Introduction

Academic literature fervently endorses moving first in negotiations (e.g., Gunia et al. 2013; Maaravi et al. 2023) since first offers create anchors that affect counteroffers and final closing prices (see Boothby et al. 2023; Furnham and Boo 2011). However, practitioners advocated that moving second (making the counteroffer) is more advantageous than initiating the negotiation (Maaravi et al. 2023). This discrepancy was dubbed the “Practitioner-Researcher Paradox” (Loschelder et al. 2016; Maaravi and Heller 2022).

The “Practitioner-Researcher Paradox” was uncovered by comparing empirical experimental results with descriptive research, which examines people’s behaviors and perceptions in the “real world” (Jang et al. 2018). Practice-based approaches recognize that practitioners’ knowledge is a vital complement to academic theoretical knowledge. According to this perspective, practical knowledge developed through hands-on experience is a distinct and valuable form of understanding that can help make academic theories more contextually relevant and applicable (Corradi et al. 2010). A development of this view is presented in Fig. 1. Based on practice-based approaches, it is proposed that practice-based knowledge should feed into both academic theorizing and the hypotheses constructed as a result of these theories. As these hypotheses are examined, the resulting empirical knowledge should be used for the validation or adjustment of academic theories and the education of practitioners, which in turn will enrich future practice-based knowledge (see Van de Ven and Johnson 2006).

Fig. 1
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A model of practice-based knowledge and its application to scientific inquiry.

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Some researchers examined the “Practitioner-Researcher Paradox” by incorporating practitioners’ experiential knowledge into the scientific domain. This shift has spurred new lines of inquiry, including the examination of second moves in negotiation and the responses they elicit to initial offers (Loschelder et al. 2016; Maaravi and Levy 2017; Maaravi et al. 2023). For instance, recent work by Lipp and colleagues (2023) introduced the concept of the anchor zone, defined as the space between the first and second offer. Importantly, while the second offer’s impact is weaker than that of the initial anchor, it does influence negotiation outcomes, particularly through its interaction with concession patterns, third offers, and other variables (Lipp et al. 2023).

The emerging research supporting the second-mover advantage and the more classic one, which generally advised moving first, mainly rely on quantitative laboratory experiments or class simulations. While this quantitative approach is crucial for establishing the anchoring effect, it may be limited (Boothby et al. 2023; Jang et al. 2018). The three main limitations of such research are a lack of negotiators’ experience and motivation, a lack of context, and a lack of exploration. First, most participants are students, laypeople, or online workers (e.g., Mturk workers) with little professional knowledge and experience and almost nothing at stake. Second, the laboratory negotiation experiments and simulations are often relatively short and straightforward regarding negotiators’ relationships and deal components; hence, a specific factor like making the first offer might be more significant than in more complex settings. These studies often overlook issues such as parallel negotiations, the time aspect of the negotiation, participants’ behavior in the negotiation, and its effects on future negotiations with the same person or their reputation (Jang et al., 2018). Finally, the quantitative approach studies participants’ behavior through their decisions in these experiments. It aims to explain it based on existing theories (e.g., the anchoring effect), but cannot access their decisions and reasons in real-life negotiations. As a result of these and other methodological considerations, some researchers stated that additional qualitative negotiation research is needed (Buelens et al. 2008; Jang et al. 2018).

On the other hand, the qualitative approach of the current article is important due to the early stage of this line of research. Thus, the current research examined practitioners’ preferences and reasoning regarding their negotiation opening decisions. Since the recent development in the investigation on negotiation opening decisions was brought forth by practitioners advocating moving second, we have turned to practitioners to trace the possible effects of various situational features on negotiation opening decisions and their utility. Specifically, we examined how practitioners who often negotiate as part of their jobs see the moving first vs. second dilemma under various conditions to clarify the effect of various conditions on the benefits and drawbacks of moving first vs. second in negotiations. This investigation generates a roadmap for future research to examine the possible factors that may affect negotiation opening decisions, their benefits and disadvantages.

The classic approach: the anchoring effect of first offers

Just as “the journey of a thousand miles begins with one step” (Lao Tzu), every negotiation must begin with a first offer. The first offer is the initial proposal of a possible settlement of the negotiation. Such a proposal may be quantitative or qualitative by nature and may be made by either party that aims to resolve the negotiation (Lipp et al. 2022). Indeed, the fascination with initial offers makes sense as they exist in any negotiation and affect its continuation and results (Boothby et al. 2023; Magee et al. 2007). Consequently, first offers are thoroughly discussed in the scientific literature (e.g., Lipp et al. 2022; Maaravi et al. 2011; Schaerer et al. 2016) and textbooks or popular books on negotiation (e.g., Malhotra and Bazerman 2007).

First offers in negotiations are thought to be anchors that affect perceptions and decisions made by one’s counterpart. When people do not have all the information, they often evaluate it using cognitive “shortcuts” known as heuristics (Belsky and Gilovich, 1999). One such heuristic is the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, also known as the anchoring effect. The anchoring effect is a well-documented, robust phenomenon in which people rely on a specific number they are presented with (i.e., the anchor) and use it to evaluate future information (for review, see: Furnham and Boo 2011; Lipp et al. 2022). For example, auditors from top U.S. accounting firms estimated management fraud rates. Some were initially asked whether fraud rates were over 1%, and others were asked whether fraud rates were over 20%. When evaluating actual fraud rates later, the first group estimated an average of 1.6%, while the second estimated 4.3% (Hitt et al. 2017, p 333).

The reliance on the initial information occurs even when the data is irrelevant to the decision. For instance, people’s evaluations of the number of African countries in the UN were affected by a random number they got by spinning a raffle wheel before making the evaluation (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Considering these findings, it seems almost trivial to recommend that negotiators make the first offer to receive a better counteroffer by anchoring their counterparts (Malhotra and Bazerman 2007). Interestingly, qualitative (semantic) anchors potentially have stronger effects than numerical ones, though research has predominantly focused on numeric anchors (Lipp et al. 2022).

Limitations and disadvantages of the anchoring tactic in negotiation

There is overwhelming evidence that moving first in negotiations leads to more favorable outcomes (Furnham and Boo 2011; Gunia et al. 2013; Malhotra and Bazerman 2007). However, a new line of work suggests that in certain specific contexts, second-mover advantages can emerge (Loschelder et al. 2016; Maaravi et al. 2023). We will now outline some such specific situations, not to dispute the benefits of moving first, but to provide a conceptual framework for its possible boundary conditions.

