Abstract
While most scholars argue that reducing fuel subsidies should be a policy priority, they also note that once subsidies are in place, many countries, including Indonesia, find it hard to reduce them. This paper examines the complexity of Indonesia’s fuel subsidy reforms from 1998 to 2019, investigating key actors and narratives that shave have their trajectory. It undertakes discourse analysis of purposively sampled news articles from two credible media outlets, reflecting the central role of media as an arena for policy debates in the Global South. It finds that Indonesia has been consistently locked in the ups and downs of fuel subsidy reforms, which are rife with economic and political tensions. This paper affirms that fuel subsidy reform in Indonesia, and elsewhere, is ultimately a complex political, not just technical, endeavour. Reform narratives of economic rationality and technical feasibility must be understood and navigated alongside social and religious beliefs, and political contestation. To this end, reform efforts will likely only succeed and be sustained if they are both embedded within broader social contracts that respect public and political sensitivities and also confront the long-term fiscal and environmental costs of inaction. Through focussing on discourse, this study offers a valuable political economy perspective on fuel subsidy reforms and insight for both scholars and policymakers on highly consequential faming discourses and conflicts.
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Introduction
Despite the mounting calls for reductions, fossil fuel subsidies persist globally. According to the IEA, global pre-tax energy subsidies fell from US$471 billion in 2018 to US$181 billion in 2020 due to lower fuel prices and COVID-19 impacts (IEA, 2021). However, subsidies surged past US$1 trillion, doubling 2021 levels and marking a fivefold rise from 2020 (IEA, 2023; Muta & Erdogan, 2023). The persistence of fuel subsidies and their tendency to keep increasing suggests that these policies remain popular and well-embedded. However, at the same time, this fuel subsidies continues to be a critical concern for researchers and policymakers on social, economic, and environmental grounds (Timperley, 2021; Vernon et al., 2021).
In general, fuel subsidies are justified for their potential to support rural development, improve economic competitiveness, and provide social protection. In rural areas, subsidies help poor households access energy for farming and home-based industries (Adam & Lestari, 2008; OECD/IEA, 2021; UNEP & IEA, 2001). They can also reduce production costs, making domestic products more competitive, and potentially boost employment (Jiang & Lin, 2014; McKane et al., 2008). Furthermore, subsidies may protect low-income populations from energy price shocks and inflation (Dube, 2003; Inchauste & Victor, 2017).
However, critics and scholars argue that fuel subsidies are fiscally burdensome, poorly targeted, and often benefit wealthier groups more than the poor (Agustina et al., 2012; Rentschler & Bazilian, 2017). In rural regions with poor infrastructure, subsidies often fail to reach intended beneficiaries (del Granado et al., 2012). They may also discourage energy efficiency, delay industrial modernisation, and weaken economic competitiveness in the long term (Harring et al., 2023; Sampedro et al., 2018; Schwanitz et al., 2014). Fuel subsidies also significantly contribute to fossil fuel overuse and emissions, undermining climate goals and renewable energy development, leading to the infamous carbon-lock-in (Seto et al., 2016; Stefanski, 2014).
To this end, reasons to reduce or remove fuel subsidies are well-founded, highlighting fiscal, health (e.g., pandemic alleviation), and environmental gains (Agustina et al., 2012; Basri et al., 2020; Schwanitz et al., 2014; Timperley, 2021). However, despite mounting pressure for reform, fuel subsidies remain entrenched or trapped in non-technical, mainly political, contestation (Jazuli et al., 2021; Skovgaard & van Asselt, 2019).
To date, the political and social dynamics that govern the pace of reform remain inadequately understood. Indeed, experts express ‘confusion’ over the slow progress in subsidy reduction efforts (Ellis, 2010; Timperley, 2021; Vernon et al., 2021). The challenges of reform, underscore the need for a nuanced understanding of the political economy of policymaking (Rentschler & Bazilian, 2017; Sovacool, 2017; UNDP, 2021), particularly exploring why it is hard and complex to reform fuel subsidies, especially in the Global South (Harring et al., 2023; Sovacool, 2017).
