ASEAN and the post-pandemic Southeast Asia

Southeast Asian states struggled in curtailing the spread of COVID-19 since the first confirmed case of the pandemic in Southeast Asia was made in January 2020. The pandemic ultimately led to 37,003,383 total cases and 369,525 deaths as of May 2024 throughout Southeast Asia (ASEAN, 2024b). The challenges encountered by the region include the difficulty in applying stringent public and social health measures to curtail the spread of the virus, such as lockdowns, quarantines, social distancing, and border closures (Carrasco and Rahemtulla, 2020; van Doren et al., 2023).

The initial expectation was that ASEAN would be able to respond to the crisis effectively. As seen with the ASEAN’s responses in countering the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and avian influenza in the early 2000s, past studies have concluded the effectiveness of regional cooperation through vast measures and how the regional grouping played an essential role during public health emergencies in the past (Sridharan, 2007; Kumaresan and Huikuri, 2015; Kliem, 2020; Tsjeng, 2020; Rollet, 2022). It was, therefore, not a surprise to see that in 2020, vast mechanisms were established by ASEAN to mitigate the effects of the outbreak: the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework (ACRF), the ASEAN Response Fund, the Strategic Framework for Public Health Emergencies, and the ASEAN Coordinating Council’s Working Group on Public Health Emergencies, to name a few (Randhawa, 2022).

Nevertheless, the vast ASEAN initiatives aimed to govern COVID-19 did not curtail the initiatives of ASEAN member states to engage in bilateral cooperation in securing vaccines. As Kliem argued, states are the central actors in international relations; thus, “COVID-19 shows us once more that such cooperation is much harder to come by when actually needed” (Kliem, 2020). In a study led by Kilian Spandler, inconsistencies in the multifaceted ASEAN response to the outbreaks can be interpreted as the diverged importance of “practicing sovereignty and statehood” (Spandler et al., 2024, p.604), known as ‘sovereignty scripts’. After the World Health Organization declared that the COVID-19 pandemic could be treated as an endemic disease, vast ASEAN mechanisms introduced after 2023 related to communicable and emerging infectious diseases led to the question of how we can interpret the recent initiatives.

Here, I argue for the interpretation of ASEAN’s post-pandemic strategy under the framework of the sovereignty script, inspired by Spandler’s 2024 study. By definition, sovereignty script is the recognition that “[…] supreme political authority should be vested in the state” (Spandler et al., 2024, p. 606), and therefore, different scripts represent different conceptions of the enactment of sovereignty. I argue that there is currently a characterless understanding of ASEAN’s responses to COVID-19 and reassesses the nexus between regional governance and enactment of sovereignty in post-pandemic Southeast Asia. Spandler’s study concluded that the relevance of four different forms of sovereignty scripts was simultaneously in play throughout ASEAN’s response to the pandemic until 2023. Here, I look closely at the initiatives taken post-pandemic (starting May 2023) and argue the relevance of the relational sovereignty scripts of ‘state-relational’ and ‘people-relational’ as the primary imperatives of ASEAN member states’ practice. Doing so extends the relevance of international relations discourses in understanding state practices in regional settings vis-a-vis public health emergencies.

The nexus between sovereignty and countering public health emergencies

Past studies have been critical in assessing ASEAN’s capacity and commitment in responding to the emergence of communicable diseases in Southeast Asia. Scholars have questioned the technical capability and commitment of ASEAN member states, stating how concerns over sovereignty, layered bureaucratic decision-making processes, and dependence on external supports impeded the region from responding effectively to pandemics (Jones and Smith, 2007; Jetschke, 2009; Lamy and Phua, 2012; Liverani, Hanvoravongchai and Coker, 2013). Sovereignty, however, has become the central reason for the lack of decisive responses. The argument that tends to be presented is that the region’s “ASEAN Way”, which entails respect for sovereignty and non-interference (Beeson, 2009; Tekunan, 2015), has made the actual regional cooperation during health emergencies slow and inadequate (Caballero-Anthony, 2008, 2018; Maier-Knapp, 2011; Amaya, Rollet and Kingah, 2015). Therefore, it was unsurprising that scholars referenced sovereignty as one of the primary factors that led to inadequate responses from ASEAN vis-à-vis COVID-19 (Bhattacharya, 2021; Rüland, 2021; Omar and Zengeni, 2022).

