biodiversity-rich marine area and local livelihoods. This attitude of denial, ultimately left the company isolated from the industry support. (fieldnotes, 2022)

We do not support what Dominga is doing. Today, all mining companies know that Dominga’s practices are very badly perceived [in the mining community]. They are not members of our organization [the Chilean Mining Council], and we do not agree with their behaviour. My impression is that nobody in this country wants to make a decision on this case [whether Dominga should be approved or not]. However, one thing is clear: Chilean people will not let others [e.g. the state, companies] decide for them, especially regarding nature protection, animals rights, mineral reserves and economic growth. Even the Supreme Court has given the message to companies: do not create harm. After 18-O, people are against the mining model of extractivism, but it is difficult to have minerals without mining. Nevertheless, Dominga has been a project doomed to fail since the beginning, but the company did not accept it. (Mining Council representative, interview, 2022). [We consider that this is nihilism because Dominga is clearly inconsistent with the industry expectations]

Along with reducing or evading tax, perhaps one of the common objectives [of immoral companies] in moving money to tax havens with little or no taxation is seeking to be beyond the reach of local authorities and their scrutiny. For a significant part of the global financial elite, anonymity and secrecy are highly valued, and tax havens are there to meet that demand (magazine article, 2021).

For the terrestrial environment, the flora and fauna would be affected by the tailings deposits, which are planned to be amidst the ‘banks of seeds of endemic species’, such as those that give rise to the phenomenon of ‘the flowering desert’, which, once buried by tailings, would disappear forever. This would affect species like the Chilean blue parrot, which is endangered. In addition, the extraction of water from streams in the area as well as from underground sources would facilitate increasing salinity and consequent desertification, which would also affect the human population. In terms of the marine environment, the big problem the scientist sees is the number of vessels transiting the area, which would affect whales, causing them to become disoriented and potentially to collide with ships. Another issue is that many endangered species, although nesting on land, actually feed in the sea, precisely in the area where the port is to be located (biologist scientist, interview, 2019). [this indicates nihilism because the environmental arguments against the project are very strong, especially in relation to (not) locating the tailings dam on top of the aquifer, and in relation to the operation of the port].

The importance of the Humboldt Archipelago lies in its unique faunal and floral diversity. A project of this nature is extremely disruptive as it affects unique diversity recognized worldwide, and therefore, the international community is closely watching what will happen with this project. (extract from the letter of 41 scientists in Oceana, 2017). [the lack of response by Dominga is suggestive of nihilism, because the scientific arguments against the project are very strong and therefore some sort of engagement with the scientific community and willingness to discuss alternatives would be considered to be morally appropriate].

We considered that moral nihilism was evident in several of Dominga’s practices, particularly their persistent disregard for widely accepted truths about the incompatibility of their mining operations with biodiversity preservation in the Humboldt Archipelago. Furthermore, the company’s owners (Delano) were involved in dealings and offshore payments that were intended to stop the declaration of the region as a protected area (La Red, 2022b), actions that would not be considered appropriate by anyone with any moral conscience. Curiously, by being morally nihilist, the company not only lost the support of the Mining Council and many people at local, national and international levels, but they also lost their legal mandate: thus, this was not an effective business strategy.

Discussion: the usefulness of a moral framework for the analysis of corporate behaviour in turbulent times

The purpose of our paper was to develop a moral framework for understanding corporate behaviour in turbulent times. We had to consider whether the disparate moral concepts that existed in the literature could be combined into a comprehensive moral framework, which we did empirically by using a case study from the extractive industries. We wanted to improve the clarity of the underlying concepts and the usefulness of the framework so that it would be more applicable for understanding the morality of corporate behaviour. This need for a comprehensive and context-sensitive moral framework is echoed in recent critiques of corporate responses to socio-political crises, where simplistic moral narratives often fail to capture the complexity of corporate behaviour (Kumar et al., 2022; Ehrnström-Fuentes & Böhm, 2023). The eight concepts we considered in the development of our framework were: moral silence, moral muteness, moral deafness, moral blindness, moral myopia, moral hypocrisy, moral paralysis, and moral nihilism.

While some of these concepts needed clarification beyond the definitions in the existing literature, and there was some overlap in these concepts, we considered that, as a reduced set of six rather than eight concepts, they were still useful in thinking about corporate behaviour. Until now, the collection of concepts in the literature had been rather disparate and dispersed, and they were not effective in providing a comprehensive understanding of how companies respond to societal values. With our definitional enhancement of the concepts and our integration of them into a coherent framework, we believe that this moral framework is now useful for the analysis of corporate moral behaviour.