Guided by such a research call, focusing on Indonesia’s fuel subsidy reforms 1998–2019, this paper delves into the politics and social significance of the country’s reform experiences. The timeline selected reflects a two-decade reform process, providing ample ground for the observation of how this reform endeavour has evolved in a country deemed an excellent research case by scholars (Beaton et al., 2017; Chelminski, 2018; Durand-Lasserve et al., 2015; Yusuf et al., 2017). Guided by previous studies on the political economy of policy reform (Araral, 2006; Aunphattanasilp, 2019), this paper seeks to answer: (1) What narratives defined Indonesian reform conflicts in the period of study? (2) Who led and participated significantly in the reform process? (3) How did these narratives shape the reform trajectory? And, how were they reflected in public discourse?
This paper employs a qualitative discourse analysis (Hajer, 2002; von Malmborg, 2023; Wash, 2020) of purposively sampled news articles from two prominent Indonesian media outlets, Harian KOMPAS (Kompas Daily) and Majalah TEMPO (Tempo Magazine). The analysis identifies key actors and narratives that have framed and shaped the fuel subsidy reform trajectory. While subsidy reforms are often justified on economic efficiency grounds, the outcomes of these reforms are shaped by shifting political coalitions, contested public narratives about the meaning of fuel subsidies, and political dynamics.
Following this introduction, the paper briefly outlines Indonesia’s fuel subsidy reduction efforts and other relevant countries’ experiences. The methodology section follows. The subsequent section presents the results and analysis. The paper closes with a concluding discussion, offering insights into the broader implications of the study’s findings and its limitations, as well as offering further research suggestions.
Indonesia’s reform trajectory 1998–2019
Indonesia’s energy subsidy landscape is composed primarily of electricity and fuel subsidies. Commonly known as subsidi listrik, this scheme is directed to the national utility company, PLN (Perusahaan Listrik Negara), to cover the gap between regulated final price and actual production costs, especially for low-income households and small businesses (Lontoh et al., 2015). Fuel subsidies (the focus of this paper), known as subsidi bahan bakar minyak or subsidi BBM, refer to subsidies for petroleum products, namely Premium petrol (gasoline), Pertalite petrol, and liquid petroleum gas or LPG, which is used in household cooking.Footnote 1 Similar to its electricity counterpart, fuel subsidies operate as a ‘price-at-the-pump’ scheme, with final prices held below market levels by Pertamina.
Indonesia’s fuel subsidies have historically been financed and managed by the central government. Indonesia’s fully integrated state-owned energy company, Pertamina, plays a key role in administering the subsidies, especially in distributing the subsidised fuels (Akimaya & Dahl, 2022; Braithwaite et al., 2012; Budya & Yasir Arofat, 2011). While the company executes state-mandated pricing and supply policies, it maintains no authority to set fuel prices or independently design subsidy programs, reflecting its function as a policy implementer (Jazuli et al., 2021; Savatic, 2016).
Indonesia’s reform trajectory began in the aftermath of the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, when mounting fiscal pressures and donor conditionalities pushed the government to reconsider unsustainable subsidy spending (Beaton et al., 2017; Bullard et al., 1998). From 1998 to 2019, the government pursued a mix of ad-hoc and semi-automatic fuel price adjustments, often buffered by social protection programs like direct cash transfers and education or health subsidies (see Table 1) (Beaton et al., 2017; Chelminski, 2018; Jazuli et al., 2021). Budget-wise, the country’s fuel subsidies fluctuated significantly between 1998 and 2019, peaking nominally in 2014 at 240 trillion rupiah (approximately 16.5 billion US dollars) (see Fig. 1).
Indonesia’s fuel subsidies (in trillion Rupiah) 1999–2019. Source: (Kemenkeu RI, 2017, 2022).
With notable successes in reducing subsidies, particularly in 2005 and 2014, followed by reversals, Indonesia’s reform trajectory is marked by inconsistency. In 2005, the government successfully implemented large, 100 per cent, price hikes, alongside compensation schemes that included unconditional cash transfers (Bantuan Langsung Tunai-BLT). These helped to mitigate public resistance (Beaton et al., 2017; Hastuti et al., 2006). Similarly, in 2014, Indonesia initiated a bold reduction in subsidies (from 240 to 60 trillion rupiah, see Table 1), supported by a clear fiscal narrative that linked subsidy removal to infrastructure development (Beaton et al., 2017; Jazuli et al., 2021). By contrast, the 2012 reform attempt failed to gain traction. Despite being framed as necessary to prevent a budgetary crisis, the proposal was blocked by the Indonesian Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, DPR-RI) following a strong counter-narrative from opposition parties, who argued it would burden the poor (Syafina, 2012; Umoro, 2020).