Here, I argue that the COVID-19 pandemic in Southeast Asia witnessed a mixture of different imperatives for practicing sovereignty. As Spandler’s study concluded, the four forms of sovereignty scripts aimed to defend different referent objects, leading some actions to take more regional collaborative measures while others to depend on the self. In assessing ASEAN’s post-pandemic policies, I affirm the relevance of the sovereignty script to avoid a “monolithic understanding [that] fails to account for ASEAN’s variegated response to the pandemic” (Spandler et al., 2024, p.604). Doing so bridges works from critical theorists on the performative aspects of conceptualizing sovereignty (Ashley, 1988; Weber, 1998; Jeffrey, 2012) and the world polity theory that defies the notion that state behaviors are self-contained (Boli, 2001; Verwej et al., 2011). It argues how states follow a pattern of rule-constrained and enabling interactions in the form of sovereignty scripts, which offer state actors “repertoires of recognized behavior from which they can choose” (Adler-Nissen, 2014; Kurki, 2008; Spandler et al., 2024, p.610).

Bridged to assess ASEAN’s post-pandemic strategies, I argue the relevance of the relational state sovereignty scripts of ‘state-relational’ and ‘people-relational.’ It is based on the argument that states aim to defend the referent object of states and peoples of the region and do so by establishing collaborative efforts due to a state’s immersion in an international environment consisting of interdependent actors (Spandler et al., 2024). Therefore, the argument is that ASEAN member states post-pandemic policies aim to establish cooperation with external actors to solidify a state’s legitimacy and provide public goods for its people (Spandler et al., 2024). A conclusion of the state apparatus and people as the referent objects to ASEAN’s post-pandemic strategy’s sovereignty scripts can be seen in Table 1 below.

Table 1 The state-relational and people-relational sovereignty scripts.
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In this piece, I intentionally sideline the relevance of Spandler’s ‘reactive’ sovereignty scripts, which consist of ‘state-reactive script’ and ‘people-reactive script’, as they do not conform to the empirical realities of Southeast Asia’s post-pandemic strategies. These categories suggest that states exhibit a reluctance to pool resources and underscore the importance of non-intervention norms as a means of preserving a state’s sovereignty (Spandler et al., 2024). As I argue in the following section, this was not the case in the Southeast Asian region, which, therefore, indicates a higher relevance of the framework’s state-relational and people-relations scripts in making sense of Southeast Asian states’ policies during a public health emergency.

Post-pandemic Southeast Asia: same imperatives for practicing sovereignty?

In contrast to the response of ASEAN member states to the regional organization’s approach in countering COVID-19 at the height of the crisis, past measures adopted during the pandemic have been enthusiastically embraced by Southeast Asian States after 2023. This came at a critical time, considering that individual ASEAN states were struggling individually on measures to counter the spread of the disease, as seen with the concerning numbers in Table 2 below. For example, one of the initiatives under the ACRF, the ASEAN Centre for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases (ACPHEED), has been acknowledged as a center that holds a pivotal role in reinforcing the long-term capacity of ASEAN in responding to health crises (JAIF, 2022). Recent engagements of ASEAN member states with similar initiatives align with the state-relational and people-relational scripts of sovereignty. ASEAN member states’ positive engagements are interpreted as means to obtain “material benefits strengthening the state apparatus” with the potential of “providing public goods” (Spandler et al., 2024, p.612). I argue in this section that the embraced collective and long-term socio-economic recovery mechanisms are ASEAN’s exit strategy from the overwhelming impacts of the pandemic. ASEAN member states’ strategic engagements in the regional organization can be seen by the collective approaches accepted by member states during Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2023, followed by Laos’ chairmanship the following year.

Table 2 COVID-19 in Southeast Asia.
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Among the unique approaches implemented by ASEAN during Indonesia’s chairmanship was the ‘One Health Initiative.’ Indonesia’s spearheading of the initiative was Jakarta’s way of expressing the importance of the interconnected nature between the environment, climate change, and human health (ASEAN, 2023). The initiative was put forward as a reflection of ASEAN’s “long-term commitments to disease surveillance and prevention”. With the COVID-19 pandemic, the initiative thus considers the threats arising from zoonotic pathogens, ultimately leading to the importance of the Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (PPPR) strategies to be adopted by ASEAN (ASEAN, 2024b). The ASEAN leaders adopted the One Health Initiative at the 42nd ASEAN Summit on May 10, 2023, and was a reflection of the ASEAN leaders’ willingness to orient the region’s policies to resilience and preventive strategies amid public health emergencies.