Our analysis reveals that the individual moral constructs, while somewhat useful in isolation, become more powerful when part of a holistic framework (see Table 3). Similarly, recent research has shown that corporate responses to crises require an integrated approach that considers both moral and strategic dimensions, as fragmented analyses can miss the broader patterns of moral adaptation (Kumar et al., 2022; Ehrnström-Fuentes & Böhm, 2023). These constructs dynamically interact in corporate behaviour. For instance, moral blindness — a failure to perceive ethical concerns — often precedes moral muteness or silence, as unacknowledged or unprocessed issues remain unspoken, reinforcing patterns of ethical inaction. Similarly, moral myopia, with its focus on short-term outcomes, can exacerbate moral hypocrisy when corporations publicly commit to long-term ethical goals but prioritize immediate profit. The case of Dominga illustrated how these constructs can overlap and influence each other, forming patterns of behaviour that shift a company’s moral position in response to turbulent times.

Table 3 Corporate Behaviour Moral Framework.
Full size table

Our framework provides a comprehensive approach to corporate moral behaviour that was previously absent. Drawing on Carroll’s (1987, 1991, 1998, 2001) typology of moral, amoral, and immoral management, as well as the moral concepts outlined by Bird and Waters (1989) and subsequent scholars (e.g., Kreps & Monin, 2011; Drumwright & Murphy, 2004), our framework integrates isolated concepts into a coherent theoretical construction. Our findings demonstrate how the various moral concepts, when integrated, can be used to effectively analyse corporate behaviour in turbulent times. In addition to the existing moral constructs, recent literature suggests a more profound engagement with stakeholders as a moral duty. Kaptein (2022) argues that corporate moral responsibility should include a duty to ‘love one’s stakeholders,’ which implies recognizing and valuing the stakeholders’ wellbeing as an inherent part of ethical corporate behaviour. By linking concepts such as moral silence, muteness, and blindness (Bird & Waters, 1989; Rendtorff, 2014) to the observed actions and inactions of the Dominga mining company, we illustrated how the framework is theoretically robust and empirically applicable. These debates reflect broader tensions around how extractive firms construct sustainability in practice, especially when under public scrutiny (Butters, 2025). They also highlight how corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices during crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, can influence corporate moral behaviour.

Despite our overall enthusiasm for the moral framework, in our empirical testing of the concepts, several issues emerged. We found that moral silence and moral muteness are substantially similar and we argue they should be merged, redefining it as ‘failing to speak up or remaining silent even though the manager is aware of underlying moral issues’ in relation to a specific issue at hand (in other words, speak no evil). Moral silence and muteness imply the use of strategies such as ceasing dialogue with communities, ignoring community concerns, and consistently failing to provide information requested by public authorities.

There can also be situations where a company fails to communicate moral concerns because it is not aware of them (i.e., fails to see evil or hear evil). We term this as moral blindness and moral deafness. While moral deafness implies “do not hear or respond to moral issues that have been raised by others” (Bird, 1996, p.55), and blindness refers to managers who cannot see or identify a moral concern, both are about managers not reacting because they don’t comprehend the moral concern. The reasons for this could be associated with a dismissive attitude towards local communities (Moreira et al., 2022), or that addressing the issue might be high-cost or problematic. Strategies relating to moral deafness and blindness include a failure to respond to key events, holding disparaging attitudes towards local communities, and a lack of acceptance of counter arguments.

Moral myopia refers to ‘situations where managers consider that moral issues are not clearly in focus (i.e., are fuzzy) or are distant in space or time’ (and therefore can be ignored). Moral myopia occurs in the failure of managers to comprehend or care about the long-term consequences of the project to communities and the environment (and sometimes even to the long-term success of the project). The success of extractive projects can be negatively affected if company behaviour does not address long-term impacts (Hanna et al., 2016; Vanclay & Hanna, 2019), for example, as shown in our case study, where the public authority rejected the legal license of the mining project due to its lack of consideration of long-term impacts.

Moral hypocrisy is where managers pretend to subscribe to societal moral standards they do not actually hold (Kreps & Monin, 2011; Lönnqvist et al., 2014). Strategies in the extractive industries associated with this moral concept include lying, deception, co-optation, bribery, creating division in local communities, misrepresentation about the extent of support, strategic action to maintain support, and obscurity about the longer-term intentions and plans of the company.

Because moral paralysis manifests itself in a similar way to strategic inaction, we found moral paralysis difficult to empirically apply in practice, given that the real underlying driver of action or inaction may be difficult to identify. Empirical certainty that inaction was due to moral paralysis (rather than strategic inaction) could only occur where managers explicitly affirmed that they were incapable of acting, which they are unlikely to admit. Thus, this concept has limited use in analysing company behavior,r even though it is conceptually clear. In our case, the lack of action by the company in situations where its reputation was affected (e.g., President Boric’s inaugural speech or publication of the Pandora Papers) could be moral paralysis or equally could be a strategic decision not to respond.