This illustrates the importance of not only a framing strategy, but also reformers’ ability to navigate Indonesian politics, including the coordination between technocrats and political elites (Beaton et al., 2017; Jazuli et al., 2021; Umoro, 2020). Indonesia’s experience reflects broader global patterns in fuel subsidy reform: success hinges on balancing economic rationales with political strategy.
India’s 2012 LPG reform, for example, was backed by strong administrative support and targeted transfers through the DBTL (Direct Benefit Transfer for LPG) scheme (Jain et al., 2018). Malaysia’s 2013–2014 reform similarly succeeded due to political commitment, allowing smooth execution of transparent communication, and compensation measures that overcame earlier failed attempts (Bridel & Lontoh, 2014). In China, cautious steps toward market-based pricing since 2009 have been shaped by the ruling party’s decision to reduce inefficiencies, though tempered by concerns over economic growth (Jiang & Lin, 2014). Elsewhere, countries like Iran, the Philippines, and Ecuador have shown that reforms only gain traction when accompanied by gradual implementation, social buffers, and public investment (Rentschler & Bazilian, 2017; Skovgaard & van Asselt, 2019). These cases highlight an imperative lesson: regardless of regime type, technically sound reform must be politically palatable to ensure reform viability and success.
Methodology
Political economy and discourse analysis
This study adopts a political economy perspective to examine Indonesia’s fuel subsidy reform trajectory, with a particular focus on language and framing (Cardinale & Scazzieri, 2018; Hudson & Leftwich, 2014). This approach recognises that apart from techno-economic dimensions, the policymaking process is shaped by dynamic interactions and contestations between relevant actors (individuals and institutions) and their narratives (Inchauste & Victor, 2017; Krupnik et al., 2022; Rahman et al., 2021). This study then employed a qualitative discourse analysis, widely used in political economy research, to investigate how language generates framings, creates meaning, and shapes the public debates that influence policy outcomes (Fischer, 2003; Hajer, 2002; Wash, 2020). See Table 2 for summary of methodology.
This approach responds to calls for qualitative discourse analyses in studies of policymaking (Krupnik et al., 2022; Wash, 2020), including individual country case studies on energy subsidy reform (Rentschler & Bazilian, 2017; Sovacool, 2017). The analysis is particularly valuable for unpacking the meaning-making processes that surround contested policy issues like fuel subsidies, which scholars consider “a political economy problem” (Inchauste & Victor, 2017). Analytically, building on the concept of discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1993), this study further aspires to reveal how diverse policy actors may converge (and diverge) around specific reform narratives. Identifying these coalitions is crucial to understanding how certain discourses gain traction, while others are marginalised. Inspired by previous studies (Alvarado et al., 2021; von Malmborg, 2023), this analytical lens offered a powerful analytical ‘vivisection’ of the tensions that characterise Indonesia’s fuel subsidy reform process.
Data collection, analysis, and timeframe selection
In policymaking, news media can and do act as an attention ‘trigger’ (Kingdon, 2014). News articles can transform a policy agenda and bring it to significant public attention, leading it to be discussed, debated, and prioritised (Aunphattanasilp, 2019; Jones & Wolfe, 2010). This consideration guided this study to news articles to be used for its discourse analysis, as previously done both in Indonesia (Apriliyanti et al., 2022) and other contexts (Aunphattanasilp, 2019; Chisnell et al., 2017).
Regarding the data, from 1 March to 31 May 2022, this study purposively sampled (Chisnell et al., 2017) news articles published between 1998 and 2019, from two leading Indonesian media outlets: Harian KOMPAS or Kompas Daily and Majalah TEMPO or Tempo Magazine. The 1998–2019 timeframe was selected to capture two decades of reform efforts, beginning after the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis. The cut-off year 2019 marks the end of President Joko Widodo’s first term, providing a natural endpoint for assessing reform before his second administration. The two print media outlets were chosen thanks to their reputation for quality reporting, non-partisanship, national reach, and significant historical engagement with policy discourse (Apriliyanti et al., 2022; Nugroho et al., 2012).