The introduction of the ASEAN One Health Initiative shows some consistent traits with the analytical frameworks of the sovereignty script. The state-relational script suggests that states are independent actors, seeking to engage with other actors to strengthen the state apparatus (Spandler et al., 2024). As independent actors, several of the ASEAN member states have initiated programs that are similar to those proposed under ASEAN, which signifies the converged interests of Southeast Asian states regarding a one-health framework within state borders. In Singapore, this has been observed since 2012, with the integration of a vast number of agencies into a ‘One Health Framework’ (Goh, 2024). Indonesia previously introduced a similar initiative under the name ‘SIZE Nasional’, which aims to enhance disease surveillance and responses across the state (PMK, 2021). As past studies and reports have shown, technically all of Southeast Asian states are moving towards transdisciplinary and multi-sectoral collaborative efforts in acknowledgement of the nexus between environmental, human, and animal health (Chung, 2025; Lajaunie, Morand, and Hinjoy, 2025; Lâm et al., 2025; WHO, 2025). Nevertheless, it is the recognition of the importance of strategic engagements with other actors that has defined the sovereignty script of Southeast Asian states.

Meanwhile, the people-relational script, which places a heavy emphasis on the state as part of the community of providers, can also be observed in the case of ASEAN’s One Health Initiative. In one of Indonesia’s Ministry of Health’s Director of Environmental Health’s speeches, Anas Ma’ruf stated, “Thank you for your (ASEAN member states) continued dedication to the health and prosperity of the ASEAN people, your contributions are invaluable” (BKPK, 2024b). Similarly, the governments of Singapore and Laos, on separate occasions, have emphasized the importance of collaboration and coordination among Southeast Asian states as a means to address issues that affect the ASEAN people. As a means to display Singapore’s importance in providing public goods for people within and beyond Singapore’s state boundaries, Singapore’s 2024 Health Minister praised ASEAN members by mentioning, “ASEAN’s commitment to fostering collaboration and sharing knowledge has been instrumental in addressing health challenges” (Saimson, 2024). At the 16th ASEAN Health Minister Meeting, the Laos delegation stated that despite past public health emergencies, ASEAN was able to “[…] come together to achieve remarkable outcomes collectively” (WHO, 2024).

These speeches and remarks from Southeast Asian states’ delegations indicate a unique element within the context of Southeast Asia’s sovereignty in times of public health emergencies. It shows that their national interests tend to converge, as any initiative aimed at improving the public health response and prevention measures would be met with minimal disagreements by any Southeast Asian state, and the absence of rhetoric indicating interference with state sovereignty. Consequently, in the case of ASEAN’s One Health Initiative, states would emphasize different elements to their conception of sovereignty, which would be in the form of state-relational in some instances, or display traits of the sovereignty script of people-relational.

Similarly, Southeast Asia’s decisiveness in responding to public health emergencies is evident in the establishment of the ASEAN Centre for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases (ACPHEED) in the same year as the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak (MOFA, 2025). After a series of special conferences and feasibility studies, ASEAN member states decided that Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam have the capacity to host ACPHEED (Thaiprayoon et al., 2024). The divisions of the centers were distinctively made, with Indonesia hosting the center for detection, Vietnam for prevention, and Thailand for response (MOFA, 2025). Therefore, despite the different locations of the centers, ASEAN member states agreed that the selected hosting states were based on capability and willingness (BKPK, 2024a).

Similar to the case of the ASEAN One Health Initiative, the ACPHEED also showed a unique element in the Southeast Asian states’ sovereignty script, which emphasized aspects of interdependence, strategic (regional) engagements, and provision of public goods for all of the people concerned (Southeast Asian region). The only disagreements regarding the ACPHEED occurred in 2019, during which debates arose over the hosting countries (Thaiprayoon et al., 2024). However, with the emergence of COVID-19, most of the differences were sidelined for a greater cause.

Laos’ 2024 ASEAN chairmanship sustained the trajectory set forth by Indonesia. Laos’, chose the theme of “Health: Transforming ASEAN Health Development Resilience in a New Context” for the 2024 ASEAN Health Ministers Meeting (ASEAN, 2024a, p.6). Laos’ Health Minister (Bounfeng Phoummalaysith) emphasized the importance of the regional organization in establishing greater surveillance systems to track potential threats in the public health sector. Among the initiatives agreed under Laos’ chairmanship was the October 9, 2024, ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Strengthening Regional Biosafety and Biosecurity. The declaration places the responsibility for ASEAN member states to synergize minimum biosafety and biosecurity standards among the member states and establish greater multi-stakeholder coordination (ASEAN, 2024a).