Research has shown that using first-offer anchoring might lead to several adverse results, like reduced trust and greater chances of reaching an impasse in the negotiation (Lipp et al. 2022). For example, when negotiating with a person who used the anchoring technique, counterparts’ satisfaction was reduced, and they were reluctant to negotiate with that person again (Maaravi et al. 2011). Moreover, negotiators who use the anchoring tactic (e.g., “move first, set an anchor”) may gain less money in a market setting because their negotiations take longer and reach more impasses (Maaravi et al. 2014; Schweinsberg et al. 2023). Additionally, precise (versus round offer) anchors are more effective. Nevertheless, these effective anchors deter people from entering negotiations with the person placing the anchor and expose information the anchor placer may not want to give (Lee et al. 2018; Loschelder et al. 2016). On the other hand, allowing one’s counterpart to make the first was shown to build trust and consequently may increase the odds that the counterpart will adopt a collaborative strategy (Lowenthal 1982). Due to these and other findings, negotiation scholars recently began examining the limitations and drawbacks of making the first move (Loschelder et al. 2016; Maaravi and Levy 2017; Schaerer et al. 2015).

Loschelder and colleagues (2016) proposed the “Information-Anchoring Model of First Offers” that acknowledges the advantage of first offers (i.e., anchoring) but also points to some disadvantages. When making the first offer, one may gain first mover advantage, yet one may also disclose information about their situation, their level of flexibility in the negotiation, and their view of the market (Lee et al. 2018; Loschelder et al. 2016). This may lead to adverse negotiation results if the counterpart uses a “pro-self” and not a “pro-social” strategy (Maaravi et al. 2023). According to Maaravi and Levy (2017), when one negotiator knows more about the market than the counterpart, each side may gain from moving second. When initiators are unaware of the market prices or counterparts’ knowledge, they may make sub-par offers, increasing the odds of an impasse (Maaravi and Levy 2017; Schweinsberg et al. 2023).

Power disparities also affect the utility of making the initial offer. The existence and quality of alternatives influence one’s offer and should be considered when debating making the first offer (Maaravi et al. 2023). For instance, a negotiator who was offered one million dollars for their brand by Conglomerate 1 and therefore asked Conglomerate 2 for two million dollars, knowing that Conglomerate 2 was about to offer two and a half million as their opening bid. This situation may be more plausible than it seems, as low-power sellers’ first offers (when facing low or medium-power buyers) were lower than those their counterparts would have given them (Maaravi and Heller 2022).

Finally, since negotiation is a decision-making process in which two sides make a joint decision, the counterpart’s strategy also influences the possible utility of making the initial offer. For instance, when negotiators used a soft strategy (since they had a friendly relationship with their counterparts or negotiated a low-value item), they preferred to move second. This strategy was quite apt, as if they were to make the first offers, these would be inferior to what their counterparts would have offered (Maaravi et al., 2023).

Research setting

The decision of whether (and how) to move first is of great strategic importance since it may influence the rest of the negotiation’s financial and social outcomes (Lee et al. 2018; Loschelder et al. 2016; Lowenthal 1982; Maaravi and Heller 2022). However, early negotiation decisions and interactions may be affected not just by strategic calculations but also by psychological aspects like one’s emotions and experience of power (Boothby et al. 2023; Magee et al. 2007). The discussion regarding the reasons for the discrepancy depicted in the Practitioner-Researcher Paradox was generated due to an initial examination of practitioners’ views regarding early negotiation decisions (Loschelder et al. 2016). However, much of this innovative research has been conducted in artificial lab settings using non-practitioner samples (e.g., students or MTurk workers), focusing narrowly on the utility of moving first versus second in low-stakes, highly controlled simulations. As a result, it often overlooks the rich experience of actual negotiation practitioners and the complexities they navigate in real-world contexts. A notable exception is Schweinsberg and colleagues’ (2023) paper that analyzed the results of millions of real-world eBay negotiations. However, this research focused on the communication within the negotiation and negotiations outcomes without inquiring about the participant’s motives and reasoning.

In this article, we aim to fill this lacuna by investigating the perceptions of practitioners who negotiate as part of their jobs. Our research questions are: (1) What are practitioners’ preferences regarding making the first versus the second negotiation offer? (2) How do they justify these choices across different personal, interpersonal, and situational contexts? We examine this issue using an underutilized method in negotiation research, i.e., qualitative research (Buelens et al. 2008).

We chose to use a qualitative method because we aimed to examine the reasons behind practitioners’ choices to go first or second in negotiations, rather than merely identifying their preferences. Qualitative research methods are particularly suited for exploring complex phenomena like perceptions and perceived motivations, since they allow for a detailed understanding of one’s views regarding the underlying factors influencing their behavior (McIntosh and Morse 2015). Such research allows the researcher to examine the possible constructs that practitioners view as relevant, thus allowing future research to isolate each construct and examine its unique influence using quantitative research.

Study 1A

This research examines practitioners’ perspectives regarding when to move first versus second in negotiations. Through interviews with 30 practitioners (who will be referred to as contributors), we explore practitioners’ perspectives regarding the contextual factors and situations that influence the effectiveness of making the first versus second move in real-world negotiations of Israeli negotiators. In this study, we aim to trace the personal, interpersonal, and situational features that practitioners perceive to affect their decision of moving first or second in a negotiation.

Methods

Data collection

We explored practitioners’ opening preferences in negotiation, reasoning, and views regarding moving first vs. second. For this purpose, we interviewed 49 contributors (30 Israeli contributors in Study 1a and 19 international contributors in Study 1b). We defined negotiation practitioners as businesspeople who have been negotiating daily or weekly as part of their jobs for several years. These conditions imply that they have the essential factors in striving for the best negotiation results (that is, the knowledge, skills, ability, and motivation that were long shown to be the crucial elements of human performance. See Weitz et al., 1986).