Full-text articles were selected based on these sampling inclusion criteria: (1) articles explicitly referencing “subsidi BBM” (fuel subsidies) in the headline or lead paragraphs; (2) contents providing substantial discussion of political, economic, or social aspects of fuel subsidy reforms; (3) contents covering and published during different presidential administrations from 1998 to 2019. Meanwhile, the sampling exclusion criteria included duplicate articles, pieces lacking relevant references (e.g., title did not match content), and reports unrelated to the core fuel subsidy policy debates.
During the article search period, this study’s searches identified 82 news articles, 66 from Kompas and 16 from Tempo. All articles were analysed in their original Bahasa Indonesia without translation before coding. This decision was made to preserve linguistic nuance and avoid meaning distortion. Selected, highly relevant excerpts were then translated into English to provide illustrations.
The qualitative discourse analysis proceeded in several steps. Firstly, all sampled full-text articles were imported into NVivo and thoroughly read in their entirety. During this process, key ideas and concepts related to the framing of the reform were identified through specific excerpts, which were then coded. Secondly, these codes were analysed and grouped to form clusters of ‘key actors’ and ‘key narratives.’ Thirdly, this study then employed a thematic analysis (van Thiel, 2014) to describe the clusters of actors and narratives relevant to the reform case. During this stage, narrative attributes (Shanahan et al., 2018) were developed to help identify discourse coalitions, key to investigating ‘the intricate nature’ of the reform and explaining which discursive claims possibly served as a ‘legitimate basis’ of reform (Hajer, 1993). All the coding and thematic analysis processes were informed heavily by previous studies, e.g., (Inchauste & Victor, 2017; Skovgaard & van Asselt, 2018).
To achieve analytical rigour, actors’ positions and discursive claims found in one outlet were iteratively double- and cross-checked across the two outlets. While both are regarded as relatively independent and non-partisan, potential biases were acknowledged, including editorial framing and reporting based on political climate. Hence, claims across both outlets were triangulated by cross-checking with other credible outlets (e.g., Kompas.com, Detik.com–arguably non-partisan online outlets), independent studies, e.g., (Lontoh et al., 2015), and government reports (Kemen ESDM RI, 2023; Kemenkeu RI, 2017), ensuring credibility and validity of findings.
Results and analysis
Emerging actors
This section details the wide range of actors across state and non-state institutions involved in promoting and impeding fuel subsidy reform efforts (see Table 3). Core executive ministries framed the reforms as a technocratic and fiscal necessity, while the legislature often acted as a political counterweight. Others, like individual political leaders, donor institutions, civil society organisations, business groups, and state-owned enterprises, contributed distinct perspectives, at times reinforcing, delaying, or redirecting reform agendas.
Of note, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (Kementerian ESDM) and the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs (Kemenko Perekonomian) played pivotal roles in Indonesia’s fuel subsidy reform by setting consumption quotas and adjusting fuel prices. These ministries worked closely with the Ministry of Finance (Kemenkeu), which framed subsidies as a fiscal burden and linked price increases to broader budget discipline (Kompas, 2002; Tempo, 2013). Kementerian ESDM also led technical implementation, using indicators such as oil prices and currency exchange rates to justify decisions (Kemen ESDM RI, 2023; Kompas, 2016).
Since the 1998 Reformasi era, the national Parliament (DPR-RI) has increasingly shaped public policy, including subsidy reforms (Lontoh et al., 2015). While reforms were initiated by the executive, the DPR-RI used its oversight powers to delay or block proposals when public support was low, often citing societal readiness (Kompas, 2000). In some cases, such as the 2012 episodes, the parliament pushed back strongly, even reversing the executive reform initiatives (Jazuli et al., 2021; Tempo, 2011).
Key political figures also influenced the reform direction. Hatta Rajasa (former economic coordinating minister) defended subsidies as a state obligation to protect low-income groups (Kompas, 2011a). Conversely, Vice President Jusuf Kalla adamantly promoted reform for fiscal restraint, warning of rising subsidy spending without reform (Tempo, 2005b). President Yudhoyono was often criticised for hesitating during urgent moments (Tempo, 2014a), whereas President Widodo took bolder steps, though concerns over consistency remained (Tempo, 2014b).
