Table 2 The payoff matrix for participants.
Strategy Choice | Local Government | Â | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Â | Strict collection (\(x\)) | Lax collection (\(1-x\)) | |||
Enterprise | Compliance (\(y\)) | Employee | Active engagement (\(z\)) | \(\left[\begin{array}{l}(1+\varphi )S-{C}_{GS}+{B}_{G}\\ (1+\alpha ){R}_{FC}-S\\ {R}_{E}-\varphi S-{C}_{ER}\end{array}\right]\) | \(\left[\begin{array}{l}(1+\varphi )S-{C}_{GL}\\ (1+\alpha ){R}_{FC}-S\\ {R}_{E}-\varphi S-{C}_{ER}\end{array}\right]\) |
Passive response (\(1-z\)) | \(\left[\begin{array}{l}(1+\varphi )S-{C}_{GS}+{B}_{G}\\ {R}_{FC}-S\\ {R}_{E}-\varphi S-{P}_{E}\end{array}\right]\) | \(\left[\begin{array}{l}(1+\varphi )S-{C}_{GL}\\ {R}_{FC}-S\\ {R}_{E}-\varphi S-{P}_{E}\end{array}\right]\) | |||
Evasion (\(1-y\)) | Employee | Active engagement (\(z\)) | \(\left[\begin{array}{l}(1+\varphi )\eta S-{C}_{GS}+{P}_{F}-{B}_{E}+{B}_{G}\\ {R}_{FE}-\eta S-{P}_{F}\\ \theta {R}_{E}+{B}_{E}-\varphi \eta S-{C}_{EJ}\end{array}\right]\) | \(\left[\begin{array}{l}(1+\varphi )\eta S-{C}_{GL}+{P}_{F}-{B}_{E}-{P}_{G}\\ {R}_{FE}-\eta S-{P}_{F}\\ \theta {R}_{E}+{B}_{E}-\varphi \eta S-{C}_{EJ}\end{array}\right]\) | |
Passive response (\(1-z\)) | \(\left[\begin{array}{l}(1+\varphi )\eta S-{C}_{GS}+{P}_{F}+{B}_{G}\\ {R}_{FE}-\eta S-{P}_{F}\\ \theta {R}_{E}-\varphi \eta S\end{array}\right]\) | \(\left[\begin{array}{l}(1+\varphi )\eta S-{C}_{GL}-{P}_{G}\\ {R}_{FE}-\eta S\\ \theta {R}_{E}-\varphi \eta S\end{array}\right]\) | |||