The contributors in this study were all practitioners in the field of negotiation from an extensive array of occupations, academic education, business backgrounds, and ages (Table 1). All contributors in study 1a were Israelis who spent most of their lives in Israel and whose work included business transactions predominantly in Israel. Contributors were approached via social media (Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.), the University’s mentorship program, and personal referrals. The interviews lasted, on average, 30 minutes (with a range of 15 to 45 min). All the interviews were recorded and transcribed, which yielded over 200 pages of material for analysis.

Table 1 Contributors’ Demographic Information (Study 1a).
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We conducted semi-structured interviews, allowing freedom to examine participants’ perspectives while using the existing data regarding negotiation (McIntosh and Morse 2015). This interview method allowed us to indicate the practitioners’ perceptions and experiences flexibly while simultaneously providing some focus on the target research questions (the limitations of the method will be discussed in the limitations and future directions section). The interviews were designed to allow the contributors to consider various situations and contexts that may affect their decision of moving first or second. This deliberate approach allowed us to explore the contextual factors they viewed as influencing their decision-making. Following a short self-introduction by the interviewer, contributors were first invited to share their personal and professional background and general approach to negotiation. They were then asked to state their preference regarding being the first or second to make an offer, elaborate on their reasoning, and reflect on whether (and in what ways) that preference was context-dependent. Additional questions addressed specific conditions that may affect their preference, such as power asymmetries, negotiation tone (e.g., aggressive or collaborative), and expectations for long- or short-term relationships.

All interviews were conducted electronically (via phone or zoom) by the same interviewer, except for the first interview, which was face-to-face. However, the process was reflexive as we compared observations from each interview (Denzin 2001). Each contributor was asked to note their general preference regarding negotiation opening strategy and their chosen strategies in various power dynamics and social contexts. Thus, each contributor presented several reasons beyond their general preference.

Data analysis

We constructed our interview structure and questions based on the preexisting literature on people’s preferences regarding making first versus second offers. In this research, we intended to uncover the more prominent preference for practitioners - making the first offer or moving second in a negotiation. We also aimed to examine their reasoning for making the first or second offer, as these reasons may expose some considerations that the current body of research has not yet reviewed. As we intended to investigate people’s views on a particular matter, the semi-structured interview was the most appropriate tool (McIntosh and Morse 2015).

We constructed our interview structure and questions based on the preexisting literature on people’s preferences regarding making first versus second offers (For the interview guide, see Appendix in the OSF repository). Our research aimed to examine: What are practitioners’ preferences regarding opening moves in negotiation, and how do they justify these choices across different contexts? By examining these questions, we intended to gain insight into considerations that the current body of research has not yet fully explored regarding negotiators’ tendencies to move first versus second. These considerations can also point us to issues that affect the perceived utility of moving first versus second in real-world negotiation contexts. Since we intended to examine practitioners’ views, so we determined that a semi-structured interview was the most appropriate tool (McIntosh and Morse, 2015). This approach allowed us to delve deep into the experiences and reasoning of professional negotiators, potentially uncovering nuances that may not be apparent in controlled experimental settings.

The analytical process was based on inductive thematic analysis of the data (Frith and Gleeson 2004). We used this method by examining the data and exposing the patterns within contributors’ preferences and their reasonings regarding making the first or second move in negotiations. The analytical process began with a semantic level analysis and moved towards interpretations of relevant underlying issues (Patton 1990; Kiger and Varpio 2020). We identified each contributor’s general preferences regarding moving first or second in negotiations and found that contributors had three preferences: move first, move second, and no general preference. Further semantic analysis of the justifications or reasonings given by the contributors exposed some prominent and repeating reasons regarding the choice to move first or second in a negotiation. Interestingly, while the contributors had some general preferences, which can also be described as their “rule of thumb” regarding moving first versus second, they often deviated from this preference in various situations. Many reasoning themes associated with one preference (e.g., moving first) were from both contributors with that general preference (moving first in our example) or contributors with another general preference (e.g., moving second). Therefore, while our studies 1a and 1b together included 49 contributors, each contributor provided insights about their negotiation order preferences across different scenarios, power dynamics, social situations, and cultural contexts.

Next, reasoning themes with similar attributes were gathered into categories (e.g., “Gap reduction” or “Market information”). We refer to these categories throughout the text as reasoning factors. Reasoning factors appear in Fig. 2 (in non-bold letters). The reasoning factors were then organized into clusters (that appear in Fig. 2 in bold letters). Finally, four underlying issues that stand behind the various reasons were identified. The underlying issues associated with each cluster represent a higher level of abstraction (For additional information, see supplementary materials).

Fig. 2
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Practitioners’ negotiation preferences, the clusters (in bold), and factors associated with each preference. Note, the number in brackets {} refers to the total number of contributors that mentioned the reasoning themes attributed to each factor.

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Findings

We examined contributors’ general preferences or “rules of thumb” regarding negotiation proposal-making. Our analysis revealed that 23.33% (7 contributors) preferred to move first, 43.33% (13) preferred to move second, and 33.33% (10) stated that they decided based on situational features. The contributors’ responses were coherent and logically reasoned. While most contributors (66.66%) had a clear general preference, they also maintained flexibility. Contributors often acknowledged the merits of the alternative approach in specific situations and reported that they would deviate from their general preference in unique circumstances. It is important to note that while each reasoning cluster is associated with a particular preference, these may not be the contributor’s general preference but rather describe exceptional situations where contributors would change their typical approach.

Analysis of reasonings associated with moving first

The first cluster is associated with a preference to move first (see Table 2a). It focused on using the anchoring effect to increase control over the situation. A synthetic analysis revealed that the first cluster was associated with the underlying issues of control over the negotiation and power relations. The cluster entailed two factors; both included the assumption that using the anchoring allows one to control the negotiation. The first focused on the academic support the anchoring strategy received. Carmel (all names throughout this article are aliases) stated: “At school, we learned about behavioral economics. I don’t remember the lecturer’s name, but after that, I was also in Ariely’s lectures. The whole point was that people have some reference that they stick to…”

Table 2 (a): Analysis of Reasonings Associated with Moving First. (b): Analysis of Reasonings Associated with Moving Second. (c): Analysis of Reasonings Associated with Having Changing Preferences.
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The second factor in this cluster appeared among contributors who seemed to perceive the anchor as more meaningful than just a way to affect the sums discussed in the negotiation. They construed anchoring as a power move that, as Galia stated, “set the playing field of the game”. Thus, the anchor is described as influencing the whole negotiation process and proceedings. One contributor said she would use this method when representing a low-power party to increase their control over the negotiation: “If you represent the weak (party), you may prefer to state something first, again, to try to frame the discussion” (Nina).