Outside the executive group, a wide range of actors contributed to the policy debate. International organisations like the IMF and World Bank advocated price liberalisation (Kompas, 1999a, 2011b; Prasetiantono, 1999). Nationally, independent observers and economists, including Faisal Basri, called for reforms anchored in public legitimacy and broader social contracts (Kompas, 2010a, 2012a). Civil society groups, such as the Indonesian Consumers Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia, YLKI), ReforMiner, and the Islamic Ccholars’ Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), evolved from early sceptics to conditional supporters, particularly when reforms addressed spending inefficiencies and environmental damage (Kompas, 2011b, 2012a, 2018b). Business associations like Apindo and Kadin urged cautious reform, often linking support to measures that mitigated inflation (Kompas, 2007b, 2008).
The involvement of the MUI highlights the considerable influence of religious groups in Indonesia’s fuel subsidy reform trajectory. Organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) also significantly shaped reform outcomes, particularly through influential fatwas or public statements issued by their leaders (Indriyanto et al., 2013; Jazuli et al., 2021). These interventions carried weight due to the strong societal reverence for religious authority in Indonesia, which can mobilise public opinion either in support of or against reform efforts (Arifianto, 2021; Datta et al., 2011).
Political parties, meanwhile, navigated competing interests. PDI-P and Golkar often opposed reforms on the grounds of equity and affordability (Kompas, 2010b, 2018a), while parties like PKS and Demokrat resisted subsidy cuts near elections to avoid voter backlash (Kompas, 2008). These shifting positions highlighted their political balancing act between economic logic and political survival.
A technically non-government stakeholder, Pertamina oversees subsidised fuels’ production and distribution. Its role is administrative rather than regulatory. Lacking formal authority over pricing (Jazuli et al., 2021; Savatic, 2016), the company nonetheless influences public discourse through projections and warnings, such as in 2007, when it flagged risks of subsidy consumption exceeding budget limits (Kompas, 2007a).
Emerging narratives
This section explores the key narratives that emerged across Indonesia’s 1998 to 2019 reform (see Table 4). These include dominant economic concerns over inflation and fiscal efficiency, technical debates around misallocation and fuel pricing, and political narratives tied to leadership and institutional power. Additional layers of discourse touch on the reform’s managerial credibility, international market pressures, social resistance, and environmental considerations.
Economically, fuel subsidy reform in Indonesia has been marked by a core economic tension between managing short-term inflationary risks and achieving long-term fiscal efficiency. As scholars also mention, public concerns over rising transportation and goods prices have often dominated reform debates, reflecting fears of eroded purchasing power and broader macroeconomic instability (Beaton et al., 2017; Jazuli et al., 2021; Tempo, 2003). At the same time, growing recognition of the fiscal burden posed by subsidies has led to calls for reallocating public spending toward infrastructure and productivity-enhancing investments (Kompas, 2015; Tempo, 2004).
From a technical policy standpoint, strongly related to the economic considerations above, was the problem of misallocation, leaving strategic fields (e.g., education, health, infrastructure, poverty alleviation, etc) less prioritised (Kompas, 2014). Subsidies were widely criticised for disproportionately benefiting higher-income groups, undermining their intended role in supporting the poor (Tempo, 2004), a critical stance widely advocated by scholars (Ihsan et al., 2024; Rahman et al., 2021; Yusuf et al., 2017). This inefficiency prompted calls for reform, reallocating funds toward the aforementioned strategic sectors. Additionally, there was increasing emphasis on the need to undertake a gradual reform approach, align domestic fuel pricing with international market rates, promoting pricing transparency and long-term fiscal sustainability (Kompas, 2004b, 2018b).
The Indonesian fuel subsidy reform efforts were frequently framed as a test of political leadership and a politician’s ability to navigate public dissent and sustain unpopular decisions over time (Kompas, 2005). Decision makers, like Indonesia’s presidents (and vice presidents) and relevant ministers, were expected not only to justify the economic rationale for subsidy reductions but also to demonstrate the political resilience to manage backlash and not allow it to become a political commodity (Kompas, 1999b). In some cases (such as in 2012), reforms were delayed or reversed to avoid continuing political kerfuffle especially between the executive and the legislative or perceived threats to investor confidence (Kompas, 2012a), shedding light on how subsidy reform was not only a matter of economic policy but a high-stakes political balance.
Reform management relates to how the credibility and sustainability of the reform efforts depend upon the government’s capacity to execute reforms transparently and managerially equitably. The success of reform was frequently linked to the government’s ability to present transparent, fair fiscal justifications and integrate subsidies within a coherent state budget framework (Tempo, 2004). Additionally, concerns were raised about inefficiencies and internal mismanagement, including the perception that certain actors, such as employees within the national oil company, Pertamina, disproportionately benefited from the subsidy system, highlighting the need for tighter oversight and institutional reform (Kompas, 2004a).