Looking into the ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Regional Biosafety and Biosecurity, several consistent traits of the state-relational and people-relational sovereignty scripts are observed. First, the adoption of the declaration demonstrated the unified voices of the Southeast Asian states, as the declaration itself would not have been adopted if any state had expressed disagreements over it. As scholars noted, “[…] ASEAN member states made a collective call for the need to ensure the provision of necessary human resources for biosafety and biosecurity in a sustainable manner” (Caballero-Anthony et al., 2025).

Meanwhile, the emphasis on the state-relational element of the sovereignty script, some Southeast Asian states have taken more advanced measures as a means to support the regional initiative. The Philippines, for example, collaborated with the US under the ASEAN Regional Forum to host workshops on biological weapon risk mitigation measures (Caballero-Anthony et al., 2025). Similarly, the Philippines assisted Laos in raising awareness and confidence-building measures related to biosecurity and biosafety, which reflects a strong element of the Philippines’ perception of the importance of providing public goods to those within the country’s state and beyond. Therefore, the different actions undertaken by state actors in the region indicate a convergence of perceptions in which states are interdependent actors, and managing public health emergencies would require collaborative and strategic engagement efforts.

During Laos’ chairmanship, ASEAN member states have shown trust to the regional organization concerning preventive measures on biosafety and biosecurity, which are elements that are detrimental to countering public health emergencies in the future. Furthermore, Laos, despite being a state riddled with foreign debt and numerous domestic challenges (Macan-Markar, 2022; Tiwari, 2024; Walker, 2024), was able to facilitate the ASEAN declaration, which speaks to how even the smaller states of ASEAN are willing and committed to a conducive post-pandemic landscape in Southeast Asia. Therefore, ASEAN during this period was perceived by their member states as bolstering state apparatuses and as a media that provided public goods for the people in the region.

Recent developments of ASEAN member states openness towards post-pandemic strategies indicate a shift in Southeast Asian states’ imperatives of practicing sovereignty. In contrast to the past, the post-pandemic Southeast Asia witnessed a shift in the sovereignty script of ASEAN states. Disagreements were minimal, as the ASEAN chairmanships of Indonesia and Laos have introduced initiatives that would allow greater regional integration and focus on long-term measures for responding to public health emergencies and outbreaks. Reluctances to pool resources and the projection of non-intervention norms have practically been absent in Southeast Asia’s post-pandemic landscape, with more cooperative modes of governance taking place in the ASEAN.

Conclusion

The practice of sovereignty in Southeast Asia shows the relevance of certain sovereignty. During COVID-19, ASEAN could not garner consistent support for collective action, as its member states prioritized bilateral means to address the life-threatening impacts of COVID-19. This comes as a puzzle, considering the pivotal role of ASEAN in establishing regional and unified approaches to counter SARS and avian influenza in the early 2000s. In this piece, I observe that similar patterns are found in the current post-pandemic landscape of Southeast Asia, in which ASEAN member states are introducing initiatives that all members have openly supported without hesitation. In understanding such a dynamic, this study argues for the relevance of the nexus between regional governance and the enactment of sovereignty in post-pandemic Southeast Asia and how the sovereignty scripts of ‘state-relational’ and ‘people-relations’ are the primary imperatives of ASEAN member states’ practicing of sovereignty.

Informed by Spandler’s 2024 study, two sovereignty scripts are identified as relevant in understanding the recent enthusiasm of ASEAN member states in cooperating in a post-pandemic landscape. First is the state-relational script, perceiving states as interdependent with other actors and undertaking strategic engagements. The second sovereignty script is the people-relational script, which argues that the state is part of a community that collectively, with other members, provides public goods for its people. ASEAN’s embraced collective and long-term socio-economic recovery mechanisms are interpreted under both those lenses.

ASEAN member states’ active engagements in shaping a post-pandemic ASEAN are seen with several initiatives taken in 2023 and 2024. Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2023 spearheaded the ‘One Health Initiative’ to express the region’s acknowledgment of the interconnected nature of diseases with elements of the environment and climate change. Meanwhile, under Laos’ chairmanship the following year, ASEAN member states ensured that initiatives were accelerated in advancing biosafety and biosecurity measures to better synergize regional efforts in anticipation of a pandemic. These cooperative mechanisms agreed by the ten member states indicate a shift in the ASEAN member states’ imperatives of practicing sovereignty, with the minimum disagreements shown among the Southeast Asian states.