The second cluster (i.e., fear of counterproductive offers) was linked to the underlying issues of control over the negotiation, power relations (like the first cluster), and emotional processes. The underlying issue of emotional processes refers to how negotiators’ emotional state may affect the negotiation. These underlying issues of this cluster are apparent in the first factor, i.e., gap reduction. A practitioner named Hagai stated: “The big advantage is that I have control because I suggested the amount first, to raise to a certain bar that will be convenient for the counterpart to continue with me and close the deal. If he starts from his side and he starts from higher, then the gaps will be much more dramatic”. At another point of the interview, he added: “…if he starts from his side and he starts high, then the gaps will be much more dramatic, and he can just be offended during the negotiations, and I do not want to create a situation where he is offended by me”. In these statements, Hagai reveals that he is concerned about a large proposal gap and the negative emotions that may accompany it, believing that he can put the counterpart at ease and advance the negotiation with a proper initial offer. He feels that if he makes the first offer, he will have more power and control over the negotiation process.

The second factor in this cluster is Inflexibility. It is associated with the underlying issues of control over the negotiation and power relations. A contributor named Doron stated: “(When) I know I have very clear boundaries in negotiations, and there are cases where I want to shorten the negotiations, so I say “it is A B C D” and I definitely take the reins, and depending on the reactions I move on.” Stringent constraints (regarding time, cost, etc.’) seem to be associated with a greater need to control the negotiation since it is unlikely that a proposal by the counterpart would suit those constraints. Doron also stated that having power in a negotiation situation may lead him to be less flexible and have more precise boundaries, thus leading to this propensity to make the first offer. According to a contributor named Adi, she tends to make the first offer when feeling she has power in the negotiation and has nothing to lose (since she has other good alternatives). However, she also claims that despite this tendency, first offers are often rejected, which may sometimes make them unproductive to the negotiation.

The last reasoning factor in this cluster is counterparts’ irrationality. It is represented by Adi’s description of situations in which the counterpart may be unable to make a proper proposal. Adi said: “…the other party is someone who has not worked and has no assets …. and has no idea where to start at all. She does not even know what to ask for, so yes, I will send the first offer”. This factor is associated with the underlying issues of control over the negotiation and emotional processes since the irrationality may also stem from emotions. Hagai described a counterpart who represents another person as rational while a counterpart negotiating his own private business as emotional and irrational: “…he (a professional negotiator) does not have the strong emotionality that comes with negotiating with a private person” (Hagai).

Interestingly, some contributors (Noam and Adi) claimed that a feeling of power is associated with a tendency to make the first offer. However, making the first offer in such situations did not necessarily improve the negotiation results (according to them)Footnote 1.

Analysis of reasoning associated with moving second

Three reasoning clusters emerged from analyzing the responses of practitioners who preferred to move second (see Table 2b). The first (discounting the anchoring effect) is associated with the underlying issues of control over the negotiation and a need for information. It encompasses two factors: acknowledging anchoring and anchoring limitations. Or’s words represent the acknowledging anchoring factor, in which one recognizes the advantages of anchoring while deciding to avoid them for various reasons: “It is (moving first) a gamble; once a number is thrown into the air, I see a reference point from which to start talking. Obviously, if the number I throw will be lower, that’s better. (However) I usually prefer not to do it, not to be the first to throw”. Tali expanded on that same idea by stating that she acknowledges the value of anchoring but prefers to: “First of all, listen to the other side, you always learn more from listening” (Tali). The second factor (i.e., anchoring limitations) is led by the perception that there may be downsides to anchoring and that one may resist the anchoring effect. Noams’ statement can represent this perception: “I found that in most cases I prefer to sit back and listen and then respond, based on the perception that with patience you can go back up; I mean it is not that someone threw this thing and that is where it will be stuck” (Noam). This factor represents a perception that anchoring may lead to the illusion of control, but a counterpart may retake control over the negotiation after it is used. Additionally, the view that once you set the anchor, it also anchors you, stopping you from improving the deal further, was also present in this factor. Daria stated that she prefers the counterpart to make the first offer “…because then the other side is committed and I’m not… there’s something really frustrating about naming a number and having it accepted because you always think maybe I could have asked for more”.

The second of the three clusters associated with the preference to move second refers to practitioners’ preference to gain information from their counterparts’ first move (information seeking). This cluster is associated with the underlying issues of power relations, a need for information, and emotional processes. The first factor in this cluster was market information. One contributor stated: “…and often this (preference to move second) comes from lack of knowledge, I do not really understand what, not sure I know the specific industry properly, I need to gain knowledge, and I do not know how this industry speaks or behaves, and (then) I listen” (Pinchas). This factor is associated with the need for information and power relations, as information is seen as power by some contributors. It is mentioned that when there is low power, information gathering is of great importance. Another contributor (Hagit) also described a fear that a lack of information might lead her to make a proposal that would hurt the counterpart’s feelings (which seems to connect with the underlying issue of emotional processes).

The second factor in this cluster referred to personal information about the counterpart. A contributor said: “I study him. I learn how he expresses himself, how stressed he is, what form of discourse best suits him, and whether he is a person who smiles and uses humor. Is he a very serious person? Is he scared? Is he very ‘outgoing’? And according to that, I can also adjust my discourse attitude…” (Tali). This factor is associated with the underlying issue of emotional processes, as they study the counterpart to understand their psyche better and thus manage their relationship. Another factor in this cluster was financial information about the counterpart. It pertains to the need for information about the counterpart’s finances and financial expectations. As Adi stated: “My preference is to get (a proposal) first from the other side to see how far we are.” This factor is associated with the need for information and emotional processes due to the fear of hurting the accord with the counterpart by making a proposal that does not suit their financial expectations.

The last reasoning factor in this cluster (dubbed the reversed proposal gap) is rather intriguing. It represents the possibility that the counterpart may make a better proposal for the practitioner than the one the latter was about to make. For example: “I was willing to pay for her work much more than she asked for…She set a relatively very low sum, really low. Let’s say I was willing to pay her several times over” (Beth). Surprisingly, this reasoning was quite common and prominent among contributors. This gap results from a lack of information regarding the counterpart’s evaluation of the merchandise, market, or negotiation.