Regarding international issues, while the influence of donor organisations, especially the IMF and the World Bank, declined over time (Beaton et al., 2017; Jazuli et al., 2021), the volatility of international oil prices and rupiah’s exchange rate remained a consistent and significant external factor (Kompas, 2010b; Tempo, 2005b). Indonesia’s shift to a net oil importer in 2004 marked a turning point, making the country more vulnerable to global market dynamics (Tempo, 2005a) and contributing significantly to the 2005 drive for reform (Beaton et al., 2017; Chelminski, 2018).
Social issues were a persistent feature of the reform discourse. While civil society organisations had limited formal influence, public sentiment strongly reflected the belief that affordable fuel was a basic right, making reforms socially sensitive (Beaton et al., 2017; Jazuli et al., 2021; Wibowo, 2015). Scepticism toward government arguments, especially in light of inefficiencies in energy and its subsidy governance, further undermined public support (Kompas, 1999c). Additionally, subsidy removal was often framed as a neoliberal agenda, seen as harmful to the poor and requiring extreme caution in execution (Kompas, 2005). These perspectives highlight the social risks and ideological resistance encountered in the reform process.
Environmental issues in the Indonesian context were arguably less visible, but certainly not absent; this discourse is steadily and slowly growing (Ihsan et al., 2024; Sekaringtias et al., 2023). The reform was occasionally framed as a step toward building a greener, more sustainable economy, positioning it within a broader shift to reduce fossil fuel dependency and accelerate renewable energy development, including wind and geothermal energy, which are available in the country (Kompas, 2002, 2012b). These narratives highlight that fuel subsidy reform was significantly associated with the country’s long-term environmental goals (Jazuli et al., 2024).
Synthesis
The findings highlight how reform discourse from 1998 to 2019 saw overlapping, and at times conflicting, narratives involving economic urgency, technical inefficiency, political risk, reform’s managerial credibility, and politically ideological resistance. It also saw a dynamic reform actor network that reflects an interconnected and yet contesting roles and influences toward the reform trajectory. The intersections between reform narratives and actors resonate significantly with Hajer’s seminal idea of discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1993), where groups of actors who, though not necessarily coordinated or formally aligned, share and advocate sets of narratives or storylines that give significance to a policy problem.
To this end, for analytical purposes, contesting attributive dimensions (Shanahan et al., 2018) were drawn from the findings to help further understand how these narratives influence the reform journey. Firstly, economic vis-à-vis social. These dimensions distinguish between narratives rooted in fiscal/market logics versus those anchored in social legitimacy or justice. Secondly, technocratic vis-à-vis ideological. These dimensions contrast evidence-based managerial reasoning with normatively or politically charged claims. Using these sets, then, four different attributes were developed to help draw discourse coalitions (I-IV), alongside their influence reform, and lay out who the relevant actors are in each group, as reflected in Table 5.
The figure indicates the significant contest between the ‘technocratic-economic’ and ‘ideological-social’ discourse coalitions. Regarding reform support, fiscal and economic frames dominated the discourse, particularly around the unsustainable burden to national budget and misallocation of subsidies. Reform is also consistently driven by external factors such as the volatility of international oil prices, with relatively less policy-leveraging. These narratives helped frame reform as a policy necessity, rationalised by state spending efficiency and long-term budgetary health. Environmental and sustainability narratives, although with less policy leverage, increasingly drive the alignment of fuel pricing with climate commitments.
However, ideological and socially embedded counter-narratives posed a persistent challenge to the reform urgency driven by the above technical and economic justifications. A powerful rights-based discourse coalition positioned fuel subsidies as a basic entitlement, complicating reform efforts and increasing the political risks of reform. Further, political dynamics shaped reform reversals or delays, such as in 2012, driven by elite contestation and fear of electoral backlash. However, as reflected in the table, moments of reform breakthrough, such as in 2005 and 2014, were made possible by the alignment of technocratic-economic drive with political will and timing, emerging mainly in the early political (presidential) era.