Moral nihilism refers to a philosophical view of managers that morality does not exist and/or there are no moral truths (at least none that are applicable to business decisions) (Pölzler, 2015). This would also be hard to establish without explicit confirmation by managers, a confession they would be unlikely to make. Therefore, in our study, we related this concept to inaction in the face of situations where widely held truths or principles demanded action. We found that this concept has relevant implications for analysing corporate behaviour, because by respecting and adhering to social normative standards, a company can create trust with neighbouring communities, citizens, and state authorities. In the extractive industries, an attitude of nihilism is likely to manifest itself in the use of strategies such as harassment, blatant lying, failure to appreciate the significance of biodiversity, and a failure to respect human rights.

Conclusion

The moral framework we have developed has been shown to be useful for analysing the morality of corporate behaviour. Our framework emphasizes the interconnections between the various concepts, demonstrating that corporate morality is a dynamic system rather than a collection of isolated behaviours. For instance, moral blindness can lead to moral silence, while moral myopia often underpins moral hypocrisy. These relationships provide a nuanced understanding of corporate behaviour in turbulent times. In our case study, despite the changing normative standards that emerged after the three disruptive events (the 2019 social uprising, COVID, and public reaction following release of the Pandora Papers), the Dominga mining company continued to stubbornly pursue its own interest in implementing the project, and consequently hardened its position, progressively ignoring concerns about the project coming from local people as well as from national and international interest groups. We consider that the company shifted from a position of moral ambiguity to either an immoral or amoral management approach. Without being able to determine intention, it is impossible to establish whether the behaviour is moral or amoral.

We acknowledge that the framework has certain limitations. While the moral concepts are useful in analysing corporate behaviour, some of them (e.g., moral paralysis or nihilism) are challenging to apply empirically due to the difficulty of discerning the underlying intentions behind the behaviour. These limitations highlight the value of further case studies to reconfirm our findings and bring greater clarity about these concepts, as well as to develop clearer indicators about how to identify and differentiate the moral concepts in practice.

Future studies should focus on empirically testing and refining the framework across diverse industries and contexts. Practical implications for corporate policy include fostering ethical leadership, developing training programs that address moral ambivalence, and creating mechanisms for accountability in turbulent situations. By bridging theoretical concepts with actionable insights, this research offers a foundation for improving corporate behaviour and guiding future investigations in this critical area.

Why oral consent was used and how it was recorded

Oral consent was necessary because some participants were uncomfortable with paperwork or had limited literacy, and because later stages of the project were conducted remotely from our home countries by phone or video call. In these cases, the consent script was read aloud in Spanish, and consent was recorded at the beginning of the interview.

The English version of the oral consent script was as follows (Spanish original stored in the institutional repository):

“I am conducting academic research for my doctoral thesis at the University of Groningen and the University of Barcelona. The study explores the social, moral, and environmental aspects of mining projects in Chile and South Africa. I would like to interview you about your knowledge and experiences. Your participation is voluntary, and you may choose not to answer any question or to stop the interview at any time. I would like to record the interview for accuracy, but only myself and my supervisors will have access to the recording. All information you share will remain anonymous and confidential; your name or identifying details will not appear in any publications. Your responses will be used only for academic purposes, including publications and presentations, in English and Spanish. There are no anticipated risks to you from participating. Do you consent to participate under these conditions?”

Scope of the consent

Consent covered:

  • Participation in the interview

  • Use of anonymized data for analysis

  • Permission to publish excerpts in academic outputs

  • Dissemination in English and Spanish

  • Assurance of anonymity and confidentiality

  • Full explanation of the purpose of the research, how data would be used, and confirmation that there were no risks to participation

Non-interventional nature of the study

This was a non-interventional, qualitative study based on semi-structured interviews and document analysis. All participants were fully informed of their anonymity, of the voluntary nature of their participation, and of their right to withdraw or decline questions at any time.

Confidentiality and data management

All data were anonymized; no identifying details of individuals, organizations, or communities appear in transcripts or outputs. Data are stored securely on University of Groningen servers (Disc Y) with restricted access, in compliance with the GDPR, the University of Groningen Research Data Policy, and Chilean law (Law 19.628 and Law 20.120).

The project adheres to Horizon 2020 FAIR data principles, ensuring data are Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, and Reusable while safeguarding participants’ privacy and rights.

Supporting documentation

Supporting documentation (e.g., blank templates of the signed consent forms, the standardized oral consent script, and exemplar formats) is securely stored in the institutional repository and can be provided to the journal upon request for verification purposes. Please note that original signed forms or audio files containing personal data cannot be shared, in compliance with confidentiality obligations and GDPR.