The third and last cluster associated with the general preference to make a counteroffer concerns interpersonal relations within negotiation. This cluster encompassed only one factor: shows of respect. Analysis revealed this cluster to be associated with the underlying issue of emotional processes. The Shows of respect factor refers to the perception that a positive, respectful relationship is inherently needed for a negotiation to be fruitful. One contributor supporting this view linked good faith in the negotiation with the avoidance of anchoring as a tactic: “…he (Lior’s partner) believes in anchoring, he wants to shoot the first proposal to anchor it… which has its advantage, but I think … if it is not a win-win it will not last long” (Lior). Another way to promote a positive relationship is by letting the counterpart make the initial offer as a show of respect. For example: “Often people are not ready to accept an offer, it doesn’t matter what you offer it is a no, so many times when you make them (make the) offer, it is … causing some willingness to talk” (Adi).

Analysis of reasonings associated with having changing preferences

According to some contributors, social norms or the evaluation of the situation are extremely important determining factors for making the first or second move decision. This cluster was dubbed situational features and is associated with the issue of power relations (see Table 2c).

The first factor in this cluster, i.e., social norms, the practitioners described the norms that may influence their initiation decisions. A contributor said: “Depending on the circumstances… When I’m selling, I determine, and when buying, the seller determines (the initial offer)” (Victor). The last reasoning factor in this cluster is personal evaluations. Another contributor said: “It usually depends; I mean, there are some usually more preliminary indications about how they actually see things… I think it’s pretty much fifty-fifty; it’s really a matter of feeling. If I feel I need to move things along, I’ll move them…” (Hagit). Both factors touched on power relations and their effects on the preference to move first versus second.

Some contributors spoke of specific situations in which their preferences corresponded with reasoning from the abovementioned clusters. For instance, a contributor (Ron) stated he may prefer to move second when he lacks relevant information. However, he generally prefers offers constructed together in an open discussion between the parties.

Though we found this study quite informative, the contributors were all of the same nationality. To allow better generalization of our conclusions, we conducted a similar set of interviews with international (non-Israeli) contributors. The results extrapolated from the interviews conducted among international contributors are described in Study 1b.

Study 1b

This study aimed to answer the same two primary questions as in Study 1a with international contributors from diverse geographic backgrounds. This should allow greater generalization of our answers to the research questions, i.e., what are practitioners’ preferences regarding moving first versus second? And how do they justify these choices?

Methods

Data collection

The data collection was the same as in Study 1a, with the difference that to allow for a more comprehensive examination of negotiation opening preferences among practitioners, we conducted interviews with 19 contributors from diverse geographic backgrounds (not interviewed in Study 1a). As in Study 1, the contributors were practitioners in the field of negotiation from diverse backgrounds (see Table 3). Contributors were approached via social media (Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.), a mailing list of Frankfurt School of Finance and Management graduates who took a course with one of the authors, and personal referrals. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed, resulting in over 150 pages of material for analysis.

Table 3 Contributors’ Demographic Information (Study 1b).
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Data Analysis

The analysis method was the same as in Study 1a, using semi-structured interviews and an English translation of the questions used among the Israeli sample. To avoid abundant redundancy, the analysis and findings similar to the initial study will not be repeated in the findings section. Instead, the findings section will only examine the differences between the two samples.

Findings

An examination of each contributor’s preferences reveals that 4 (21.05%) of the practitioners prefer to move first, while 5 (26.32%) prefer to move second, and 10 (52.63%) prefer to let the situational features dictate their strategy on a case-by-case basis. The low percentage of practitioners who preferred making an initial offer (like the one seen in Study 1a) may signal that the contextual factors under which it may be better to move second are seen as quite common, thus supporting the importance of thoroughly tracing and examining them.

Analysis of reasonings associated with moving first

The first two clusters (the anchoring effect and fear of counterproductive offers) are associated with preferring to move first. Interestingly, while the analysis revealed remarkably similar patterns to the ones found in Study 1a, we did uncover some differences. In study 1a, contributors referred explicitly to the academic circumstances in which they were exposed to the anchoring framework. While anchoring was mentioned by some international contributors by name (thus indicating that they learned of it), they did not refer to the academic setting in which it was introduced. This may be attributed at least partially to the anchoring effect being famous in Israel because it was studied by prominent Israeli researchers (Ariely et al. 2003; Tversky and Kahneman 1974).

Second, the “when having high power” theme was found in 10 contributors’ interviews in Study 1a and only among two contributors in Study 1b (the other themes in the fear of counterproductive offers factor were similar in Studies 1a and 1b). Finally, the counterparts’ irrationality factor that appeared in Study 1a was not apparent in the analysis of the international group of contributors. This may be attributed to a difference in social or professional norms. Additionally, in Study 1a, some contributors often negotiated emotional issues with people who may not always be experienced and, at times, be emotional (e.g., practitioners in real estate and family law). These minor differences do not change the general pattern of results. However, the underlying issue of emotional processes is not as central in Study 1b as in Study 1a.

Analysis of reasonings associated with moving second

Two of the three clusters extracted from Study 1a were similarly depicted in Study 1b. Nonetheless, some slight variations were found. These differences entailed the almost complete absence of the first cluster (discounting the anchoring effect), represented by only one contributor’s discussion of anchoring limitations: “ It’s like throwing the anchor, and then from that point, I know that whatever I want to get more than the anchor, I’ll not get it. So, I’m trying not to put the offer first” (Henry). As was stated above, one possible reason for the prominence of anchoring among the contributors of study 1a is the fame of the anchoring effect in Israel (Ariely et al. 2003; Tversky and Kahneman 1974).

The second cluster showed similar patterns in Studies 1a and 1b, except for wanting another perspective, a factor that the contributors of Study 1b did not present. Another interesting slight difference from Study 1a could be seen in the show of respect factor (interpersonal relations cluster). In Study 1a, the show of respect was expressed by allowing the counterpart to make the first move. A contributor from study 1b stated: “If I feel that I can trust the person, I can put the (first) offer” (Henry).