The analysis sheds light on the deep, ‘sticky’ tensions between economic rationality and social legitimacy of the reform. While state actors, particularly the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Energy, consistently framed subsidies as fiscally unsustainable, popular resistance was fuelled by the widely held belief that affordable fuel is a fundamental right, a sentiment echoed by the general public and political parties (Jazuli et al., 2021; Wibowo, 2015). This deep-rooted, perceived entitlement transformed fuel pricing into a politically charged issue, where reform was socially complex. As a result, especially during electoral periods, decision-makers such as ministers and presidents resisted reform, not out of ignorance or being ill-informed of the need or benefits of reform, but due to the political and reputational risks it posed.
These tensions were further shaped by Indonesia’s shifting political dynamics. Post-1998 Reformasi decentralisation and vast democratisation altered the balance of power between the executive and the legislature. The country’s Parliament acted beyond its budget and policy oversight capacity. When not opposing the reform, as in 2005 and 2014, the Parliament would support the ruling administration in narrating reform as important for fiscal savings and infrastructure development. But at times when opposing reform, such as in 2012, the DPR-RI emerged as an anti-reform advocate, a reactive institution capable of stalling, reshaping, or reversing reforms depending on political mood and electoral calculations (Umoro, 2020).
Political leaders and parties, further, played diverging roles in shaping the complex reform terrain. While some parties like PDI-P and Demokrat voiced pro-reform rhetoric, most avoided supporting subsidy cuts near election time. These parties even changed stance (from opposing to supporting reform, and vice versa) based on whether or not they were in power (Jazuli et al., 2021). Political leaders like Vice President Jusuf Kalla pushed for fiscal reform grounded in macroeconomic logic, as in the 2005 reform episode, whereas others, including President Yudhoyono, avoided unpopular reforms amid political pressure, especially during the 2012 reform effort. President Widodo’s 2014 reforms marked a bolder shift, but as subsequent years showed, political capital and momentum remain uncertain.Footnote 2
The analysis further suggests that reform momentum is not strictly bound to specific timing, such as election cycles per se, but to key moments of alignment between technocratic-executive drive, legislative compromise, and public receptivity. As the Indonesian case shows, the opening of ‘reform windows’ depends on the alignment or the ‘coupling’ (Kingdon, 2014) of diverse technical and non-technical factors: strong mandates early in a political term, leaders’ political will, external shocks (e.g., oil prices), and fiscal saving urgency.
This convergence can arguably be observed during President Widodo’s reform effort in 2014 when he expeditiously introduced and defended the necessary fuel subsidy reductions. Amid the political opposition and lurking public protest, the president’s reforms proceeded, backed by not only by his ‘political will’ but also by well-prepared technocratic policy designs, such as cash transfers (the BLT), and well-crafted communication strategy, framing the reform as necessity for education, health, and infrastructure advancement and development. Similar reform success due to such factors’ convergence was arguably observed during the 2005 reform under President Yudhoyono. Conversely, when the fragmentation or de-alignment arose, reform urgency failed to gain traction, again such as in 2012.
In the end, while there is growing consensus that fuel subsidies are inefficient and regressive, learning from the Indonesian case, this agreement has not automatically translated into policy change followed by policy continuity, as reform reversals and inconsistent implementation has undermined long-term progress. This study affirms that fuel subsidy reform in Indonesia, and possibly elsewhere, is not just a mere economic policy challenge but also a layered political struggle. Such reform demands navigating the interplay of narrative legitimacy, institutional power, and political risk. As (Hajer, 1993) suggested, while agreement among elite actors may indicate reform readiness, its sustainability also depends on broader social, political, and, to the ‘Indonesian’ extent, religious legitimacy.
Concluding discussion
The reform challenges identified in this article affirm scholarly warnings (Inchauste & Victor, 2017; Skovgaard & van Asselt, 2018; Sovacool, 2017; Timperley, 2021) that subsidy reforms are not only about technical adjustments but also about reconfiguring deeply seated political ideas about rights, national development, and state obligation. Moreover, the actor dynamics confirm that pro-reform groups or coalitions are unstable and shaped not merely by political timing but also by dynamic institutional and political configurations. The executive–legislative relationship, for instance, emerged as the reform’s key decision-making battleground in Indonesia. This transformed subsidy reform from a technical concern into a symbolically and politically charged issue, generating recurrent resistance not only from the public but also from decision-makers themselves.