Analysis of reasonings associated with having changing preferences

Although in Study 1b, there were more contributors with no general preference compared to Study 1a, the reasonings associated with changing preferences were similar between the two studies and, therefore, (to avoid abundant repetition) will not be repeated here. The minor differences between Study 1a and Study 1b found in all three types of preferences (moving first, moving second, and changing preferences) do not change the general pattern of results.

Integrated analysis

We will now introduce an integrated analysis to best present the results of Studies 1a and 1b. We would first like to note that under a quarter of the 49 contributors generally preferred to move first (see Fig. 2). However, it is noteworthy that many contributors preferred to make the initial offer when they feared the counterparts’ offer might be very distant from what they were willing to settle for or when they were inflexible and unable to compromise (or perceived the counterpart as irrational).

Regarding the preference to move second, some contributors acknowledged the advantages of anchoring but stated that they still preferred to move second, some specifying the limitations of anchoring. The other issues associated with preferring to move second were the need for additional information and the need to show respect and generate good faith.

Finally, the effect of social norms on the decision to move first is unsurprising since norms greatly affect our behavior. However, assessing the situation on a case-by-case basis seems to be quite elusive, as it suggests that one’s intuition regarding the counterpart and the atmosphere in the room should dictate the decision.

Main reasoning themes

We extracted the reasoning themes that contributors mentioned first- those that were typically used to justify their general preference and were repeated more than once during the interview. We refer to these as main reasoning themes. Among contributors who preferred to move first, five main reasoning themes were identified. Eight of the eleven contributors who favored initiating the negotiation cited the anchoring effect as their primary reason. Of these, four provided explanations that aligned with the scholars’ recommended it reasoning theme, two referred to the diverse applications of anchoring (anchoring can be used in diverse ways reasoning theme), and two had reasonings consistent with the setting the playing field or framework theme. The remaining three contributors referred to the counterpart’s offer may be extreme theme (two contributors) and the allowing room for concessions theme (one contributor).

Among the eighteen contributors who preferred to move second, nine main reasoning themes were identified; these themes referred to the issues of anchoring, information seeking, and unexpected offers by the counterpart. Four of the contributors referred to the anchoring effect in their main reasoning. Two of them revealed a concern that after using anchoring, they would not be able to improve their position beyond their initial anchor (anchoring also anchors you reasoning theme), while the other two conveyed reasonings consistent with the anchoring works but the contributor prefers not to use it reasoning theme. Both cited the need to gather information from their counterparts’ proposals as the reason for their preference not to use anchoring.

Information seeking is another issue that was very prominent among the main reasoning themes of contributors that preferred to move second. One contributor suggested that they prefer the counterpart to move first since they want additional market information (lack of information about the market reasoning theme). The others revealed reasoning related to information about the counterpart, i.e., getting a sense of the counterpart reasoning theme (two contributors), knowing the counterpart’s expectations reasoning theme (two contributors), evaluating the counterpart to strategize the negotiation reasoning theme (three contributors), and learning where the counterpart stands to refrain from a large gap reasoning theme (two contributors).

The last issue that was prominent among those who preferred to move second was unexpected offers by the counterpart. Three contributors suggested main reasonings consistent with the counterpart’s starting offer may be better for you reasoning theme, while ones’ reasoning was consistent with the counterpart’s offer may be extreme reasoning theme, suggesting that they needed to know this to tread lightly.

Among the twenty contributors that stated that they have no general preference most presented main reasonings associated with their evaluations of the situation and the norms that may apply to it. Nine referred to issues associated with norms regarding buyers and sellers reasoning theme and additional two referred to norms regarding the power relations reasoning theme. Four contributors presented reasonings associated with their evaluations of the situation (two related to context evaluation reasoning theme and two to evaluating the power dynamic reasoning theme).

Some contributors that had no general preference suggested a main reasoning consistent with moving first or moving second but then suggested many qualifications to explain why this does not guide their general preference. One contributor was consistent with setting the playing field or framework reasoning theme and another with the allowing room for concessions reasoning theme. Both are generally associated with moving first. One contributor was consistent with the counterpart’s starting offer may be better for you reasoning theme and another with lack of information about the market reasoning theme. Both are generally associated with moving second.

A Conceptual Model Mapping Practitioners’ Early Negotiation Decisions

Based on our analysis of practitioners’ perspectives, we developed a model that illustrates how various reasoning clusters may influence the decision to move first or second in negotiations (see Fig. 3). The model presents a systematic decision-making flow. While the model is based on practitioners’ statements, it represents an interpretation of how these various clusters of reasonings may interact in the decision-making process. Thus, the model introduces a framework for considering the complex relations between reasonings that influence early negotiation decisions.

Fig. 3
figure 3

Beginning of negotiation decision model based on practitioners’ reasonings.

Full size image

Discussion

This research focused on practitioners’ preferences regarding making the first versus second move in negotiation and their reasoning for these preferences. Practice-based approaches view practitioners’ knowledge as a distinct understanding that enriches theoretical knowledge (Van de Ven and Johnson 2006), and past research called for descriptive observation-based research to be applied to negotiation research (Jang et al. 2018). The current research is innovative as it observes and traces the perceived decision-making patterns of professionals who negotiate in a real-world, rich, and uncontrolled environment, unlike most studies where participants negotiate in a controlled environment with simplified, unchanging situations. There is a large gap between researchers that generally recommend moving first in negotiations (except in very specific situations), and the contributors’ preferences, as less than 23% of contributors favored moving first in negotiations (Lipp et al. 2022; Maaravi et al. 2023). While some contributors may be unaware of the anchoring effect, several contributors explicitly referenced anchoring yet still preferred to move second. This suggests that there is more to these contributors’ responses than unawareness of the anchoring effect. Under certain conditions, like information asymmetry or when using a pro-social strategy, moving second can be more beneficial than moving first (Maaravi et al. 2023). Some contributors described exactly such conditions, suggesting that their choices may reflect adaptive decision-making processes rather than resistance to scientific evidence.

Some reasonings partially align with recent work by Lipp and colleagues (2023), who introduced the concept of the anchor zone, suggesting that while the second move has a smaller influence than the first, it still shapes negotiation outcomes. This framework invites scholars to move beyond isolated anchoring effects and instead consider how early moves interact and evolve over the course of a negotiation. The contributors’ emphasis on information-seeking and flexibility resonates with this more process-oriented view. However, other contributors referred to reasons for moving second that do not correspond with current research. These reasonings are of importance since they form a roadmap for future examination of whether the preference for moving second is actually advantageous in these real-world conditions; if so, how frequently such conditions arise and how can they be identified; and if not, what cognitive biases, heuristics, or situational misperceptions lead negotiators to believe that deferring the first move is the better strategy. For instance, contributors often cited information-seeking as a rationale for preferring to move second. However, it is worth considering whether the additional information from the counterparts’ first move serves less to improve negotiation outcomes and more to reduce the contributors’ sense of uncertainty.

The anchoring effect cluster presented practitioners’ preference of making the first offer due to their knowledge of anchoring and their belief that the initial proposal not only anchors a number but also the structure of the deal or its framework and allows room for concessions. This perception is consistent with past research indicating that initial offers are associated not just with the outcome sum but that the composition of initial offers influences the composition of negotiation outcomes (Lipp et al. 2023; Moran and Ritov 2002). These qualitative (semantic) anchors are under-researched due to the challenges in examining them empirically (Lipp et al. 2022). Another cluster is the fear of counterproductive offers. This cluster entailed three factors (i.e., gap reduction, inflexibility, and counterparts’ irrationality). These factors refer to situations in which there were concerns that the counterpart’s offer may be outside the practitioner’s ballpark due to its extremity, inflexibility, or the counterpart’s irrationality.

We note three clusters that are associated with the preference to move second (i.e., discounting the anchoring effect, information seeking, and interpersonal relations). Some contributors reported that anchoring may not always be as helpful as is often depicted, a view that is partially consistent with some research regarding the power of second offers in generating an anchor zone referring to the interaction between first and second offers in influencing negotiation outcomes (Lipp et al. 2023). Some contributors also proposed that a “fake anchor” could be used by describing a proposal as an example to anchor the negotiation. Past research has already begun examining a version of this issue called “phantom anchors” and found that using these anchors led to receiving more beneficial offers (Bhatia and Gunia 2018). However, the methods for generating the phantom anchors used in Bhatia and Gunia’s (2018) research differ from those proposed by our contributors.

Information seeking was a prominent cluster associated with moving second; practitioners prefer to move second and gain additional information about their counterparts. This view is consistent with findings regarding the information disadvantage of moving first (Boothby et al. 2023; Loschelder et al. 2016). Some practitioners felt it was better to move second when they wanted to build a rapport with their counterparts and show respect (interpersonal relations cluster). Finally, some contributors mentioned having changing preferences based on situational features such as social norms and personal evaluations.

We also examined the contributors’ main reasoning that were given first, typically used to justify their general preference and were repeated more than once. Among these main reasons, the anchoring effect was a dominant rationale for those who favored moving first. However, even among these respondents, interpretations varied, with some simply trusting the researchers’ recommendations, others viewing anchoring as a versatile tool, and others as a move designed to prevent extreme offers. Contributors who preferred to move second articulated a wider range of justifications, with information-seeking emerging as a particularly prominent theme. Some saw the counterparts’ initial offer as holding potential profits, as it may be unexpectedly favorable or revealing, while others feared that moving first may reduce their own flexibility later in the negotiation or that their offer may be seen as aggressive. Contributors with no general preference often cited contextual factors and negotiation norms as their main reasoning.

Emerging research directions

The factors and reasoning themes that are the basis for these factors may guide us to issues that should be further examined in future research in the field. Future research should investigate whether the tendency to move second in the conditions that were depicted by the contributors’ reasonings is widespread among negotiators beyond this specific sample. It should also be ascertained whether this preference is advantageous in practice in the situations mentioned in the contributors’ reasonings. In cases where it is not advantageous, future research should examine what cognitive biases or situational misperceptions lead negotiators to believe that moving second is the better strategy. For instance, a meaningful cluster refers to the fear of the counterparts’ offer being counterproductive. Future research should examine when counterparts’ offers are likely to be counterproductive and whether moving first does or does not lead to a more productive negotiation.

While anchoring was studied extensively, the various ways one may use a non-numeric anchor are understudied (e.g., Lipp et al. 2022; Moran and Ritov 2002). Additionally, a concern that arose regarding the use of anchoring is that you could not ask for a better offer than the anchor you proposed. Studies should examine whether that fear represents a realistic problem or an unfounded fear. Some stated that with work or awareness, the counterparty might resist the anchor, and the proposal of a “fake anchor” arose. Some research found that fake or phantom anchors can be used to improve negotiation outcomes (Bhatia and Gunia 2018). Future research should further examine the emotional implications of using “fake anchoring” (which may appear underhanded) and how it may affect people who become aware of it. Future research should examine how it is best used, for which features (numeric anchors, deal structure anchors), with what types of examples (like the negotiation or dissimilar, precise or general, real or made up), and in which types of negotiations. It should also be examined how the counterparts’ realization that a phantom anchor was used affects the negotiation.

Past research found that people’s satisfaction with the negotiation that began with the counterparts’ use of anchoring was lower, and they were reluctant to negotiate with the person again (Maaravi et al, 2014). However, the reasons for this lack of satisfaction were not examined. We propose that future studies examine the various reasons proposed by the current research as possible mechanisms for people’s dissatisfaction and reluctance to negotiate again with the same person using anchoring as a technique.

A key issue in this research is the need for information. Past research referred to knowledge gaps and their association with less favorable negotiation outcomes. For instance, following a $1 million offer for their brand by Conglomerate 1, the negotiator asked Conglomerate 2 for $2 million, not knowing that Conglomerate 2 planned to open with $2.5 million (Maaravi and Heller 2022). Future research may also benefit from examining issues associated with the benefits of making the first versus second offer when various types of information are lacking or when there are discrepancies in the available information. The need for additional information was mentioned often as a reason to make the counteroffer. Also, several types of information are mentioned (market information, financial information about the counterpart, and personal information about the counterpart). Although some of these types of information were already discussed in the literature (see Maaravi et al. 2023), future research should examine how different types of missing information may affect the utility of making the first versus second offer differently.