The Indonesian case reflects how the interplay between competing narratives, around inflation risk, fiscal sustainability, misallocation, and political risk, created a “discursive lock-in” that constrained reform options over time. As demonstrated in the reform episodes of 2005 and 2014, successful reform moments only materialised when technical urgency aligned with executive political will, parliamentary cooperation, and public acceptance. These episodes resonate with Kingdon’s concept of effective policymaking, where reform becomes possible when problem, policy, and politics streams successfully converge (Kingdon, 2014). Conversely, failures such as the 2012 reversal illustrate how misaligned political coalitions, poor timing, and insufficient public engagement can derail reform efforts, despite compelling economic justifications.
Comparatively, Indonesia’s experience mirrors other reforming states, albeit with its unique political atmosphere. In India, for example, LPG subsidy reform combined technocratic cash transfer schemes with a populist narrative of national discipline (“Give It Up”) to win middle-class support. Yet even there, technical fixes encountered delays due to weak local administrative capacity (Jain et al., 2018). Malaysia’s 2013–2014 reforms show how price liberalisation became viable only when ‘coupled’ with transparent communication and a fiscal credibility agenda, timed strategically for early in a new political mandate (Bridel & Lontoh, 2014). In contrast, China’s reform strategy has remained ambiguous, committed to long-term reduction while managing powerful state-owned interests and social risks (Jiang & Lin, 2014; Shuang, 2016). These cases underline a broader pattern: that such reform depends not only on technocratic designs but also on the ability to manage institutional legitimacy, elite consensus, and public support.
To this end, this paper contributes to the literature in two main ways. First, by empirically demonstrating how fuel subsidy reform in Indonesia is not only an economic policy concern but also the arena of narrative and institutional contestation, this study advances understanding of reform as a multidimensional political economy challenge. The paper deepens our grasp of how reforms are continuously reshaped by shifting coalitions, evolving political regimes, and path-dependent discourse dynamics. Second, methodologically, resonating with other studies (Alvarado et al., 2021; von Malmborg, 2023), this paper shows the value of qualitative discourse analysis, powered by discourse coalitions investigation, for mapping the dynamic narrative terrain of policy reform. By analysing how subsidy reform was discussed in the media (and by actors discussed in it) over two decades, the paper reveals how public narratives serve not just to reflect but also to constrain or drive policy and reform possibilities.
The paper has indeed limitations. First, while the study offers a robust qualitative account, its reliance on print media excludes other forms of discourse that may offer alternative perspectives, particularly from grassroots voices. Future research could consider integrating reader comments, social media debates, or public survey data to capture a wider public sentiment. Second, while the discourse-actor mapping presented here offers valuable insights, its empirical focus is restricted to a specific 1998–2019 period. A more dynamic, longitudinal tracing using interview and/or policy document data could further illuminate shifts in actor positions and narrative alignments.
Moreover, as discourse analysis of political texts provides depth and nuance, it could benefit from some more advanced, technologically supported research tools. Future research, for instance, might apply computational tools such as web-scraping or computerised language processing to analyse broader content and more extensively. Hence, such complex analytical processes would benefit from being undertaken by more than a single researcher, as suggested by Hudson and Leftwich (2014). These approaches, nevertheless, should never undermine the key interpretive reading but complement it, ensuring the political subtleties and institutional embeddedness of reform discourse are not lost in quantification.
This paper lays the groundwork for future empirical studies, which could capture dynamic discourses from policy documents, politicians, and decision-makers over the same period and beyond. Utilising frameworks such as the policy multiple stream framework (Kingdon, 2014), which has proven helpful in analysing similar cases (Béland & Howlett, 2016; Jazuli et al., 2021; Ridde, 2009), would enhance the depth of analysis of the case. Such empirical research would contribute valuable insights for crafting pragmatic and practical policy recommendations (Sovacool, 2017) that address the complex political, social, and environmental implications of fuel subsidy reforms, complementing existing techno-economic notions of reform urgency.
Data availability
The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.
Notes
In late 2022, it was found that the subsidies soared to over 300 trillion rupiah, exceeding the 2014 figure of 240 trillion rupiah. On a technical level, the 2022 event arguably, clearly undermined the 2005 and 2014 reform successes.
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Jazuli, M.R., Roll, K. & Mulugetta, Y. A discourse analysis of fuel subsidy reduction: revisiting the political economy of Indonesia’s experiences 1998–2019. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 13, 47 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-06342-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-06342-1