Another issue that should be examined in future research is the reversed proposal gap factor. According to some contributors, the occurrence in which another offer is better for you than your opening offer is common enough to be a reason to move second. Research should determine whether and in which cases such an occurrence is common and how it affects the negotiation and its outcomes. It is possible that such occurrences are not common but memorable to practitioners because they are surprising.

Finally, while cross-cultural research is common in some domains, the effects of following social norms and the possible prices of not following social norms in negotiation should be examined in various social situations and cultures. Future studies should examine the effect of cultural and organizational culture features on how people respond to initial offers. Sometimes, making an initial offer may break accepted norms and thus backfire.

Theoretical and applied significance

This research has some meaningful, practical contributions. It provides insights into how practitioners conduct negotiations, offering more realistic guidance than laboratory-based studies. It also presents a descriptive model, noting our interpretation of practitioners’ decision-making process based on their reasoning regarding moving first vs. moving second in negotiations.

This research also contributes to negotiation literature by identifying specific issues related to moving first versus second above the ones currently discussed in the literature, including the place of societal and organizational norms, the possibility of a reversed proposal gap or counterparts’ irrationality, and other issues. It also adds to the descriptive understanding of negotiations in the real world by tracing negotiators’ views regarding how they make beginning negotiation decisions. Another key theoretical contribution of this research lies in its ability to trace precise areas warranting systematic laboratory investigation. Through field-based insights, the study maps specific research pathways for understanding the impact of various information gaps, the emotional implications of anchoring techniques, and the role of norms in negotiation dynamics - domains that have yet to be thoroughly examined in existing literature.

This paper answers the call for the additional much-needed qualitative study of negotiation (Buelens et al., 2008). The importance of this approach is evident since our understanding of how practitioners conduct themselves in actual negotiations and how market negotiation is conducted seems to be lacking. Past studies examined the utility of moving first versus second in negotiations under various conditions in lab settings. However, such an examination is based on situations constructed by the researchers that may not properly represent the conditions in the field. Furthermore, much like in other areas of quantitative research in social sciences, the participants in these studies often survey companies’ workers or students (Chandler et al. 2019; Teschner and Gimpel 2018).

Some researchers find these samples sufficiently reliable (Herbst and Schwarz 2011). However, the studies using those samples, much like laboratory or in-class simulations, tend to lack the context that occurs in actual negotiations. For instance, students and survey company workers may lack both negotiation experience and motivation to better their performance in the negotiation exercise, and the studies often involve strangers or a single participant or dyad (Buelens et al., 2008; Keith, Tay and Harms, 2017; Roulin, 2015; Teschner and Gimpel, 2018), which is rarely the case in real-life negotiations. The current study addresses this gap, providing insights into real-world negotiation practices.

Methodological considerations

In this study, we outline practitioners’ views regarding their preferences for making the first versus the second offers in negotiations. Thus, we aspire to direct future research and researchers to possible avenues that may lead to recognizing specific features that yield a first versus second-mover advantage in negotiations. While much may be learned from this research, it does entail some limitations.

We used qualitative methods to examine practitioners’ perceptions, understanding that tracing their thought processes could shed new light on their initial negotiation decisions. While our samples varied considerably—from a focused study of Israeli practitioners to a highly diverse international sample—this methodological approach aligns with our qualitative research objectives. Rather than seeking statistical representativeness, we aimed to uncover rich insights into practitioners’ decision-making processes. Although limiting generalizability, this method allowed us to identify key issues for future empirical investigation. Future studies should examine these issues with quantitative representative samples across relevant cultural and organizational contexts.

Since qualitative methods are used descriptively, not to generalize or deduce causality, we cannot determine whether the contributors’ perceptions of negotiations are correct and whether their methods improve negotiation results. Additionally, while a sample size of 49 contributors is substantial for qualitative studies, it is insufficient for statistical analyses examining potential associations between participants’ professional characteristics (like years of experience, gender, or field of occupation) and their chosen reasoning themes. The final analytic structure includes six overarching clusters, which we find conceptually appropriate given the dataset’s richness. However, we identify more specific reasoning themes within each cluster to preserve the nuance in contributors’ accounts. These finer distinctions enable greater analytic depth and allow future work to build on more targeted insights. That said, the number and specificity of these themes occasionally result in a somewhat fragmented picture. This reflects the diversity in how practitioners articulate their decision-making, and we aimed to balance clarity and fidelity to the data.

Future studies employing mixed methods or purely quantitative methods using larger samples explicitly designed for statistical analysis should explore such relationships. We also cannot determine whether they are representative of the population or whether they are accurate and consistent in accounting for motives and behaviors they may not be aware of. For reasons of confidentiality and identifiability of the data, which are common concerns in qualitative research (Kaiser, 2009), we are unable to share full interview transcripts; the analyzed excerpts are provided in the supplementary material. Finally, while this research examined practitioners, it is possible that additional issues would be uncovered if additional research were conducted among practitioners with extremely high expertise, high success rates, and decades of experience.

The efficiency of the reasoning themes in affecting negotiation outcomes should be examined in the future via controlled experiments isolating and examining each of them and by researching big data on negotiations and their outcomes. In the future, the representativeness of these perceptions should be examined with broad quantitative questionnaire research of representative populations from various fields, levels of expertise, and cultural backgrounds. Interviews with extremely high expertise and experience and decades of experience may also uncover additional insights. Another interesting issue we encountered when interviewing the practitioners was the challenge of accurately measuring negotiation experience. The practitioners struggled to delineate clear boundaries between negotiation activities and other professional interactions, making quantifying their actual negotiation experience difficult. Additionally, some practitioners focused on the importance of negotiation for their role, which could be great, but the time it takes could be meager. This measurement challenge highlights the need for future research to develop more refined methods for assessing negotiation experience in professional contexts, perhaps by creating clearer operational definitions of what constitutes negotiation time or employing alternative measures of experience.

In conclusion, the importance of this research lies in examining the reported perceptions of expert practitioners’ preferences regarding making the first versus second move in negotiations. It traces the reasoning expert practitioners give to justify their preferences. This examination may be used better to understand negotiation practitioners’ reasoning and its underlying issues. However, its primary purpose is to outline issues and features that should be studied and examined when advancing our understanding of real-life negotiation processes, thus providing a crucial foundation for future research in this field.